

December 1979

**The Capability of the Puppet Regime to Launch an
Attack on the South: A Comprehensive Analysis**

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Summary:

South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Cultural Bureau reports on the current situation and information regarding the risk of a North Korea attack, North Korea's military capabilities, and the definiteness of a possible of a North Korean invasion.

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北傀의 武力南侵 可能性에 对한
綜合 分析

1979.12.

情報文化局

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I. 北傀의 最近動向(10.26 事態 以後)

1. 南北對話 再開 提議

- 11.6. 駐유엔 北傀大使 한시해, 발트하임 유엔事務總長 面談, 南北對話 問題 討議
- 11.9. 字 노동신문 社說: 南北對話 再開提議

2. 對美 直接協商 主張

- 11.21. 字 노동新聞 論評: 駐韓美軍과 核武器의 即刻撤収 및 北傀 - 美國間 平和協定締結 爲한 對美協商 및 對話 主張

3. 北傀 公館長會議 開催

- 12.5. 現在 40 個國駐在 北傀 公館長을 平壤에 召還, 公館長會議를 開催中인 것으로 把握됨.

4. 80 年 모스크바 올림픽 南北韓 單一팀 構成

會談 提議(12.20. 放送)

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◦ 80年 올림픽 南北韓 單一팀構成을 為한 會
談을 80.1.17. 平壤, 서울, 板門店中 開催
提議

5. 北傀 党 人民軍委員會 全員會議 擴大會議 開催
(12.18-21.)

- 金日成 直接 主宰
- 勞動党 中央委 軍事委員, 人民軍 黨委員會委員
및 候補委員, 人民軍 各級部隊 指揮官 및 政
治 일꾼 參加
- 金日成 演說: 人民軍隊를 政治, 軍事的으로 더
욱 強化하기 위한 指針, 綱領
- 討論, 決定 採択: 軍指揮官들과 政治 일꾼들이
討論에 參加하고 該當決定을 採択했음.

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II. 北傀의 武力挑發 · 危險性에 關한 첩보

1. 日本外務省 北東亞課長 提供 첩보 (12.22. 提供)

◦ 最近 韓半島 周辺情勢 : 美 · 中共 공히 對韓半島 關心度 弱화

- 美國은 이란問題로, 中共은 80年1月 越南에 對한 軍事行動 準備


◦ 北傀軍 12.12 事件以後 約1週前부터 一切의 訓練中止

◦ 北傀의 12.20 올림픽 單一팀 構成會談 提議는 1950年6月 南北協商을 提議하고 南侵을 敢行했던 背景과 類似함.

◦ 北傀는 上記 周辺情勢와 韓國內 12.12 事件을 決定的인 南侵機會로 誤判할 可能性 濃厚 : 今年末부터 80年1월에 結친 時期가 매우 危險한것으로 分析

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2. 駐日 中共大使館 駐在 류연재 (人民日報 特派員



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또는 軍事專門家로서 高位工作員이라고도 함) 提
供정보 (류연재 - 日本記者 - 亜細亞 親善交流協會
이부끼 事務局長 - 駐日 김병연 參事官 確認)
(12.14. 頃)

- 北傀는 南侵을 為한 對内外 環境이 北傀에
有利하게 造成되었다고 보고, 南侵計劃 時期를
80 年 가을로부터 앞당기고자 하고있음.
- 北傀의 南侵意慾을 中共도 억누를수 없는 狀
態임.
- 中共은 北傀의 이러한 움직임을 美國에 이미
알려 美國은 駐韓美軍撤収를 中止하였으나, 戰
争에 直接 介入을 願치 않는 美國内 輿論의
움직임을 볼때 美國으로서도 손을 쓸수없는
狀態임.
- 北傀의 南侵時期가 80 年 가을에서 앞당겨
진것은 10.26 事件 때문임.
- 民主化運動과 經濟混亂의 渦中을 利用, 80 年
2月頃부터 特殊部隊의 게릴라를 投入하고
容易한 時期에 全面攻擊 開始

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3. 美国의 U.S. News & World Report 誌

12.24. 字 特輯記事 “80 年の 展望”

