'Achieving USG Nonproliferation Objectives in Pakistan,' State Department Cable 290844 to US Embassy Pakistan

Summary of a meeting with French non-proliferation advisor Andre Jacoment. Discussion of the consequences of the French government's cancellation of a project to build a plutonium reprocessing plant at Chashma, Pakistan.

Report on status of France-Pakistan deal for saviem trucks, which was connected with the recently canceled plutonium reprocessing plant project.

Ambassador Hummel describes a conversation with General Zia. They discussed the cancellation of the French reprocessing project, disputes over the Pakistani-Afghan border, and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTRO).

The United States wants a public announcement from the French that the Pakistan plutonium reprocessing plant project is officially canceled.

Plans for meetings with Congress members to discuss resuming aid to Pakistan. Talking points include the cancellation of the French reprocessing plant deal and the importance of Pakistan's position in the Middle East. Also includes discussion of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, technical capabilities, and the United States' efforts to block their nuclear development.

Request for the Paris Embassy to discreetly look into an export license granted to the French company Robatel to export centrifuges to Pakistan.

Comments by Robert Alston of the British Foreign Office on the State Department's "non-paper" on Pakistan. He questions the list of countries and expresses concern about the response of states with their own covert nuclear programs, like South Korea and Taiwan.

Comments by French advisor Jacomet on the State Department's demarche on Pakistani nuclear development. Jacomet stated that the French government was planning a similar demarche. He was most concerned about the response of Italy and West Germany.

The State Department asks for information on a letter sent by IAEA Director General Eklund to Munir Khan of the Pakistani atomic energy commission. IAEA inspectors in Pakistan should also be alert to "any questionable use of facilities or disposition of safeguarded material."

Summary of conversation with IAEA official Davi Fischer. Fischer stated that Director Eklund had not yet written to the Pakistani atomic energy commission. He also reported a number of "troubling bits of information" on the situation in Pakistan.

U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."

Australian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.

United Kingdom response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development. U.K. and U.S. Embassies will be cooperating in delivering information to Spain and Belgium.

Italian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development. Reports that Pakistan has not yet requested any equipment from Italy, but if they did Italy would follow all mandated safeguards.

Swedish response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.

British ambassador's meeting with Spanish Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs to discuss the UK demarche on inverter exports. Under Secretary agrees to cooperate and block all loopholes.

U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan advises against informing the Indian government about U.S. concerns over Pakistan's nuclear program. It would have an "adverse impact" for the U.S. government to be seen colluding with India by Pakistan.

West German response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate and expressing surprise that Pakistan was attempting to complete the reprocessing plant.

Canadian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully and expressing surprise that Pakistan was attempting to complete the reprocessing plant.

U.S. Ambassador to India reports that the Indian government is aware that the U.S. believes Pakistan seeks nuclear weapons capability. An Indian diplomat informed him that Pakistan was two to three years away from nuclear capability.

Discussion of a British list of countries that were actual or potential manufacturers of inverters. The U.S. does not want to approach any "nuclear threshold states" yet because some might not cooperate or might inform Pakistan. Also discusses strategies for approaching the Soviet Union and China in the future.

Spanish response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.

Britain agrees with U.S. thinking on the matter of State Department cable 292469, except on its approach to the Soviet Union. Britain decided not to approach the Soviets because they were unsure whether Moscow’s “commitment to nonproliferation outweighs their special political interests vis-à-vis Pakistan.”

French officials hope to avoid a confrontation with Pakistan and want to maintain dialogue until it is clear whether Bhutto will be executed. French civil engineers are working at the Chasma plant site and keeping the French government informed of the situation.

Dutch response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully. Foreign Minister van der Klaauw also express concern about less developed countries ("LDCs") that consider non-proliferation discriminatory.

Japanese response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, describing recent discussions between Pakistan and Japan that touched on nuclear issues.

Austrian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.

Belgian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear developement, agreeing to cooperate fully.

Swiss response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.