Record of a Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and Prime Minister of Afghanistan M. Daud, 20 May 1959

[handwritten at the top: distributed to CPSU CC Presidium members and candidate members and Cde. Kuznetsov]

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION

[between] N. S. Khrushchev and Prime Minister of Afghanistan M. Daud

20 May 1959*

* the record of the conversation was not examined by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev. 

After a mutual exchange of greetings Daud said that he has familiarized himself with the new construction in the Southwest region of Moscow and could not fail to note the enormous successes in the development of the Moscow economy and housing construction.

N. S. Khrushchev said that it this is actually interesting and sometimes he himself derives great satisfaction by tearing himself away and going to look at the new construction of public buildings and housing in Moscow. He added that he very much likes to see the growth of the new in Moscow, especially as progress in the area of housing construction is going quite rapidly here. He cites this example, in particular: in 1949 400,000 square meters of new housing were built in Moscow with a great strain of manpower, and this year 2,500,000 square meters of new housing are being and will be built. And it’s not a matter of money. Then, in 1949, we could give the necessary money for new construction in Moscow. However, for then-current reasons, we did not physically have the ability of perform the amount of work that will be accomplished this year. Then N. S. Khrushchev asked Daud whether he had seen the construction of houses of precast reinforced concrete. 

M. Daud replied that he had seen [it], and added that, considering the nature and tempo of the construction he had seen, in about five years Moscow will be turned into the most beautiful city in the world. 

N. S. Khrushchev noted that at the present time the construction is mainly being developed in new places, in the Southwest and other regions of the capital, but old Moscow remains, since it is considerably more expensive to build with the demolition of existing buildings than to build in a new place. After some time we will have two Moscows as a result of such a development of construction, old and new. When first-priority needs in housing are satisfied the time will come to clean up old Moscow, empty everything decayed there for scrap and build new buildings instead of them with all the conveniences people need. 

M. Daud Switching to the purpose of his visit, expressed gratitude for the attention and the opportunity offered to meet and talk in order to cover the situation in Afghanistan and the international situation unfolding around Afghanistan. Daud said that he will talk about this very briefly since Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Naim already covered these questions in considerable measure during a meeting with N. S. Khrushchev in January of this year.

 Daud continued, as you know, our neighbors, Iran and Pakistan, are countries tied to one another and other countries by military pacts. However, an influx of foreign weapons to these neighbors of Afghanistan has not yet begun in large quantity, and we have no great concern for our security and the situation in this region. But after the conclusion of a series of military agreements between the eastern participants of the Baghdad bloc and the US, foreign weapons have begun to arrive in considerable quantity in Iran and Pakistan, our neighboring countries, not to mention that the financial support of these countries from the US has increased.

 The conflict with Pakistan, which arose about a certain incident with the national flag, has already taught us much, and prompted us to that important thought that a country desiring to preserve its independence should be seriously concerned about its defense. After this certain bilateral military agreements were concluded between the US and Iran, [and between] Pakistan and Turkey, and increased deliveries of weapons began. Without any hesitation we told the Americans and their allies about our concern on this matter. And every time we heard a cool reply from the Americans: “American weapons will never be employed against Afghanistan and no aggression will ever be committed against Afghanistan with the aid of American weapons”. The US military agreements, particularly with Pakistan and Iran, have caused us serious concern, said Daud, and prompted us to present some of our thoughts to you, our friends.

 As concerns Iran then, Daud said, we have no questions with it which might cause big differences. We not have a not very big question which divides us from Iran today. It is the question of the waters of the Helmand River, a river which flows from our country and then crosses the border zone into the territory of Iran. We leave to Iran what it actually needs for its economy from the water reserves of this river.

 Replying to N. S. Khrushchev’s question, Daud explained that a large part of the river passes through the territory of Afghanistan, but then the river goes to the border, travels along it, and goes further into Iranian territory. in this last sector of the river, the Iranian, it flows as a border [river] upstream, but the remainder, its largest part in length, is Afghan.