- 카터大統領이 80 년에 맞게 될 가장 가혹한 시련의 하나는 亞細亞일것임. - 카터大統領은 来年の 亞細亞問題 対処方案을 慎重히 檢討해야 함.
- 亞細亞는 美, 蘇, 中共의 힘의 角逐場
亞細亞人들은 우라디보스독으로부터 印度洋, 아프리카니스탄과 베트남에 이르는 蘇聯의 軍事力 增強에 카터大統領이 어떻게 対処하는지를 注視

4. 美国의 軍事問題 專門誌 Defence Monitor 誌

年末特輯記事 “戰爭狀態의 世界”

- 亞細亞에서 ^{아시아} 韓半島의 紛争과 中共·越南間의 休戰狀態가 80 年代에 美国과 蘇聯이 衝突할 수 있는 가장 큰 潛在性을 지니고 있음.
- 韓國戰이 결코 公式的으로 끝난것이 아니며

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武力衝突의 危險은 여전히 남아 있음.

- 北傀南侵의 1次的 形態는 韓國에 對한 間接 上陸 및 休戰地帶에서의 땅굴파기 試圖이며 北傀軍이 南侵을 敢行할時 美軍에 對한 攻擊을 隨伴할것임.

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III. 北傀의 武力南侵 可能性에 對한 綜合分析

1. 北傀의 武力南侵 可能性에 對한 肯定的 要因 가. 國際情勢

1) 美國의 汎世界的 指導力弱화 및 危機對 처 意志力 喪失

- 75年 越南戰 敗退로부터 現在의 이
란事態에 이르기까지 美國의 汎世界的
指導力이 顯著히 弱화되었으며 國際危
機에 對처할 意志力 喪失

2) 蘇聯의 相對的 地位強化

- 쿠바軍 代理戰爭에 依한 아프리카地域
및 예멘 等에서의 軍事 戰略的 要衝
確保

- 印度支那 및 아프가니스탄의 親蘇勢力
化等 亞細亞에서의 影響力增大와 地位
強化

- 亞細亞 및 印度洋等에서의 海軍力強化

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3) 美·蘇의 歐羅巴 優先政策

- 美国의 西歐에 對한 “퍼싱” II 및 “크루즈” 미사일 配置計劃 沮止 내지 遲延戰略의 一環으로 蘇聯은 美国이 直接 介入하는 韓國戰等 他地域에서의 局地戰 誘發 支持可能

4) 유엔의 集團的 安全保障機構로서의 機能

마비 내지 喪失

- 第 30 次 總會, 韓國問題와 關聯 矛盾 되는 西方側과 共產側의 兩 決議案 同時通過
- 유엔 安保理事會의 캄보디아로부터의 모든 外國軍 撤収決議 및 이란의 美國人質釋放 決議採択과 그 履行能力의 歛如
- 韓半島問題와 關聯한 蘇聯의 拒否權 行使 - 1950 年 韓國戰當時와 같은 유엔軍 派遣決議 期待 至難

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✓ 5) 美 - 蘇間 直接 對決 없는 局地戰 可能

- 越南戰

- 베트남의 캄보디아 侵攻, 中共의 베트남 侵攻

다. 韓半島 周辺情勢

◦ 美國과 蘇聯의 利害得失

1) 周辺 強大國關係 現況:

- 美·中共 및 日·中共關係 發展에 따른 美·日·中共 3國의 對蘇 牽制勢力 形成에 對하여 蘇聯은 不安하고 美國은 相對的으로 有利한 立場

- 北傀의 對 中共·蘇聯 等距離 獨自 路線追求에 對하여도 蘇聯은 不滿

蘇聯의 北傀 武力南侵 積極支援 境遇:

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(1) 中共의 对北傀 支援을 위요하고
美 - 中共間 및 日 - 中共間 離間이
造成되고,

(2) 美, 日을 意識한 中共의 对北傀
消極的 支援은 中共 - 北傀間的 離
間을 가져오며,

(3) 蘇聯의 对北傀 積極支援이 成功할
境遇 中共 周邉에 또하나의 反中
共, 親蘇 勢力을 形成하는 一石三
鳥의 効果와 利益을 蘇聯이 얻을
수 있음.

2) 蘇聯은 直接戰爭에 介入하지 않는 方法
으로 北傀支援이 可能하나, 美国은 軍隊
를 增派, 直接 戰爭에 介入하여야 하는
보다 큰 負擔을 안게 됨.

