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Documents

July 12, 1969

Memorandum of conversation of the Ambassador of the USSR A.F. Dobrynin with Kissinger

In this July 1969 report to the Politburo, Soviet ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin recounts a wide-ranging conversation with national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger a half-year into President Richard M. Nixon’s first term. Dobrynin also offers his candid personal evaluation of Kissinger and the secret White House “backchannel” established by Nixon to circumvent the State Department and communicate directly with the Soviet leadership.

July 11, 1975

Draft US Department of State Cable on Approach to South Korea on French Reprocessing Plant

A follow up report for Henry Kissinger on the state of U.S. policy toward South Korea's purchase of a French reprocessing plant.

July 8, 1975

US National Security Council Memorandum, Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing

South Korea's nuclear plans have reached a point where the U.S. State Department believes that the Embassy in Seoul must "approach the Koreans directly."

November 19, 1971

South African Nuclear Fuel Agreement

U.S. State Department memorandum weighing the arguments for and against renewing the agreement to sell uranium enrichment services to South Africa. The political fallout from engaging with the South African apartheid regime coupled with the fact that they had not signed the NPT were closely considered.

October 23, 1975

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 059.298

Pope discusses DPRK representatives' attempt to establish contacts with Henry Kissinger via China as Heo Dam is scheduled to meet Henry Kissinger after the latter's visit to Beijing.

December 22, 1973

Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger from John A. Froebe, Jr., “Korean West Coast Island Situation"

John A. Froebe, Jr., briefs Henry Kissinger on the Northern Limit Line Dispute.

December 3, 1973

Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger from Richard H. Solomon, “The Korean Situation and the China Element"

National Security Council staff member Richard H. Solomon advises Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to work with the Chinese in order to respond to North Korea's provocations along the Northern Limit Line

May 18, 1974

State Department cable 104613 to Consulate, Jerusalem, 'India Nuclear Explosion'

The day of the test, State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) rushed to update Kissinger. INR provided background on what had happened, how the United States and Canada had inadvertently helped India produce plutonium for the test device, earlier U.S. and Canadian demarches against “peaceful nuclear explosions,” and India’s capabilities to produce and deliver nuclear weapons. The report did not state whether India had made a decision to produce weapons, but it forecast that two large unsafeguarded reactors under construction could eventually “produce enough plutonium for 50-70 nuclear weapons.”

January 16, 1973

H. Daniel Brewster to Herman Pollack, 'Indian Nuclear Developments'

The interagency group prepared a response to NSSM 156 on 1 September 1972 and it was sent to Kissinger. The summary of the study reproduced here includes the conclusion that an Indian test would be “a set-back to nonproliferation efforts” and that Washington should “do what [it] can to avert or delay” one. Thus, recommendations included a number of unilateral and multilateral actions that the United States government could take, noting that “given the poor state” of Indo-American relations, an “overly visible” U.S. effort would more likely speed up an Indian decision to test a device, Even non-US efforts were likely not to “be per se effective.”

June 27, 1969

Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Shriver and the National Security Council, 'Conversation with Schriver on Pompidou Visit, Military Cooperation with France, and Middle East'

Ambassador Shriver and Kissinger discuss wanting President Pompidou to visit the U.S. soon, and the former states that he will ask President Nixon to give his opinion on this and to approve it soon. Kissinger further states that he does not know if the President wants to aid France, either militarily or by nuclear means, though he does not think it is out of the question that the President may want to do so. Finally, Kissinger notes that the U.S. does not need French aid in negotiations with the Soviets but would not be opposed to their help in talks with the Israelis.

Pagination