Record of a Conversation [between] Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Walter Nash, Prime Minister of New Zealand, on the Shore of the Caucasus (Pitsunda)

Secret Copy Nº 2

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION

[between] Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Walter Nash, Prime Minister of New Zealand, on the shore of the Caucasus (Pitsunda)

20 April 1960

Nash expresses pleasure at the warm meeting given him by N. S. Khrushchev and says that first of all he would like to clarify on which questions he would like to exchange opinions with N. S. Khrushchev.

N. S. Khrushchev expresses agreement to hear out Nash.

Nash there are a number of questions on which it would be interesting to exchange opinions with N. S. Khrushchev. But first of all I would like to dwell on how I approach the conversations with you.

I have always advocated summit conferences and was very glad when Macmillan came to you in Moscow for a visit. It seems to me that an agreement could be achieved at a conference in Paris, if only on one of the questions in order to keep up the hopes of the peoples. I hope that the May conference of heads of governments will be the start of a series of such conferences. 

I have read all your statements on international questions and today I would like in the course of discussions with you to find out your attitude toward the most important of them, namely: peaceful coexistence, disarmament, relations between the East and West, the German problem, and the Berlin question. I myself have formed definite principles with which I approach all these questions. I approach the conversations with you with one goal – I want to facilitate a relaxation of the international situation and an end to the “Cold War”.

I hope for a frank discussion of these questions without concealing differences. Only thus we will be able to determine what differences exist, whether there are differences at all, and whether they can be eliminated.

I would like to demonstrate a friendly approach during the discussion of international questions with a person who has made the most epochal proposals in favor of peace which I have ever read in my entire life. I mean your proposal at the UN about general and complete disarmament. 

We want to solve problems by peaceful means. If we do not solve them we will die together, but I want to live together. 

Nash further asks N. S. Khrushchev to present his opinion about the problem of disarmament.

N. S. Khrushchev A frank discussion will help [us] understand one another, and this is the main thing. Inasmuch as you are acquainted with our proposals about general and complete disarmament, this makes my task easier. 

We are very disappointed at the state of affairs with the negotiations in Geneva. As we see, our Western partners want to talk about monitoring, but not about disarmament. We are in favor of monitoring, but with disarmament. We are against monitoring without disarmament.

Right now the Western countries are proposing a level of the armed forces for the US, USSR, and China of 2.5 million men for each country. But we have unilaterally already reduced our armed forces by one-third and we will have less than 2.5 million men. The US has about the same, 2.5 million men. So what can be the subject for discussion? A level of 2.5 million men was already proposed two years ago. The countries have already brought their armed forces to this level unilaterally. 

But now the representatives of the Western powers say: let’s set up monitoring. But in this case it would essentially not be monitoring, but espionage.

If our partners had agreed with a proposal to destroy the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, I mean rockets, aircraft, submarines, aircraft carriers, etc. then we would agree to develop a monitoring system so that not a single country could keep or create these means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

For example, I think that humanity right now is worried most of all about the development of atomic weapons. Therefore [we] need to begin with this. But the Western partners do not want this. They are for a reduction of conventional armed forces and monitoring, but we have already reduced our forces by a third. Why [do] we [need] monitoring if we are disarming ourselves? The Westerners say: we do not believe you. But this is already up to them. We, too, don’t believe them. Evidently some time will pass and another additional unilateral reduction of the armed forces will take place in the Soviet Union because we don’t need them. With the current level of development of military technology we cannot allow an attack on the Soviet Union, but if they try to attack us then we will be able to strike the countries which made the attack with a crushing blow and destroy them. Based on all [I] presented it is clear that the question of nuclear weapons needs to be solved without fail and, the main thing, [the question of] the means of their delivery, for nuclear weapons are hard to destroy right now since nuclear weapons can be concealed in all countries. But if the means of delivery of nuclear bombs are destroyed the latter will not be dangerous, for these are not pocket weapons, and therefore if we destroy the means of delivery then humanity will be able to breathe freely and not fear for its future.

Under this condition we agree to disband the army, destroy the weapons, and establish monitoring. But the Western powers are proposing to reduce the armies and establish monitoring. Essentially, the Western powers want to get away from a solution to the question of disarmament in the Committee of 10. Well, if they continue to behave this way in the future then we will raise the question of the uselessness of such negotiations.