3) 美国의 韓國戰 參戰에는 選舉를 앞둔
美政府에 輿論의 壓力等 国内的 負擔이
加重됨.

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다. 韓半島 内部狀況

1) 北傀 内部狀況

- 金日成의 神格化 独裁体制維持에 武力統一
緊要

◦ 金日成, 武力統一 主唱下에 30年間 独
裁体制 지탱

◦ 10.26. 我國事態에 關聯

· 金日成 自身도 不安

· 武力統一 絶好의 機會로 判斷可能

◦ 金日成 生存時 統一不成就 境遇, 金正一
後繼体制 構築疑問視

2) 北傀의 軍事力 優位

- 現 時点에서 北傀의 軍事力이 優勢하나,
時間이 흐름에 따라 北傀의 對我國 優位
性 減退를 認識

3) 南北經濟力 隔差

- 現 時点에서 我國의 經濟力이 北傀보다
優勢하며, 時間이 흐름에 따라 優勢한 經

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濟力隔差가 深化될 것을 認識

4) 我國의 内部狀況

- 10.26 事態, 12.12 事件, 政治過渡期 및 80年度에 予想되는 石油難, 貿易低調, 인프레等 經濟混亂 時期를 絶好의 機會로 判断 可能


2. 北傀의 武力南侵 可能性에 对한 否定的 要因

1) 駐韓美軍의 存在와 美国의 自動參戰 裝置

2) 蘇聯의 对北傀 積極支援 疑問視

- 蘇聯은 北傀의 赤化統一實現 成功与否에 对하여, 美国의 積極介入을 想定할 境遇, 確信할수 없는 立場임.
- 北傀의 南侵成功時에도 自國勢力化 疑問과 日本의 核武装等 軍國化의 利害得失을 比較 選擇하여야함.

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- 3) 美国의 積極介入에 對備한 中共의 參戰(1950年 戰爭時와 같은) 期待 ^{難望} _{不可}
- 4) 美, 日, 中共等 週辺三國의 韓半島 現狀固定 支持
- 5) 蘇聯의 對北傀 積極支援 沮止를 為한 美, 中 共 및 西歐의 對蘇 對應戰略에 對한 蘇聯의 不安
 - 美·蘇直接衝突 내지 第三次 世界大戰 擴戰 可能性 不排除
- 6) 北傀의 侵略者로서의 世界的 非難과 糾彈 甘受

1980. 8. 30 에 해군부에 의거 일반문서로 파급하

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이런것: 80-6-30 이반 문서로 재현

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The Capability of the Puppet Regime to Launch an Attack on the South:
A Comprehensive Analysis

1979.12

Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Cultural Bureau

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I. Leading Trends in the Puppet Regime

II. Information Regarding the Risk of an Armed Provocation from the Puppet Regime

III. Comprehensive Analysis of the Puppet Regime's Capability of a Military Attack
Against the South

1. Regarding the definiteness of the possibility of a military attack against the South

Factors:

- The International Situation
- The circumstances of the area surrounding the Korean Peninsula
- The situation inside the Korean Peninsula

2. Negative factors regarding the possibilities of a military attack on the South by the
Puppet Regime

I. Leading Trends in the Puppet Regime (Following the State of Affairs of 10.26)

1. Opinion regarding the restart of dialogue between the South and North:

- On 11.6 UN Secretary General Waldheim had a face to face meeting with the North's
Ambassador to the UN Han Si-hae and discussed the issue of North-South talks;
- On 11.9 the Rodong Sinmun's leading story was that talks would restart between
the North and South.

2. The US perspective on direct talks:

- 11.21: The Rodong Sinmun ran a critical article calling for the immediate withdrawal
of the US Armed Forces in Korea and (their) nuclear weapons, and for the purpose of
concluding peace talks between the Puppet Regime and the US, negotiations and
dialogue.

3. The Puppet Regime's diplomatic attaché hosts a conference:

- As of 12.5, 40 attaches have been recalled from their overseas residences to
Pyongyang, and we understand that a meeting is currently in progress.

4. It is being proposed that the North and South have a combined team at the 1980
Moscow Olympics (12.20 broadcast):

- It is proposed that for the purpose of discussing a single North-South team for the 1980 Olympics, discussions be held between Pyongyang and Seoul at Panmunjom on January 17 1980.

