

December 21, 1981

**Central Intelligence Agency, 'Background to Present
Situation in Poland and Possible Soviet Role'**

Citation:

"Central Intelligence Agency, 'Background to Present Situation in Poland and Possible Soviet Role'", December 21, 1981, Wilson Center Digital Archive, CIA declassification, 2008 <https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/165340>

Summary:

Report outlines the various factors leading up to martial law, including Soviet influence, possible Warsaw Pact intervention, and possible public backlash.

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from MacArthur Foundation

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

FIRDB-315/22804-81
21 December 81

**Background to Present Situation in Poland
And Possible Soviet Role**

RELEASE IN PART
EXEMPTION: ,HR70-14
DATE: 08-19-2008

FORM 3413 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

he

[Redacted]

IN

TDFIR DB-315/22804-81

PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

[Redacted]

HR70-14

THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED

AND NOT A MOVE TAKEN SIMPLY TO SATISFY MOSCOW AND EASE SOVIET PRESSURE, BUT RATHER AS A SURRENDER TO MOSCOW THAT HAS RESULTED IN SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER INFLUENCE/CONTROL BY THE SOVIETS OVER POLISH AFFAIRS. SOURCE CITES THE MAKEUP OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL SALVATION (AND THE FACT THAT THE ESTABLISHED NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE (KOK) WAS BYPASSED AS THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE BODY FOR MARTIAL LAW) AS ONE VERY STRONG INDICATION OF THIS RESULT. SOURCE IS FURTHER CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS, THROUGH THE PERSON OF MARSHAL KULIKOV, ARE EXERCISING STRONG INFLUENCE, IF NOT OUTRIGHT CONTROL, OVER THE POLISH ARMED FORCES. THE RANK AND FILE OF THE POLISH ARMY IS NOT FULLY AWARE OF THIS, AND, INDEED, AS IN ALL OTHER AREAS OF POLISH NATIONAL LIFE, THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO DISGUISE/HIDE THEIR ACTIVE ROLE.

B. SOURCE BELIEVES THE POLISH ARMY WILL FOLLOW THE ORDERS OF ITS LEADERS AND WILL PERFORM RELIABLY THE TASKS ASSIGNED BY THE COUNCIL. SOURCE EMPHASIZES THAT THE ROLE OF THE ARMY IN MARTIAL LAW IS THE MORE PASSIVE ONE OF PROTECTING KEY INSTALLATIONS AND OF TAKING UP "NEUTRAL POSITIONS" TO ISOLATE FACTORIES AND CITIES.

5
4
3
2
1


[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(classification)

(dissem controls)



3413 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS



TDFIR DB-315/22804-51

PAGE 3 OF 7 PAGES

~~SECRET~~
(classification)



HR70-14

THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED

WHILE THE ACTIVE ENFORCEMENT MEASURES, INCLUDING THE ARRESTS OF SOLIDARITY MEMBERS, ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY FORCES OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (MSW).

C. NEVERTHELESS, SOURCE BELIEVES THAT SERIOUS INCIDENTS OF RESISTANCE WILL CONTINUE TO OCCUR IN POLAND, AS THE POPULACE REALIZES THE TRUE NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ACT, AND AS AN OPPOSITION MOVEMENT BEGINS TO RECONSTITUTE ITSELF, AS SOURCE BELIEVES IT WILL. IN EXTREME CASES, THE MILITARY WILL BACK UP THE SECURITY FORCES, WITH THE INTENT TO RESORT TO FORCE SHORT OF THE USE OF FIREARMS. HOWEVER, IF THERE ARE SERIOUS INCIDENTS OF BLOODSHED, THE POLISH ARMY MAY FALTER. IT IS AT THIS POINT THAT SOURCE BELIEVES SOVIET (WARSAW PACT) INTERVENTION WOULD COME. ITS PURPOSE WOULD NOT BE TO REPLACE POLISH TROOPS IN THEIR CURRENT ROLE, BUT RATHER TO STIFFEN THEIR RESOLVE. POLISH FORCES WOULD CONTINUE AS THE ORGAN IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE POPULACE, WHILE THE INTERVENTION FORCES REMAIN OUT OF THE CITIES, WHERE THEIR PRESENCE WOULD BE KNOWN BUT NOT DIRECTLY FELT. THIS OBVIOUS, BUT NOT IMMEDIATE, PRESENCE WOULD BE INTENDED TO BOLSTER POLISH FORCES

5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~

5
4
3
2
1

(classification) (dissem controls)

FORM 12-79 3413 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

IN

TDFIR DB-315/22804-81

PAGE 4 OF 7 PAGES

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

[Redacted]

HR70-14

THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED

AND INTIMIDATE THE POLISH POPULACE. SOURCE BELIEVES THE SOVIETS WILL NOT HESITATE TO INTERVENE EARLY ENOUGH THAT THIS INTENDED EFFECT WOULD BE A REALISTIC EXPECTATION. SOURCE STRESSES THAT THIS SORT OF INTERVENTION IS NOT THE SAME AS THE INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968; THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES ENVISIONED, INTERVENTION WOULD TAKE PLACE WITH THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE POLISH LEADERSHIP, AND WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE POLISH MILITARY.