 Then Daud briefly touched on the history of the question of the Helmand River. He mentioned that in the middle of the 19th century the Englishman Goldsmith proposed a comprehensive solution of the problem of the Helmand River. However, subsequently the question of the territory and the water was decided separately. At the end of the 19th century the Englishman McMahon also researched this problem and in his conclusion outlined such a distribution of the water of the river in which 2/3 was to go to Afghanistan and no more than 1/3 to Iran. Then the level of the river repeatedly rose and fell, just as the riverbed itself changed, which gave rise to constant disputes between Afghanistan and Iran of a territorial nature, and also disputes over the division of the water. About three years ago the Iranian government proposed solving these questions with the aid of the technical mediation of third countries, the creation of a special mediation commission. Then such a commission was created in Washington with mutual consent. It included an American, a Chilean, and someone else. This mediation commission created on the basis of the agreement of both sides, drafted a report with copies sent to the governments of Iran and Afghanistan. The sides were to examine and approval the report of the mixed mediation commission. Three months after receiving the report the Afghan government declared that it agreed with the conclusions of the commission of experts. The Iranians acted differently and declared non-acceptance of the commission’s conclusions. The commission found that in order for 22 cubic meters of water to enter Iran in a set period (one second) it was necessary to deviate from McMahon’s standard ([by] 52 cubic meters a second)**. 

** the digital refinements were submitted by the USSR MFA OSV [Middle East Department] 

 Having analyzed this, the Iranians refused to confirm the report of the commission. The Iranians insisted on the Afghans leaving Iran as much water in the Helmand River as McMahon set earlier, before the work of the technical mediation commission. However, the Afghan government did not want to give Iran more water than the mediation commission considered necessary. Insisting on their positions the Iranians began to say to the Afghans, “We are brothers, let’s decide ourselves. Why do we [need] foreign mediators[?]”. We told the Iranians, “You yourselves suggested a neutral commission yourselves which was to mediate. We accepted this suggestion. Now we think that the decision of the commission should form the basis of further negotiations and agreements about the waters of the Helmand River. The current Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Ansari, was the last authorized representative of the Iranian government sent to Afghanistan about the question of the division of the waters of the Helmand River. He arrived as a personal representative of the Shah to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the existence of an independent Afghanistan. In the name of the Shah Ansari offered to solve the question of the division of the waters of the Helmand River “in a fraternal way”. Then we also sent our representative to Tehran, who was Ludin, the Afghan Ambassador in London. He held talks with the Iranians and promised to add two or three cubic meters of water a second to the existing norm, but stated at the same time that he could not add more water in Iran’s favor from the resources of the Helmand River. The Iranians did not accept this offer. This question is now in such a situation. However, we think that it cannot lead to big conflicts in our relations with Iran. We have built a dam in the upper course of the Helmand River for irrigation purposes. But the Americans refused to help us build a dam in the lower course of the Helmand River since they do not want them to be able to be blamed for infringing on the interests of Iran. However when we have the ability we Afghans will build the dam in the lower course of the Helmand River needed for the water supply of Afghan lands in this region. Daud said, we are friends and brothers to the Iranians and do not wage propaganda against them and do not intend to wage propaganda. But they constantly print articles against us in their “free press”, but we give the appearance that we do not notice this. Daud said, we do not want to exacerbate the conflict with Iran. However, our differences on the distribution of the waters of the Helmand River will of course not become the cause of any clashes with Iran of a military nature.

 Daud continued, another question concerns our second neighbor, Pakistan. This is the most important and vital question for us, stressed Daud. Neither Pakistan itself, nor some friends of Pakistan have agreed to consider this question on the basis of fairness, seriously and deeply, and give the impression that they do not understand either the importance or the depth of this question, nor the consequences of their particular decisions. But since it is a question of the lives of seven million Afghans and the territory which was seized from Afghanistan by colonizers about a century ago. Since that time kings have been replaced and governments of Afghanistan might have had contrasting domestic and foreign policies. But one question of our foreign policy has remained unchanged. With respect to this question there are no differences in the positions between the kings and governments of Afghanistan which replaced one another. It is the question of the fate of the seven million Afghans now outside the borders of our country, it is a vital question, a question of the honor and the fate of Afghanistan, and until it is resolved there can be no question of the establishment of normal, friendly relations with Pakistan. We demand nothing and are imposing nothing on Pakistan. We say only one thing to the Pakistanis: give the Afghans living on your territory the right to self-determination, give them the conditions for the free expression of their will. This is all that we want with respect to Pushtunistan.