5. The Party of the Puppet Regime held a plenary session of the Korean People's Army (KPA) Committee (12.18-21):

- Kim Il Sung presided over the meeting directly;

- The Worker's Party Central Committee, the Military Committee, the Head of the KPA Party, committee candidates, the commanding officers from each rank of the KPA, and government workers attended;

- Kim Il Sung's speech: doctrine and guidelines for strengthening the KPA politically and militarily;

- Debate and adopted decisions: The decision to have army commanders and government workers attend debates and participate in related decision making has been adopted.

II. Information regarding the Risk of an Armed Attack from the Puppet Regime

1. Intelligence provided by the head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Northeast Asian Affairs Division (provided on 12. 22):

- The most recent circumstances on the Korean Peninsula: both the US and China are losing interest in the Korean Peninsula:

- The US because of Iran, China is preparing for military operations in Vietnam to commence January 1980.

- The Puppet Regime, following the situation of 12.12, stopped all military training exercises approximately one week ago;

- The Puppet Regime's suggestion to have a meeting on 12. 20 to discuss the creation of a North-South Olympic team bears a strong similarity to the proposal for talks in June of 1950 that preceded the invasion subsequently carried out against the South;

- There is a strong possibility of the Puppet Regime misjudging the surrounding circumstances described above and the incident within South Korea on December 12 as providing a decisive opportunity to invade the South: We believe that the period of time between the end of this year and January 1980 will be dangerous.

2. The resident attaché at the Chinese Embassy, Ryu Yeon-jae [sic] (correspondent for the People's Daily and also, due to expertise in military operations, a very high-ranking spy) supplied this intelligence (Ryu Yeon Chae- Japanese reporter- Asian Friendship Society Secretary General Ibukki - resident attache counselor Kim Byeong Yeon confirmed) (Approx. 12. 14):

- The Puppet Regime reports that it is fostering the international and domestic environment to its advantage for the purpose of launching an invasion of the South, and that they are advancing the time of the planned invasion to autumn of 1980.

- China cannot control the Puppet Regime's desire to invade the South;

- China has already alerted the US to the Puppet Regime's movements and the US has stopped the evacuation of US Forces stationed in Korea, however: when looking at the movements of the American public, who do not wish to directly intervene in the case of war, even the US cannot take any measures;

- The Puppet Regime has moved the time of the invasion forward to autumn of 1980 due to the 10. 26 incident:

- Taking advantage of the democracy movement and economic difficulties, in approximately February 1980 special army guerrilla forces will begin to enter the South and it will be an easy time to begin an all-out attack.

3. America's U.S. News & World Report 12.24 edition feature story: "Outlook for 1980":

- One of President Carter's greatest challenges he will face in 1980 is Asia- we must carefully examine President Carter's Asian relations plan next year;

- Asia is an arena of competition between the US, the Soviet Union, and China. Asians must monitor how President Carter will handle the strengthening of the Soviet Union's military power from Vladivostok to the Indian Ocean, Afghanistan, and Vietnam.

4. The US publication Defence Monitor, which is a publication focused on military issues, published an end-of-year special feature titled "The World in a State of War":

- In Asia, the conflict on the Korean peninsula and the armistice between China and Vietnam remain the largest potential latent areas for a conflict of interest between the US and the Soviet Union;

- The Korean war has not officially ended and the danger of an armed conflict always remains;

- The first time the Puppet Regime invades the South, they will try to land spies against the South (in the South) and destroy tunnels in the armistice region. When the Puppet Regime invades the South, they will also attack the US.

III. A Comprehensive Analysis regarding the Capabilities of the Puppet Regime to Launch an Armed Invasion of the South

1. Positive factors regarding the capabilities of the Puppet Regime to launch an armed invasion of the South:

a. The international situation:

1) The US ability to lead in the global arena is weakening and there is a loss of willpower to do crisis management;

- From the time of the US defeat in Vietnam in 75 until now, there has been a noticeable weakening of US global leadership and a loss of willingness to handle international crises;

2) The relative strengthening of the Soviet position:

- Through the Cuban military proxy war, the African region, Yemen, etc. the Soviets have been expanding their strategic positions;

- The expansion of relative influence into Indochina, Afghanistan, and others is increasing influence in Asia and strengthening leadership;

- Strengthening of military power in Asia and the Indian Ocean.