Of course, we are using the meeting of heads of government in Paris and will discuss this question there. But if we and they do not come to agreement then we will raise the question at a future session of the UN General Assembly in New York that the decision of the General Assembly adopted at its 24^th Session is not being carried out. We don’t want to deceive world public opinion and be a front since it needs to be frankly said that in fact there are no negotiations about disarmament. That’s what our decision is.

Nash The proposals of the Western powers about disarmament meet the Soviet proposals in general, namely: to begin disarmament with conventional types, then switch to nuclear weapons, and then to the procedure allowing war to be precluded.

N. S. Khrushchev This is correct: as of September of last year, but the UN General Assembly ended after this and we in the Soviet Union reduced our armed forces from 3,600,000 to 2,400,000, that is, we thereby reduced our army to the level envisioned in the Western powers’ proposal.

Nash This is correct, but the main thing is in what procedure the disarmament measures are to be accomplished. If the sequence of disarmament measures is changed, then it leads to a need to prepare new measures.

N. S. Khrushchev We are ready to [one word illegible, possibly “clear up”] the procedures. Let’s come to agreement about a reduction of armed forces [to two 2.]5 million, then it would be a subject for negotiations. But we have 2.4 million men right now, but they are suggesting we establish a level of 2.5 million. What are we to do then, increase the strength of our forces?

Nash But a quite important fact is evident: there are four people in the world who will be discussing world problems at the summit conference. I have already met with two of them. Both of them declare at the same time without a shadow of a doubt that they are for disarmament. And they both say that you, too, want this.

N. S. Khrushchev This is actually so.

Nash De Gaulle told me this. A week before this Macmillan also declared this. I am not so acquainted with the French to entirely trust De Gaulle, but as regards Britain, it actually wants disarmament. 

We will soon again be meeting with Macmillan in London in May at a conference of prime ministers of the Commonwealth countries. Thus, two world leaders in the West are fully determined to achieve an agreement about disarmament on any basis.

N. S. Khrushchev But their authorized representatives in Geneva say otherwise.

Nash I don’t know this, but I can assert that the main thing depends on the heads of the governments.

N. S. Khrushchev Evidently, these people told you about this and don’t tell anyone else about their desire for disarmament but, on the contrary, Jules Mock, the French representative in Geneva, says differently. As is well know, Jules Mock is a socialist. Your brother. The British representative Ormsby-Gore says the same thing as Jules Mock, although he is not a socialist. 

Nash We should have mutual trust, and then the question of disarmament can be solved. It is important that three of the four, including you, want disarmament. Why is it necessary to doubt?

N. S. Khrushchev I don’t doubt the sincerity of Macmillan and De Gaulle. I believe them. Eisenhower also wants disarmament.

Nash You said that other representatives of the West are making other statements. But since all leaders want disarmament then why the concern about what others say since the government belongs not to these other people, but to those leaders who believe in disarmament and have sufficient authority to achieve disarmament.

N. S. Khrushchev I agree, but I cannot ignore the facts: the representatives of the Western powers in Geneva are not saying what the heads of government are saying. It is impossible to move the problem of disarmament ahead with such a disparity.

Nash But if the leader of countries are for disarmament then they should tell their representatives to seek disarmament. Whoever disobeys should be replaced. Personally, I believe that Macmillan, De Gaulle, and also Eisenhower want disarmament.

N. S. Khrushchev I also want to believe [them], but unfortunately, the words of the leaders of these countries are inconsistently put into effect by their representatives. A month has already passed, and nothing has been done and there are no prospects for an improvement. Briefly put, the Western proposals do not envision the goal of disarmament.

Nash I know only the statements of the heads of governments of the Western powers on disarmament. If there are elements which are preventing the establishment of relations of trust between governments then still other steps need to be taken.

N. S. Khrushchev I don’t think that the authorized representatives are pursuing a policy which the governments themselves would not pursue. It is known that whoever is not guided by the instructions of his government is simply removed.

Nash again repeats his views that authorized representatives cannot pursue a policy which differs from the instructions which their governments give them.

N. S. Khrushchev says that during an evaluation of the work of the Committee of 10 it is based on specific facts, and every day he receives information about the progress of the negotiations in the Committee of 10.

Nash I think that Mr. Khrushchev is not saying what he thinks. When you gave your proposals on disarmament at the United Nations you became a leading light of international life: you, the most powerful country in the world, have exhibited a readiness to renounce the use of force and to not impose your will on other countries.

N. S. Khrushchev We are not abandoning our statements. We have already reduced our armed forces by one-third. We are going the way of realizing our proposals, but our partners do not want to travel this path.

Nash But Britain has recently reduced the means of waging conventional war.