 I want to stress, Daud said further, that the tension which exists in connection with this question is the tension in the relations between the Afghan people and the Pakistani government, and not between the peoples of Afghanistan and the peoples of Pakistan not sharing the position of the Pakistani government. Based on what was said, said Daud, our relations with Pakistan need to assessed as bad; it is from Pakistan that we expect all kinds of trouble. Nevertheless, we are trying and exerting every effort for these questions to be solved by peaceful means. We do not have the slightest intention of solving these questions by pressure or by aggression.

 And when we see that thousands of American military men are moving next to our borders and building military bases in proximity to them, this concerns us. We also see an intensive saturation of the Pakistani army with American weapons is taking place. This also worries us. The truth is, there are also gratifying aspects in the Pashtun question for Afghanistan. For example, in order to create a provocative situation, the government of Pakistan sent 100 armed Pashtuns to the parade in Kabul as its military representatives for the holiday of independence of Afghanistan. But, Daud declared, I would like to confidentially inform you that after becoming familiar with Kabul the Pashtuns sent to us in Afghanistan stayed with us for the holiday, established contacts with our population, and before departing Afghanistan told us, “You can consider us your military unit, we will never deny that we are the same Afghans as you”.

 Daud continued, according to information coming from Pakistan and Iran Afghanistan’s receipt of new weapons from the USSR has scared the Pakistanis, and especially the Iranians. On the other hand, Afghanistan’s cautiousness with respect to Pakistan and Iran has recently increased even more in connection with the military agreements they have concluded with the US. This prompted us to send Naim, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Soviet Union in order to share our fears for the future development of events with you.

 N. S. Khrushchev thanked Daud for the clear and frank presentation of the views of Afghanistan on relations with Pakistan. Khrushchev said, I already expressed my views about this question when we had a conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs Naim. Pakistan will go to open warfare with Afghanistan. You need to more likely be on guard against any sort of sabotage and provocations from the Pakistani side; the main danger to you is right there. Your general with whom I recently spoke on this question has placed reliance on Afghanistan getting heavy weapons but, Khrushchev said, I think that you more likely need the light weapons necessary to fight the armed bands of saboteurs which are being sent to you and will be sent from your neighbors. It is hard to expect a direct attack on you from Pakistan and Iran. Both the Iranians and Pakistanis will fear that you will turn to us for aid. We have a common border with you, and they will not risk open aggression. They well understand that we can even support you in sufficient measure from our own territory with missiles and our artillery. The danger is that provocations created from outside might be depicted as a purely internal matter, depicted as if various tribes in Afghanistan were fighting among themselves and against central authority.

 M. Daud said that he completely agreed with Khrushchev. The enemies of an independent Afghanistan will strive to find internal forces in Afghanistan on which they might try and rely. This matter is not new, such a policy was waged in Afghanistan long ago by Britain. There are such internal forces in Afghanistan, there are some tribes and a certain part of the clergy. These forces use those reforms which we will pursue in the country in order to try and act against us. Daud said, as you know, we have had such a situation in the country up to now that half the people are women, removed from any participation in public life and they live like they lived hundreds of years ago, closed in purdah. Our enemies use the clergy, obscurantism, and backward tribes to fight us. Therefore we need to prepare to conduct reforms as we ought and carry them out when we have a sufficiently strong army capable of defending the central government from the intrigues of hostile force without and within. 

Then Daud switched to the question of last year’s Iraqi events and said that in this connection he would like to examine the question of relations between Iraq and Egypt, and also between the UAR and the Soviet Union. 

In Afghan circles the events in Iraq last year and the succeeding development of relations between Iraq and Egypt, and also between the Soviet Union and the UAR have evoked large and serious responses. The exacerbation of relations between Iraq and Egypt could only weaken the front of the Arab peoples in the face of the forces of colonialism. Soviet relations with the UAR, rather with Egypt, recently spoiled, are also leading to a weakening of the situation in the region of the Near and Middle East. Daud said, we are brothers of the Arabs, Muslims, and we warned the ambassadors of Iraq and Egypt in Kabul, initially indirectly, and then directly, about the danger of the developing situation. I myself, said Daud, told the ambassador of Egypt that these relations and strife would lead only to a weakening of the positions of the peoples of the East. I told the ambassador of Egypt that the government of Sudan would like mediate between Iraq and the UAR. The Egyptian ambassador replied that he also had heard about this and thought that Egypt will not object to mediation, especially if a neutral Muslim country acted as mediator. Considering that this is a hint at our country I told the UAR Ambassador that Afghanistan is ready to do every thing that depends on it to normalize relations between the UAR and Iraq. However, the Egyptian ambassador did not subsequently return to this question. 

