On June 5, 1962, N.S. Khrushchev received Mamadou Dia, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Senegal, for discussions on Soviet-Senegalese relations. Dia expressed Senegal’s interest in learning from both socialist and non-socialist nations, proposed agreements on trade, technical cooperation, and cultural ties, and briefly discussed disarmament and NATO tensions. Khrushchev emphasized the USSR’s willingness to cooperate with non-socialist states while expressing hope that Senegal might adopt socialism in the future.

Subandrio discusses Indonesia’s relations with the US, particularly Sukarno’s recent meeting with Kennedy, where they debated non-alignment, nuclear testing, and the German question. Khrushchev shares his perspective on global tensions, including his discussions with French politician Paul Reynaud and concerns over Western military strategies.

Khrushchev shares his dissatisfaction with how German and French leaders, particularly De Gaulle and Adenauer, have responded to disarmament and peace proposals. He and Nehru discuss the USSR's foreign policy toward Europe, including the fragile state of European alliances, tensions surrounding Berlin, and the possibility of shifts in West Germany's orientation. Khrushchev expresses cautious optimism that the international crisis might be resolved without war, emphasizing the need for negotiations while critiquing Western policies and leadership.

Khrushchev and Nehru discuss rising global tensions, particularly surrounding the German peace treaty and the status of Berlin. Nehru expresses concerns about the resumption of Soviet nuclear tests, warning of their impact on global opinion and the risk of escalating conflict. Khrushchev defends the tests as a necessary response to Western threats and military buildup. The two leaders are later joined by Ghanaian President Nkrumah to present a collective appeal from the Belgrade Conference, urging peaceful solutions and proposing a summit between Khrushchev and Kennedy to reduce the risk of war. Khrushchev emphasizes the need for global disarmament and greater involvement from neutral nations to pressure the US toward peace, while Nehru advocates for careful diplomacy to avoid further polarization.

Khrushchev and McCloy discuss the German peace treaty, with Khrushchev praising Eisenhower’s disarmament efforts and reaffirming the USSR’s intent to sign the treaty regardless of US opposition. They exchange views on nuclear testing, disarmament, and verification mechanisms, with both sides recognizing the challenges of inspections and trust. The conversation ends with agreement to continue talks the following day to further explore disarmament and German settlement issues.

Khrushchev and Popovic discuss the ongoing tensions surrounding the peace treaty with Germany and the future of West Berlin, with Khrushchev emphasizing the Soviet Union’s readiness to act if negotiations fail. They address the actions of Western powers, particularly the United States and its allies, and the risks of escalation, while acknowledging the importance of diplomacy to avoid conflict. Khrushchev also touches on the Soviet decision to suspend disarmament measures, the broader international situation, and internal developments in both the USSR and Yugoslavia.

Khrushchev addresses graduates of Soviet military academies, emphasizing the strength of the Soviet armed forces and the importance of peace through disarmament and diplomacy. He outlines the need to conclude a peace treaty with Germany to resolve lingering tensions from World War II, criticizing the resistance of West Germany under Chancellor Adenauer and warning against militarization and nuclear escalation. Khrushchev stresses that the Soviet Union seeks peaceful coexistence but will defend its sovereignty if necessary.

Khrushchev and Somali Prime Minister Shermarke discuss Somalia’s efforts to maintain political and economic independence following decolonization, with Shermarke requesting Soviet assistance for development projects in agriculture, industry, and infrastructure. Khrushchev emphasizes the Soviet Union’s support for anti-imperialist movements and offers potential economic cooperation while acknowledging the need to balance assistance with domestic priorities.

This document provides an in-depth analysis of Cuba's reactions to various international developments during late 1964. Cuban leaders were pleased with the radical anti-imperialist tone and diplomatic successes of the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. Fidel Castro welcomed French President de Gaulle's anti-American stance during his Latin America trip, linking it to tensions in pro-American governments. The British Labour Party's election victory was viewed positively, fostering hopes for policies aligned with Cuba's interests. Domestically, Nikita Khrushchev's ousting in the USSR created distrust and concerns about the continuity of Soviet support. Lastly, Cuba cautiously celebrated China's first nuclear test, seeing it as a potential shift in global power dynamics favoring socialism.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

On this second day of the talks, international affairs were the main topic of conversation. From the Soviet record, which like those of the first and the next discussion, was made by Fedorenko and the third secretary of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Anatolii I. Filyov, it is evident that the atmosphere was fully relaxed, anti-imperialism brought the communist leaders together. Both hated America, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and their leaders. They discussed the situation in the Near East in detail and were heartened by the victory of leftist forces in Iraq. They joked a lot. And only at the end did Mao lightly touch upon his claims to Khrushchev, who at once reminded the Chinese leader of the Soviet advisors. It was obvious that this question continued to bother him, and Khrushchev exacerbated his grievance.