N. S. Khrushchev I don’t know this, but I am left only to believe you. British weapons do not worry us. Macmillan also knows this. He knows that these weapons cannot give the British anything, but if a war begins then Britain will simply be destroyed.

Nash The possibility of such a prospect should not guide our discussions. One cannot pose [your] partners with a choice – either agree with my proposals or you will be destroyed.

Nash says that he would like to hold a discussion of the question of disarmament in general terms without going into the details of this question.

N. S. Khrushchev I am not offering such ultimatums. But since, if there won’t be an agreement, then the matter might actually come to a war and then everyone will suffer, small countries first.

We want the actual destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. And this has found approval among all the members of the United Nations. For me general statements are little. I am interested in specific matters. Therefore it turns out that you judge by words, but I judge by deeds, but by the specific results of the conference in Geneva. That’s the difference between us.

Nash But the British and French governments have told me confidentially that you want disarmament.

N. S. Khrushchev But this is insufficient. In the West they simply don’t want disarmament.

Nash I believe that the British government wants disarmament.

N. S. Khrushchev So far the British representative in Geneva is not displaying any desire for disarmament.

Nash We welcome that you have talked about disarmament in the UN. These proposals presume a certain flexibility in their realization and they are unquestionably a step forward. In my statement in Wellington I welcomed those goals which you are pursuing with universal and general disarmament. However, the actual difficulty is that in what procedure this goal will be achieved.

N. S. Khrushchev agrees with Nash.

Next Khrushchev says jokingly that when he meets in Paris with Macmillan he will suggest he send Nash as Britain’s representative to the disarmament conference. At the same time he says that, as Nash has obviously noted, he consequently plans to nominate [vydvinut’] not a Communist, but a Laborite.

Nash says that Jules Mock congratulated him (Nash) in connection with the speech at the UN General Assembly on the question of disarmament.

N. S. Khrushchev They have also congratulated me, however this is insufficient.

Nash The entire problem of disarmament has evidently become lost in a multitude of details. He asks Khrushchev, is he not too optimistic in proposing to accomplish disarmament in four years [?]

N. S. Khrushchev asks Nash’s opinion of whether four years is too much or too little for such a problem.

Nash Very little. I am personally ready to seek disarmament even right now, but [I] need to reckon with the sentiments of the people.

N. S. Khrushchev I think it is indisputable that the more weapons there are in the world the more there will be mistrust between countries and the more time we will spend on negotiations and the more we accumulate weapons.

Nash I absolutely agree. However, it is necessary to try and not become lost in the labyrinths and networks of too-detailed negotiations on the question of disarmament in stages.

N. S. Khrushchev Just these networks, that is, disarmament in stages, and set up by your countries so as not to get out from the problem of disarmament. Why do we [need] four years to solve this problem? The heads of four governments could meet and declare that they have come to agreement to take specific steps for disarmament with appropriate monitoring. However, if people don’t want disarmament then one can say 100 years, and everything will be for naught.

Nash says that if one could sign such an agreement for complete disarmament then no preliminary conditions would be needed.

N. S. Khrushchev says jokingly that evidently he and Nash now have complete agreement and it remains only for Nash to go to Geneva.

Nash replies that, unfortunately, he will soon have parliamentary elections in New Zealand which will be difficult for him since he only has a one-vote majority in Parliament.

Further, he says that he considers the exchange of opinions held on disarmament more than valuable. In the near future he will have to take part in a number of important conferences in London from 3 to 11 May (the Commonwealth Countries Conference), then he will be two days at the United Nations, and from 31 May to 4 June he will take part in a SEATO countries conference. He would like to know N. S. Khrushchev’s opinion on the question of Germany and West Berlin, and also about the problem of underdeveloped countries and relations between the East and West.

N. S. Khrushchev says that he is ready to present the position of the Soviet government on a peace treaty with Germany and about West Berlin. He says that the Soviet government favors signing a peace treaty with the two Germanys because two Germanys actually exist. All the partners in the fight against Nazi Germany do not want the reunification of Germany. Will there ever be a single Germany? Obviously, there will be. But when, no one knows. Therefore it’s necessary to sign a peace treaty with the two Germanys.

But as regards the question of the reunification of Germany this is a domestic matter of the Germans themselves.

The Western powers do not want to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. They cannot recognize the GDR, but they can find a form to sign a peace treaty with both German states.

They can sign a peace treaty with whatever government they want. 

We, just like the countries of people’s democracy, are ready to sign a peace treaty with both German states.

