

November 20, 1970

**Letter from Director of the Bureau of International
Scientific and Technological Affairs Herman Pollack
to Miller N. Hudson, Jr. at the US Embassy in Rio De
Janeiro**

Citation:

"Letter from Director of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs Herman Pollack to Miller N. Hudson, Jr. at the US Embassy in Rio De Janeiro", November 20, 1970, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Record Group 59. Department of State Records. Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs. Office of Atomic Energy Affairs. Subject Files, 1962-1974. Box 20, 1971 Brazil AE
<https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/145013>

Summary:

Miller thanks Pollack for his letter (attached) with historical background on Brazil's interest in developing nuclear weapons.

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

Return to AE

(F)

Brazil

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 21 1970

Miller N. Hudson, Jr., Esquire
Scientific Attache
American Embassy
Rio de Janeiro

Dear Miller:

I found your letter of November 6 a fascinating bit of historical background on Brazilian preoccupation with nuclear explosives. I have turned over to Don Zook the delicate question as to whether or not the contents of the letter should be conveyed to AEC. I am sure he will bear fully in mind your caution on this point.

All the best,

Sincerely,
/s/ HPM

Herman Pollack
Director

cc: Dr. Rouleau

Clearance: SCI/AE - Don Zook

SCI/AE:JPTrevick:ws 11/20/70

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11/20/70

Wilma/Mr. Zook

Ref: Miller Hudson's 11/6/70
letter to Mr. Pollack on
conversation w/F. Buarque

Mr. Pollack noted on original of the
letter

"DZ -- Please have someone do up
acknowledgment for me."

a

Secret / Noform

EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Original Scan
~~(action VES)~~
HP
action
DGE
Please have
someone do up
ackn. for me.
11/9

November 6, 1970

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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Herman Pollack, Esquire
Director
Bureau of International Scientific
and Technological Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Herman:

Today's lunch was a most informative one and not without possible implications for the future. As you know, Fernando Buarque and I have been personal friends since Vienna, so today was something of a personal despedida lunch--just the two of us, tucked away in a little German restaurant here in Rio. Fernando is being transferred to Berlin as Consul there. After three martinis, a bottle of wine, and cognac (as Jack Rouleau can tell you, Fernando has quite a capacity), we began reminiscing about our past relationships.

We have all known for a long time that there exists within the Brazilian Government at least one and possibly more secret policy papers on atomic energy. Fernando finally unlimbered and gave me a picture of the contents and some of the potential implications of both past and present policy documents.

Apparently the original policy document was written just after Admiral Cunha was forced out of office and Damy

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Souza Santos assumed the position of President of the Brazilian Atomic Energy Commission. Buarque said that he received "Top Secret" instructions while he was in Vienna that he was to remain as quiet as possible on the various U.S. positions vis-a-vis safeguards, and that under no circumstances was he to cast any votes or make any speeches which would preclude or adversely affect Brazil's right to pursue a nuclear device program. Buarque said that his instructions had said "because we are actively engaged in the necessary preparations and preliminary research which will permit Brazil to embark on a nuclear device program in the near future should that be desirable." It was at that time, according to Buarque, that he became close friends with Damy Souza Santos. It was also in that same period that the Atomic Energy Commission conducted its first safeguards inspection in Brazil. According to Buarque, Damy told him to be careful in his relations with "Miller Hudson, because he knows what we are up to." Apparently, this was based on the first inspection of Brazil in which I participated. Damy apparently gave me credit for more insight than was justified at the time, because it was not until much later, as you can tell from the inspection reports, that we came to suspect Damy of attempting to emulate the path which we suspected India and Israel were embarked upon. Actually, the first time that I realized the full extent of Damy's attempts to put Brazil in a position to move in this direction, was when I came down here as Science Attaché. You will recall I sent a rather long airgram reporting on the implications of what I saw (Rio's A-792 of 5/23/68). Briefly, and not to prolong this letter unduly, Buarque essentially confirmed virtually all of the points made in that analysis.

The new element in the picture is that he indicated that it was the visit of Chairman Seaborg to Brazil which essentially froze the Brazilian position with respect to the NPT Treaty. Although he was extremely loquacious,

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and even though I come from New Mexico, I must confess that Latin logic sometimes leaves me adrift. The gist of what he said was that the hard line elements in the Brazilian Government were and continue to be in favor of continuing Damy's efforts. The more rational "Castelistas" were not and are not. Fortunately for all of us, it was the latter who won out as far as operational activities in Brazil are concerned, and according to him that remains the official operational policy to this day. On the other hand, Seaborg's visit was interpreted by hard line elements as an attempt to pressure Brazil into signing the NPT by offering "goodies" and implicitly threatening to withhold cooperation if Brazil did not sign. It then became a matter of national pride not to sign the agreement. According to Buarque, this played right into the hands of the former Foreign Minister, Magalhães Pinto, because he saw in such a position a domestic political advantage. Ergo, Brazil's adamant refusal to become a signatory to the NPT Treaty and present policy guidance from the highest level is to preserve Brazil's options.

As you know, Buarque has suffered some professional reverses lately, partly because of his mixed-up personal life, partly because of Bittencourt's enmity, and partly because during this current posting here in Brazil, he has acted something like a maverick in attempting to get things done in science and technology, even when this meant challenging strong personalities like Rademaker, who is now Vice President. I suspect that his personal bitterness about not being promoted recently may have led him to confide the above points to me. I have no reason, however, to believe that this obvious indiscretion on his part is not essentially correct. It simply fits too well with the facts we know.

I see no basis for us to be immediately worried about the situation as outlined above. It is something, however, which is clearly latent within certain elements of the Brazil picture, and therefore as the future unfolds, I

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think we must all be very careful to keep an eye on any developments which might lead to a situation which would again encourage "adventures" like Damy envisioned.

I have no objection to your making this information available to AEC if you feel it is desirable to do so. I have not told Bob Wilcox, however, as I did not want to hurt his feelings or have him think I was butting into his business. As you know, because of my long satisfactory experience with AEC before actually joining you, I perhaps tend to lean over backwards not to give an appearance of wanting to meddle unnecessarily in their business.

Sincerely yours,



Miller N. Hudson, Jr.
Scientific Attaché

cc Bob Dean ARA/LA/BR
AMB
DEM
POL
POL/R

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