D. SOURCE BELIEVES THE WARSAW PACT INTERVENTION WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN ACCORDING TO A PLAN DRAWN UP IN NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1980. ALTHOUGH THIS PLAN WOULD HAVE BEEN UPDATED AND AMENDED, SOURCE BELIEVES THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES REMAIN VIABLE IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. THE PLAN CALLS FOR FOUR ARMIES TO OPERATE IN POLAND, ONE IN EACH OF FOUR QUADRANTS. TEN DIVISIONS FROM THE WESTERN SOVIET UNION WOULD OPERATE AS TWO ARMIES IN THE EASTERN HALF OF POLAND, ONE IN THE NORTHEAST AND ONE IN THE SOUTHEAST. TWO CZECHOSLOVAK DIVISIONS AND AN ARMY STAFF WOULD OPERATE IN SILESIA, AND AN EAST GERMAN DIVISION AND AN ARMY STAFF WOULD OPERATE IN POMERANIA. WARSAW PACT UNITS IN POMERANIA AND SILESIA WOULD BE

5
4
3
2
1


~~SECRET~~

5
4
3
2
1

(classification)

(dissem controls)

3413 COMPLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS



TDFIR DB-315/22804-81

PAGE 5 OF 7 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

HR70-14

THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED

JOINED BY THE TWO DIVISIONS OF THE SOVIET NORTHERN GROUP OF FORCES STATIONED IN POLAND, AND BY WHAT SOURCE BELIEVES ARE THE EQUIVALENT OF FOUR ADDITIONAL SOVIET DIVISIONS, THE ARMOR FOR WHICH HAS BEEN IN OR NEAR SOVIET-CONTROLLED TRAINING AREAS IN POLAND SINCE AT LEAST EARLY SUMMER. TAKEN UNITS FROM HUNGARY AND BULGARIA WOULD ALSO PARTICIPATE. SOURCE BELIEVES THIS INTERVENTION FORCE IS ABOUT THE MAXIMUM THE SOVIETS COULD MUSTER UNDER THE PLAN, AND STRESSES THAT THIS IS INDEED A VERY LARGE FORCE, ADEQUATE TO THE TASK. SOURCE NOTES THAT ONLY 20 ROADS ACROSS THE POLISH-SOVIET BORDER MEET THE STANDARDS FOR MOVEMENT OF ARMORED COLUMNS, AND THAT SOVIET PRACTICE CALLS FOR TWO ROADS TO BE USED FOR EACH DIVISION.

E. SOURCE IS ADAMANT THAT WHAT THE SOVIETS REGARD AS THE CRITICAL NATO-ORIENTED MISSION OF SOVIET FORCES STATIONED IN EAST GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD PRECLUDE THE USE OF ANY DIVISIONS FROM THE GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY (GSFG) OR THE CENTRAL GROUP OF FORCES (CGF) IN AN INTERVENTION IN POLAND.

F. SOURCE BELIEVES THAT THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THIS INTERVENTION FORCE WOULD MOVE INTO POLAND AND TO THEIR INTENDED

5
4
3
2
1



~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

5
4
3
2
1

FORM 3473 OBSOLETE PRE EDITIONS



IN

TDFIR DB-315/22804-81

PAGE 6 OF 7 PAGES

~~SECRET~~
(classification)




HR70-14

THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED

AREAS OF OPERATION OVERNIGHT TO REDUCE THE RISK OF INTERFERENCE AND TO PRESENT THE POPULACE WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING.

G. SOURCE STRESSES THAT THE KEY TO THE NECESSITY FOR INTERVENTION IS THE REACTION OF THE POLISH POPULACE TO MARTIAL LAW AND THE STEADFASTNESS OF THE POLISH MILITARY IN THE FACE OF THAT REACTION.



5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

5
4
3
2
1

3413 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS




BT

TDFIR DB-315/22804-81


PAGE 7 OF 7 PAGES

~~SECRET~~
(classification)



HR70-14

THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED



5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

5
4
3
2
1