As concerns relations between the USSR and Egypt I would like in the most friendly fashion to express an opinion that if the previous good relations were restored between the Soviet Union and Egypt this would be in the interest of peace in the region of the Near and Middle East and in the interests of the peoples of the countries of this region.

 Then Daud switched to the question of the report of the newspaper Daily Telegraph about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. This report was disproven. This report strongly disturbed us. This was a blow to Afghanistan. We did not at all imagine the goal of this provocation. The matter was limited here to supporting the Iranians with their plans with respect to foreign troops or this was part of some broader plan of action against Afghanistan. In any event, this very much had an effect on us.

 After this Daud switched to the question of the Soviet-Afghan discussions currently being held in Moscow. He said, our delegation has held successful discussions here. We have confidence that these discussions will successfully end with the conclusion of appropriate agreements. In this connection I want offer great sincere gratitude for all the aid which the Soviet Union has unselfishly given and is giving us, and I want to against assure [you] that we will never forget this. However, in this connection I would like to make one small request. There are very few trained people [kadry] in our country and when the chair of a minister or his deputy remains empty it very strongly influences our work. A general who is a deputy chief of the general staff of the Afghan armed forces and the acting minister of public works, not to mention the rest, are taking part in the Moscow discussions. We would like them to return to Afghanistan as soon as possible. 

N. S. Khrushchev said that he would like to present his ideas about Egypt and Iraq. Khrushchev said, I want to note that we agreed with you that in conclusions: neither we, nor Egypt, nor Iraq, nor the entire Muslim world can gain from the conflict which has recently arisen in this region. Nasser raised the question of fighting “world Communism”. But this is a fictitious question. Even if the problem of Iraq and Egypt is hypothetically considered from the point of view of the Communist camp’s interest in expanding and strengthening, then the acquisition of Iraq and Egypt and the loss in the process of the authority of the Soviet Union in colonial and dependent countries would be disadvantageous even from the point of view of reasonable trade, but politically it would be simply stupid. Nasser raised this question of fighting Communism thinking that it would be the most beneficial to him to conceal his own difficulties, but he was mistaken and miscalculated. The real reason for the difficulties is that Nasser made a big mistake in uniting Syria with Egypt. I hinted to him last year in Moscow that he ought not do this. But he is a person who is young, energetic, and demonstrative, and I thought that evidently once he wanted [something] [that’s] all. But that isn’t so in politics. Sometimes it happens that today you won, but tomorrow this victory will be a noose on [your] neck. Take the same Syrian question, for example. We are simply not involved here. We didn’t create the difficulties for Nasser. If he were more experienced he would have understood that at one time the traditions and culture of French multiparty democracy were transferred to Syria; to this it is necessary to add that the standard of living in Syria is far higher than in Egypt, and the economic prospects are considerably richer than in Egypt. Therefore it is a complex and difficult situation there to carry out the measures decided by Nasser. The leftist circles of Syria are stronger than in Egypt. Under the influence of the danger from the left some Syrian political circles decided to unite with Egypt and accelerated this unification more than Nasser himself. Now they regret this. Take Quwatli. He is a smart person, he has his own political views. We reckon with and respect him. Take General Bizri, the chief of staff, or Azm, for example. These are people of different political views, but none of them are Communists, but are nationalists. We have good relations with them. Nasser didn’t understand the particulars of the situation of Syria and didn’t see that his difficulties appeared after the unification of Syria with Egypt and as a result of this unification.

 The Socialist Party of Hawrani was the strongest party in Syria. All the other Syrian leaders lost their position which they held before unification. Nasser and his associates removed Quwatli, Azm was put out of action, and hundreds of Syrian officers were retired, and hundreds put in prison. However, all these repressive measures by Nasser did not at all mean that now everything will be in order. He pursued these measures such that exacerbation became unavoidable. It had to happen and it happened. He accused Communists of this. If it had been possible I would have helped him, but I was powerless right here, said Khrushchev. This already became a question of prestige. 

