Cable No. 1414, Foreign Minister [Sosuke Uno] to the Ambassador in China, 'The Chinese Student Demonstrations'

Confidential

Indefinite Duration

Top Urgent

Number: 047299-001 to Diplomatic Missions　GM3160-05

Received: May 22, 1989, 19:07:13

Draft Telegram            

Primary: China Division Director, Principal Deputy Director

Telegram Section: 1 [signed]  2 [signed]

Drafted: May 22, 1989

Drafter:  Oku  Telephone number: 2426

To: Ambassador to China

From: The Foreign Minister

Subject: Office Memorandum

Primary: Asian Affairs, China

Top Urgent

Pattern Code: [blacked out]

Outgoing Telegram Asian Affairs, China No. 1414, Transmission by Separate Fax 

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GM3160

Confidential

Indefinite Duration

The Chinese Student Demonstrations

May 22, 1989

China Division

1. The Facts

(1) With the declaration of martial law on the 20th, it is a new situation. The intent of the authorities to bring the situation under control by force has become clear. At present, the morning of the 22nd, however, there have been no clashes.

20th:    From 10:00, martial law was declared in the eight districts of central Beijing.

21st:     From before dawn, there has been a confrontation with troops on the outskirts of Beijing (there has been a gathering on the scale of 100,000 students and city residents in front of Tiananmen Square).

In the evening, there was issued an “Appeal of the Competent Authorities in Beijing” and “An Open Letter to the Residents of Beijing,” issued by the command of the martial law units.

(2) Two full days have passed since the imposition of martial law, but the military still has not resorted to force.
(Conceivable Reasons)

(1) It is difficult for the leadership to adopt a policy of force. (The forced removal of the students by the military would produce a considerable number of victims, make enemies of the general public, and forfeit the Party’s prestige. The leadership would have to be prepared for that. Abroad, too, they would suffer a further decline in image).

(2) Therefore, is it a fact that the present leadership is struggling with the response to its imposition of martial law? For now, are they aiming to separate by indirect means (note) the students from the average citizen and isolate them?

(Note): In the news on the 21st were such stories as “Average Citizen’s Milk Stolen” and “Infectious Disease Spreading in Square in Front of Tiananmen Square.”

(3) Perhaps the decision-making mechanism within the leadership is not functioning properly. We cannot exclude that possibility either.

2. Future Prospects

(1) Direction of the Student Demonstrations

(a) Martial law has been imposed, but the authorities have not been able to act decisively to use the military to forcibly remove them. It seems that a situation of stalemate will continue for a while.

(b) However, it is fully imaginable that the present leadership, seeking to divide the students from general city residents, will seize an opportunity and use the military to expel the students by force. One could say that how the military, which is seen as having a reluctant view internally on the use of force, moves from this point forward is a key point (the remarks of senior figures in the military and such have been reported on Chinese television).

(c) Even should a military suppression take place, although we would probably see something of a return to normal, the criticism and anger of students and the general public towards the present leadership would grow. There is a concern that it would even shake the foundations of the present leadership. Also, the problems behind the student demonstrations (such as lagging democratization and cadre corruption and impropriety) would in no way be settled. There is the possibility of their breaking out again in the future due to some impetus.

(2) The Leadership

(a) Position of Zhao Ziyang

(i) He has probably been dismissed from his position as secretary general (perhaps at the Politburo meeting of the 17th?), but this cannot be confirmed. (See note.) It has to be noted that such a move has in no way whatsoever been announced publicly.

(Note) Key persons on the Chinese side (such as former foreign minister Huang Hua and All-China Women’s Federation President Kang Keqing) have responded to our questions in saying that he has been ill.

(ii) It can be imagined that there is questioning within the Party as to its responsibility for, in effect, having brought on today’s situation by making the student demonstrations worse with their repressive response.

(iii) There seems little chance of a returning the situation to its previous state so long as Li Peng and others are not driven to step down (with Zhao’s increasing popularity, Li Peng and others likely want to stamp out the fire). However, in the event that the situation is not brought under control by martial law, we cannot exclude the possibility of a rally by Zhao supporters (such as Wan Li, Tian Jiyun, and Yang Rudai). A Zhao comeback, too, is possible.

(b) Li Peng’s Position

(i)  Exposed to so much criticism from the masses, including students, his position cannot be strong. On the other hand, with the post-Deng era in sight, there is no one at this point, including Li Peng, capable of becoming a real leader. For the time being, Li Peng is likely to stay in power with the backing of the elders.

(ii) However, bringing the student demonstrations under control will not be easy. Even if he brought the situation under control by force, restoring the leadership’s damaged image would be difficult, and not only domestically but internationally as well. Running the government would not be easy, and his position would be unstable.

(iii) Should the situation turn markedly worse, then there is also the possibility of Qiao Shi, ranked third in the Party, taking charge of the situation.

(c) Deng Xiaoping’s Retirement

There have long been rumors that he would mark the end of his career with the Chinese-Soviet summit and then retire. However, there is considerable resentment among the general public that the lack of progress in democratization is due to what has, in effect, been Deng Xiaoping’s long “dictatorship.” The current student demonstrations may drive him to a situation of having to retire early. (Conversely, not wishing to give the impression of having retired due to the demonstrations, there is also the aspect of his being not being able to retire for a while.) 

3. Significance, Effect of the Present Student Demonstrations and the Response of the Authorities

(1) Decline in Communist Party’s Prestige     

The decline in the party’s prestige on account of the people’s disappointment and their distrust of politics is undeniable. The situation is one of the party growing increasingly distant from the public and true democratization receding into the distance.

(2) Effect on the Basic Line

(a) Reform and Opening

The drive of students and city residents alike for reform and opening is consistent with the direction of the present leadership. Consequently, there will basically be no change in direction. However, there is the possibility of its slowing and, in the long term, stagnating. 

(b) Unification of the Fatherland

Taiwan is making criticisms and Hong Kong and Macao are making their opposition known with large-scale demonstrations and gatherings. The situation is exacerbating distrust in each one in regard to the present leadership. It may become a hindrance to maintaining Hong Kong’s prosperity for its smooth reversion in 1997.

(3) International Influence

(a) Decline in Image

With so much chaos and the imposition of martial law in Beijing for the first time since the country’s founding, the result is images of “an unstable country,” “a country behind in democratization,” and “a country of power struggles,” leading to the collapse of its image as a healthy member of international society and a growing sense of distrust as to what kind of country China really is.

(b) Adverse Effect on Investment, Trade and Other Economic Exchanges with Other Countries

The dismissal of Zhao Ziyang, an active promoter of China’s opening policy, has made companies from Western countries uneasy. There is the possibility of economic exchanges stagnating. In particular, investments would likely decline.

(4) Effect on Relations between Japan and China

There is also the reporting of the Japanese press (which is sympathetic to the students). Depending on how Li Peng and the present leadership responds to the situation, criticism is likely to emerge against playing up the friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and China or actively promoting yen loans and other economic cooperation. As for our side, however, from the position that this issue remains to the end China’s domestic affair, we expect that there will be no repercussions.

Such economic effects as a decline in investment in China are likely.

(End)