In my opinion, it is clear why a peace treaty is necessary. Fifteen years have already passed since the end of the War, and it is already long been time to sign a peace treaty with Germany. A treaty eliminates the vestiges of the past War and eliminates the question of West Berlin, which constitutes part of the territory of the GDR.

Considering that a capitalist system exists in West Berlin we don’t wish violence, and the GDR agrees to preserve the internal system which exists there, giving it the status of a free city. The question is thus: the Soviet delegation in Paris will propose this. If this proposal does not find understanding from our partners we will sign a peace treaty with the GDR and thus the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin will end. The government of the GDR will then establish its control over all the territory of the GDR and the right of the Western powers to land, air, and water communications with Berlin will also end. If the Western countries want to use force to remain in West Berlin then this will be answered with force.

The Western powers might remember the example of Japan. The Western powers signed a unilateral peace treaty and thereby deprived us of all rights with respect to Japan. It is asked: why can we not act this way with respect to Germany? But we will preserve our proposal about the free city of West Berlin when signing the treaty with the GDR. We don’t want to retreat from these proposals. This is indeed a most liberal position.

Nash But how can one speak of free access to West Berlin if the Western powers have lost their rights to access to this city?

N. S. Khrushchev The Western powers will lose these rights, but the Germans in West Berlin will keep the right to communication with other countries.

Nash But if the GDR does not agree?

N. S. Khrushchev But the GDR has already agreed last year in its statement in Geneva.

We are ready for an agreement about the free city of West Berlin to be guaranteed by the United Nations. We are ready for such a status which it would secure.

Nash But West Berlin would have access to West Germany?

N. S. Khrushchev West Berlin does not have the right to establish any special ties with the FRG since West Berlin is on GDR territory. West Germany, just like, for example, New Zealand, should have the same ability to access West Berlin as other countries.

Nash But if West Berliners want these special ties?

N. S. Khrushchev The West Berliners can either agree with the GDR proposals or leave inasmuch as the territory of West Berlin is GDR territory. No fabrications of Adenauer about a plebiscite can have success.

It has no relation to West Berlin.

I can assure you, Mr. Nash, that we will do what we say with respect to a peace treaty with Germany.

Nash I will think about everything you have said. Right now I am thinking in particular about the future of West Berlin.

N. S. Khrushchev Let the capitalists continue to live in West Berlin and make money off the population of West Berlin if the latter likes this.

Nash I would like to direct attention to the fact that question of peaceful coexistence has very great possibilities. This question, like existing problems, cannot be solved by force.

N. S. Khrushchev We think that in the conditions of a free city the West Berliners will choose the system they want.

Nash But they will be surrounded by enemies.

N. S. Khrushchev No, it is not so. However, if [one] takes your point of view and consider the Germans as enemies with respect to one another, how would you feel in the place of the Germans of the GDR if you carried their enemy in their hearts[?]

It is no accident that the Western countries do not want to sign a peace treaty. They know very well that they then would lose the legal right to be in West Berlin.

Nash But if they don’t want a peace treaty, what will happen?

N. S. Khrushchev Then we will sign [one].

Nash But can one party force the other to sign a treaty?

N. S. Khrushchev We are not forcing [anyone], but inviting, requesting. But if they don’t want to, then we will sign [one] ourselves.

Nash Then each power can desire to have their own peace treaty.

N. S. Khrushchev I have already cited the example of Japan. The US unilaterally signed a treaty with Japan. Why can we not sign a treaty with Germany? What kind of law is this? Admit that we have different rights, and this is recognition of the principle of peaceful coexistence.

Nash You have inserted a very important word, “peaceful”.

N. S. Khrushchev Yes, we are for peaceful coexistence. Whoever is for capitalism, let him show what they want to achieve.

Nash I am not worried what the future holds – capitalism or Communism. I want only to say what might happen that there will be four peace treaties.

N. S. Khrushchev Well, what then. Let them submit such a version.

Nash This will raise the question of the differences between the countries.

N. S. Khrushchev I am in favor of all contentious questions being solved, and let history decide who is right.

Nash I want to see in Geneva the accomplishment of those ideas and those thoughts which you expressed in New York.

N. S. Khrushchev I assure you that in Paris we will do everything that depends on us to achieve disarmament.

Nash It is necessary to seek mutual trust between countries. I hope that it will be so. It means that the Soviet side should trust the Western powers.