3) US, Soviet policy focus on Europe:

- The Soviet Union's blockade of US deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles to the West (Europe) is part of a delaying tactic and may induce support for limited American direct intervention in a Korean war.

4) Increasing paralysis of the UN's function as a collective peacekeeping organization:

- At the 30th opening session, two contradictory resolutions on the Korean problem passed the Western bloc and the Communist bloc simultaneously;

- The UN Security Council lacks the ability to enforce the resolutions it adopted to withdraw all foreign troops from Cambodia and get the American hostages released;

- The Soviet Union's exercise of veto power regarding the problem of the Korean peninsula makes it difficult to expect a resolution similar to the one in 1950 to dispatch UN troops.

5) The possibility of the US and the Soviet Union to engage in limited warfare without fighting:

- The Vietnam War;

- Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, China's invasion of Vietnam.

b. The situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula:

- The pros and cons of the Americans and the Soviets:

1) The current relations of the surrounding superpowers:

- In accordance with the way US-Chinese relations and Japanese-Chinese relations develop, the Soviet Union is nervous about the formation of the counterbalance of the three countries of US, Japan, and China to its own power, and we believe the US has a relative advantage;

- Although the Puppet Regime is pursuing individual and equidistant lines with China and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union is dissatisfied;

- In the event that the Soviet Union actively supports a Northern invasion of the South by the Puppet Regime:

(1) China will increase its support of the Puppet Regime which will create difficulties in US-China and Japan-China relations;

(2) China's consciousness of the US and Japan as it provides passive support to the Puppet Regime causes difficulties in relations between China and the Puppet Regime;

(3) In the event that the Soviet Union's active support of the Puppet Regime is successful, countries surrounding China will once again oppose China, and the Soviet Union will be able to gain an advantage, killing two birds with one stone as China makes efforts to form friendly relations with them/

2) The Soviet Union can avoid directly intervening in the war by actively supporting the Puppet Regime, but the US will have to embrace a larger burden by dispatching troops and directly intervening in the war.

3) The domestic pressure of public opinion on the United States government, which has an election coming up, will add to the burden of US participation in a Korean war.

c. The internal situation of the Korean Peninsula:

1) The internal situation of the Puppet Regime

- Reunification by force is vital to the continuation of Kim Il Sung's deification and the autocratic system:

- Kim Il Sung has maintained his dictatorship for 30 years under the promise of forceful reunification;

- Regarding the situation on 10.26 in this country:

- Kim Il Sung is unsure of himself;

- He may see forceful reunification as a golden opportunity.

- If reunification is not achieved under Kim Il Sung, there is doubt that Kim Jong Il will be able to build a system as the successor.

2) The superiority of the Puppet Regime's military capabilities:

- At the current time the Puppet Regime has superior military force, but as time goes on the Puppet Regime's capabilities might weaken in comparison to our own.

3) The economic gap with the South:

- At the current time our country has a superior economy compared to that of the Puppet Regime, and as time goes on we recognize that the gap between our economies may widen.

4) Our internal situation:

- It is possible that with the situation on 10. 26, the incident on 12. 12, the government transition period and the anticipated difficulties with oil in 1980, low trade volume, inflation and other economic difficulties, this time may be viewed as a golden opportunity.

2. Negative factors regarding the capability of the Puppet Regime to launch a military invasion of the South:

1) The existence of the US Armed Forces in Korea and the automatic entry of the US into a war;

2) Doubts regarding the Soviet Union's active support of the Puppet Regime:

- The Soviet Union cannot be certain whether or not in reality a forceful attempt at reunification by the Puppet Regime will succeed if the US actively intervenes;

- The Puppet Regime, even at the time it militarily invades the South, must choose to weigh the gains and loss of questions about its own influence and of Japan's nuclear armament and militarization.

3) In the event of direct US intervention it is difficult to expect that China will intervene in response (as it did in during the war in 1950);

4) America, Japan, and China, the three countries surrounding the Korean peninsula, all support the current status quo;

5) The Soviet Union is uncertain due to the strategic countermeasures of the US, China, and the Western bloc against the Soviets aimed towards stopping the active Soviet support of the Puppet Regime:

- If the US and the Soviet Union clash directly we cannot exclude the possibility that it may erupt into World War III.

6) As the invader the Puppet Regime will receive the world's condemnation and denunciation.