When we talked with Nasser some time ago he said, I want to remove Hawrani, this is a bad person, maybe he ought to be arrested. Then I told Nasser that this was unreasonable, he is your deputy; people see that he is not thrown out, and people following Hawrani support you. When this is done it is necessary to bear in mind that Hawrani himself is an passionate opponent of cooperation with Communists. From this point of view the most advantageous thing for the Communists from what I could advise Nasser would be to tell him to force out Hawrani. Then a still greater exacerbation would occur, but I didn’t do this. 

The Communists were not guilty of this situation which was created. What do the Communists have to do with it if the President makes mistakes? It stands to reason that the Communists could make use of these stupidities in their own interests, as always happens in such cases, for it is a law of battle. I told Nasser that it was necessary to unite Egypt with Syria not as he had done, but on the foundation of a federation or a confederation so that the Arab countries remain independent, but act together. But you united with Syria, I told Nasser, threw out its leaders, and others see this and think to themselves: we won’t do it like that already. Egypt has kingdoms among its neighbors. How can they unite on such principles on which Nasser would like this unification when this would mean deprivation of independence for them, and for their leaders the deprivation of a throne[?] They will never agree to this! But, what if there were a confederation? This is possible. Each country in such a union preserves its independence and is not subordinate to another. But Nasser’ was then dizzy from success, and he decided that he was almost the second prophet on Earth. And he spoiled everything himself.

 A revolution occurred in Iraq in July of last year. I tell you sincerely, Khrushchev said to Daud, that we didn’t know about this. We even didn’t know who Qasim was. Nasser also knew nothing about the events in Iraq. A revolution began in Iraq, but Nasser was in Yugoslavia and did not know how to return to Egypt. He wanted to go by ship from Yugoslavia to Egypt. I advised him not to do this. Then he wanted to fly across the Mediterranean Sea by plane. I counseled: a ship can be torpedoed, but a plane can be shot down over the sea and no trace will remain. We suggested to Nasser: let’s organized a plane flight to Egypt via Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Then we told the Iranians that we are sending a government commission to Iraq and asked permission for an overflight across the territory of Iran. The government of Iran agreed to the overflight across the airspace of Iran, and Iraq permitted the overflight of this aircraft to Egypt. However, Saudi Arabia did not agree to the overflight of the aircraft across its airspace. [He] had to fly without this consent. And here an episode occurred which clearly showed the character of Nasser. We told our pilot: do not fly across Saudi Arabia without permission. If Saudi Arabia does not give permission then fly to Damascus. The aircraft flew over Iraq. Nasser ordered the aircraft to fly directly to Cairo over Saudi Arabia without permission. Our pilot refused in a difficult situation, and asked Moscow. We confirmed – fly to Damascus. We are responsible for an aircraft with our aircraft markings. If we had not asked for consent and flown across Saudi Arabia to Egypt, what would have happened? For we protested when the Americans flew over Vienna without permission. One cannot fail to take this into account.

 Nasser considered that once there was a revolution in Iraq, Iraq ought to immediately go over to [the side] of Egypt. There were other sentiments in Iraq. How were we at fault in this? But, said Khrushchev, if I were in Iraq I also would not agree to a union with Egypt. Bizri did not agree. One’s will cannot be imposed, one cannot fail to take into consideration that Iraq is much richer than Egypt. 

M. Daud Undoubtedly

N. S. Khrushchev If Iraq had united with Egypt then Egypt would have robbed it blind, and the riches of Iraq would have gone to Egypt. The Iraqi patriots did not want this. There was nothing Communistic in this resistance to union with Egypt. One simply needs to understand one’s own national interests and then you will decide this very question, that is, you won’t agree to the union. But Nasser had set himself a task: to become head of the entire Arab world, which was unacceptable to the Arabs, especially as this was not about an ideological movement, but about a union of states. Nasser is a smart person, he understood, but he cannot tell the truth about the failures of his policy and invented something about Communists. And he has failed in this.

Who loses more from our quarrel, we or he? If he quarrels with us and won’t take credits from us, we won’t be out of pocket, materially we lose nothing from this. On the contrary. However, it would be damaging to us politically: a weakening of the anti-colonial forces. Khrushchev said, turning to Daud, you’ve read our last letter to Nasser? It seems to me it gives an objective picture of the situation.

