

**November 7, 1957**

**Letter No. 60 from Tai Ha Yiu [Yu Tae-ha] of the  
Korean Mission in Japan to President Syngman Rhee**

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**Summary:**

Yu briefs President Rhee on a meeting with Kazuo Yatsugi regarding Kishi and Fujiyama's stance on the Korea-Japan proposal draft issue.

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA

KOREAN MISSION IN JAPAN

Tokyo, November 7, 1957

No. 58

TO : His Excellency  
The President

FROM : Tai Ha Yiu

SUBJECT : Meeting with Kazuo Yatsugi

I met Yatsugi in the evening of the 6th and had a long and serious exchange of views with him. I thought it would be to our best interest to meet people like Yatsugi and others who previously took interest in the settlement of our problems before meeting the officials of the administrative level in the Jap Foreign Ministry.

Yatsugi went to Taipei the first part of October to attend the Double Tenth celebrations. After his return, he said, he met Kishi and Fujiyama and found them determined to resume the preliminary talks and come to agreement on the various issues. Fujiyama recently returned from attending the UN General Assembly session but due to a slight illness, has not been active although Yatsugi said he managed to see him and the Prime Minister several times.

According to Yatsugi, Kishi and Fujiyama fully realize that the Korean side will not accept the terms of the draft agreed minutes drawn up last June 13. The Foreign Minister told Yatsugi that with the talks arrived at this difficult stage, he (Yatsugi) in his private position, should draw up a plan that would be acceptable to both sides. Yatsugi said he replied that he was not in a position to do such a thing but that all matters be discussed with me after my return.

Kishi and Fujiyama are still anxious to settle the problems as early as possible, he said, however, the political situation makes it impossible for the two men to accept the Korean amendment proposal. The administrative level in the Foreign Ministry, not to speak of the Finance Ministry and certain members in the Liberal-Democratic party, are definitely against it. Such being the case, Yatsugi's suggestion was that some plan should be drawn up that would prove face-saving and acceptable to both sides.

Kishi's political position has weakened considerably since the last month. His nationwide stumping tour did not help him in the least. The public's opinion of Kishi is that although he is capable of settling administrative matters, he has no foresight or caliber to solve political problems to his benefit. As a means of remedying this shameful situation, Kishi's advisors are advising him to abandon the idea of a Southeast Asian tour for the time being and make up his mind to dissolve the Diet at the end of the month. Yatsugi said he was not adverse to the idea, but Kishi himself has no confidence that it would be the best course. Study shows, according to Yatsugi, that a dissolution and eventual election will reduce the Liberal-Democratic seats by 30 or 40 with the socialists gaining that many. Presuming that the loss of 30 to 40 seats would not bring serious disaster to the L-D party, there is no visible hope that this would strengthen the Kishi group.

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Ishibashi is said to be completely recovered from his illness and Miki Takeo, former secretary-general of the party is waiting for an opportunity to bring him back to power. Ikeda Hayato, although of the same party is in open clash with Kishi. In view of all these conflicts, it can be concluded, Yatsugi said, that the dissolution of the Diet would strengthen the Ishibashi and Ikeda groups rather than Kishi's. Kishi is in a position where it may not be possible for him to prolong his government as well as his own position and by latest next March he will have to make up his mind whether or not to dissolve the Diet. At the present time, he is in a big dilemma.

With regard to Kishi's Southeast Asian tour, since he is determined not to dissolve the Diet at present, the date for his departure has been set for November 18. However, Yatsugi foresees no outstanding results.

After hearing what Yatsugi had to say, I told him of my recent visit to Korea, which although for purely personal reasons, some discussion on official problems took place. I told him that from my talks with the various leaders of government and other fields, I found that all were strongly against backing away from our original stand. If Japan is really sincere, I said, it must accept our amendment proposal or any one of the many personal suggestions I made on several occasions. If that is not done, there can be no solution. If the Japanese side continues to drag on, the time will come when it may be too late even if the Japanese decide to accept our amendment proposal. The Japanese side must therefore give us its answer now, I said.

Yatsugi's reply was to call for another meeting after he has carefully studied what I had said to him. He suggested a meeting next Tuesday (12th) with me and the ambassador together with Ishii, Itagaki, Tanaka and Funada so that the two groups could discuss and study means of settling the problems. Fujiyama being indisposed, will not be able to attend. The extraordinary Diet session will adjourn on the 12th and Yatsugi's suggestion was that we meet in the evening of that day. I agreed to the meeting but told him to arrive at some definite decision before coming to the meeting. Yatsugi's opinion was that the upper level should first take up the problems before turning them over to the administrative level so as to keep the details away from the newspapers.

After giving deep thought to what Yatsugi said, I came to the conclusion that our amendment proposal made last summer will not be accepted by Japan. The Japs also know that the Korean side will never accept the original draft agreements drawn up on June 13. If everything should fail, I shall bring up the amendment proposal I brought with me and get the Japs to accept the term "and it does not substantially impair Korean claims". The new term is not as strong as the previous one but it still is favorable to us. However, I did not take it up with Yatsugi as I felt that the present was not the right time. I shall continue to push for acceptance of our previous amendment proposal on the property claims. Even if we should go into formal discussions, it would be to our benefit to have our proposal inserted in the agreed minutes with the results to be left to the future. We will then have something from the Japs in writing. The final stage has arrived and this is an opportunity for me to repay what I owe to His Excellency and with whatever that is in my power I shall see to it that the problems are settled in our favor.

After we had got through discussing our problems, Yatsugi gave me an outline of his visit to Taipei and of his impressions. Yatsugi found Taipei much improved in many ways. What impressed him most was that the often repeated threats of invading the China mainland by the Taipei

government were not mere gestures as he had thought but a genuine determination of the Chiang government. He met the Generalissimo and other leaders of the government and found that 18 Japanese generals all in the 2, 3, 4 star category were playing an important role in training and shaping the Chinese army. He learned from these Japanese military advisors that the soldiers in training under them were former soldiers from the mainland and young Formosans who were making rapid progress. A joint maneuver of those trained under Japanese advisors and those under the U.S. advisors was recently carried out and it was discovered that those who had received their training from the former were far better than those who got theirs from the U.S. military. The Nationalist government, according to these Japanese officers, is well satisfied with their work much to the consternation of the U.S. authorities. The Chinese government feels that in attacking the mainland, knowledge of Japanese tactics would serve the best purpose. According to these military advisors, if the 500,000 man army of the Republic of China were to launch an attack on the mainland, it could manage to occupy such provinces as Kwangtung and Fukien. The Chinese will not stop to consider the consequences such occupation would have--that of bringing about a third world war. There were at one time 36 Japanese officers hired by the Chinese government to train the Chinese army but at the opposition of the U.S. authorities, only 18 of them are permanently employed by Nationalist China.

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1 CC  
Nov. 10. 57  
cc  
Gen. Van Fleet  
Feb. 10.

Yatsugi's information leads me to conclude that Japan favors a war between the two Chinas so that in case a third world war should break out, she would benefit from it.

When I asked Yatsugi if friction between Fujiyama and Ohno does exist, he answered in the affirmative, adding that he had advised the foreign minister to send Ohno abroad. He also verified the report I received regarding the Vietnam reparations except on the nature of the \$200 million "quasi reparations" which was quite different from Fujita's.

*Yui Kaji*