N. S. Khrushchev They have already taught us to trust the Western powers, especially in the first years of the existence of the Soviet state during the intervention. We ourselves did not go armed into any country, but were engaged in expelling enemies from our territory. Now we will trust, but we will also verify so as not to end up in a stupid position. You ask Churchill how he taught us to trust him.

Nash says that during the intervention many living on the other side fought against it, in particular, he himself. Both you and we have learned from the experience of history and from their own experience. Right now there is a natural desire of people to live in peace, for if a war begins then it will kill everyone

N. S. Khrushchev Agreed.

Nash I know the history of Russia. My only desire is for the peoples of the Soviet Union to be given the right to rule their own country as they want. I cannot agree with how these rights are being realized. But the main thing is coexistence and disarmament on the basis of mutual agreement. 

I would like to also say something about the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, with which it is impossible to agree, but this would take us too far.

N. S. Khrushchev What facts do you have on this score?

Nash Your treaty with the Germans which would allow them to attack us.

N. S. Khrushchev Obviously you know history badly. If you want, I will tell you how it was. This is a bitter truth for Great Britain and France. Great Britain and France wanted to direct Hitler to the East. They sent a delegation to Moscow but they were irresponsible people who didn’t have any authority. They sat in Moscow, drank tea, and at this same time in the Western countries they were strongly pushing Hitler to attack Russia.

When they handed over Czechoslovakia to the Germans the Soviet government was ready to fulfill its allied duty and come to its defense, but France declined. Such was the history. 

We wanted to send troops to Czechoslovakia to help the Czechs, but the Poles would not let us pass.

Hitler understood that the British and the French did not want to fight him, but did not object to him fighting the Soviet Union. But Hitler feared the USSR more than Britain and France and made a maneuver – he signed a pact with the USSR so as not to have two fronts. He counted on defeating France and Britain, and then the Soviet Union. We knew this, but nevertheless signed the treaty because it was clear that Britain and France wanted us to be involved in a war, and we decided it would be better if they were involved in a war with Hitler first. If the government of the Soviet Union, Britain, and France had opposed a war together Hitler would not have gone to war, but Britain and France didn’t want this. If you, Mr. Nash, also bear responsibility for this, then let you answer for this.

Nash says, smiling, that he is not responsible for the policy of these countries, although New Zealanders are also proud that they belong to the countries of the British Commonwealth. He says that he was personally against the intervention in the Soviet union. He also remembers that in Britain they did not trust Ribbentrop.

N. S. Khrushchev The problem is not in the personalities, but in the policy. Hatred for socialism beguiled the capitalists in these countries.

Nash I hope that this won’t happen any more. This was an enormous mistake. However, I came to the Soviet Union to help you make history and not to talk about history. 

N. S. Khrushchev I agree. But you touched on a question of history first and, as you see, it was not to your advantage. 

Nash repeats that he came to the Soviet Union to help Khrushchev make history.

N. S. Khrushchev replies that he values this position of Nash.

Nash says that after the Soviet Union he will go to London, then to Rome, and will then return to London to take part in a conference of prime ministers of the Commonwealth countries, and then visit Adenauer.

N. S. Khrushchev says that he himself met with Adenauer at one time. He says that relations between the USSR and FRG will evidently be somewhat feverish after the USSR signs a peace treaty with the GDR, but after this these relations will somewhat improve because an acute problem, West Berlin, will be removed. Then we and Adenauer will possibly meet and drink a bottle of Rhine wine.

Nash expresses great satisfaction with the conversation, which was very useful.

N. S. Khrushchev says that he was pleased at Nash’s coming and the conversation which they had, and also the understanding displayed by the prime minister of New Zealand of the position of the Soviet Union on a number of questions of international relations.

Nash further makes a request of N. S. Khrushchev for the appeals of 12 people living in New Zealand that their relatives living in the USSR be able to leave for New Zealand be considered. At this time he passes a list of these people. 

N. S. Khrushchev says that the list of these people will be considered and no obstacles will be put in the way to their departure for New Zealand if there is a legal basis for departure.

Present at the conversation from the Soviet side were Ya. A. Malik, Deputy USSR Foreign Minister; N. D. Belokhvostikov, Chief of the 2^nd European Department of the USSR MFA; and G. M. Rodionov, USSR Charge d’affaires in New Zealand.

From the New Zealand side were MFA Permanent Secretary Macintosh and Counsellor-Interpreter of the Prime Minister [Zorab].

The conversation lasted three hours and was recorded by N. D. Belokhvostikov and G. M. Rodionov.

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28 April 1960