M. Daud confirmed this.

N. S. Khrushchev This Saturday in Moscow I will probably be able to receive El-Kuny, the UAR ambassador, who is bringing us the message of reply of Nasser, possibly there will be something new here.

I want to say some words about the question of Communism. We are Communists, but we think that if a child is born prematurely, it will die. Communism is a historical law. It depends on how history develops. And we are against surgical interference. Some of our neighbors could confirm that we firmly hold to a policy of non-interference.

 M. Daud said that he confirms this.

 N. S. Khrushchev said that we will henceforth hold to such a policy. After this Khrushchev said confidentially that according agent information that the Americans already almost have a stranglehold on Nasser. They give him credits, but publish nothing about this so there be no loss of trust in him from other Eastern peoples. Khrushchev declared, we could say absolutely accurately by numbers when and what deals he, Nasser, recently concluded with the Americans. Khrushchev added that we showed our awareness during the Suez events, and also when the Turks were preparing an attack on Syria; the Turks were enraged, but they didn’t know our sources, our secret of getting this information. Then we found out how Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan were preparing an attack on Iraq and we also prevented the development of events in this direction. Now things might go better, but just let Nasser not throw his domestic questions to us and not accuse us of interference in these internal affairs. For some do this. There in South American countries, for example, they threw rotten eggs at Nixon, and it turned out we were at fault in this! But if Nixon had come to us then we would bear responsibility for his security and nothing would threaten him here. However, we cannot be cursed for countries where we don’t even have our ambassadors. 

 M. Daud I am very grateful to you for your explanation and completely understood your position.

N. S. Khrushchev said that we are conducting an honest and unselfish policy. They cuss us out in Egypt, but at the same time send telegrams with a request to hurry up the conclusion of an agreement for new supplies of Soviet weapons to the UAR. However, we are not fools. It is one thing to give economic aid without any political conditions whatsoever, but they spit in your eyes and you give the spitter artillery pieces and machineguns; if matters are pursued that way then they won’t respect you. If it were a matter of an agreement on a purely commercial basis, that’s another matter, for payment for all these weapons is essentially symbolic. We are not very interested in preserving our supplies to Nasser at any price. It is sufficient to recall how many years the British sat in Egypt as masters. We lived and nothing happed with us. If such a situation returns now, we won’t suffer; Egypt will suffer more, although of course it wouldn’t be pleasant for us if colonialism were restored in this sector. 

M. Daud said that the policy of Afghanistan is directed at all these misunderstandings be resolved as soon as possible 

N. S. Khrushchev replied that this, too, is our wish and that another situation would be only to the advantage of the imperialists. However, how can one help Nasser when he again comes to the point that he even plans to throw out Hawrani. Khrushchev said, Nasser is a young man, he is learning the hard way – he will learn. When they teach a child and they show that one cannot touch [something] hot, but it is cold – he won’t burn his fingers yet – he doesn’t learn. 

We told him sincerely and advise him in his own interests, but he thinks that we have some secret goals here. Well, what of it, let him try. But he has already tried and now sees what this leads to. 

M. Daud expressed gratitude for the conversation. He again asks that the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan discussions being held in Moscow be expedited.

 N. S. Khrushchev said that he will take steps so that the conclusion of the discussions is expedited. Right now only technical questions associated with the construction of roads remain; specialists and technical experts are elaborating these questions. The elaboration of these questions will be finished in the near future.

 M. Daud said that he again would like to say that Afghanistan is sincerely thankful for the aid which the Soviet Union has given it up to now and is being given absolutely unselfishly.

 N. S. Khrushchev said, “We regard you and the King of Afghanistan with great respect. We have no reason for our relations to change for the worse”.

 M. Daud confirmed this.

 N. S. Khrushchev said that for our part we will do nothing that could spoil relations. We have given no cause for you to change your good attitude toward us.

 M. Daud said that he is confident of this. 

The conversation ended at this.

Present at the conversation were: from the Afghan side, Abdul Hakim [Shakhalami], Ambassador of Afghanistan in Moscow; from the Soviet side, V. S. Semenov, Deputy USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, and A. P. Pavlov, Chief of the Department of Middle Eastern Countries.

Eh. Aliyev interpreted the conversation

A. P. Pavlov recorded the conversation