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September 7, 1961

Memorandum of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru

Nikita Khrushchev and Jawaharlal Nehru discuss global disarmament, the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear weapons testing, and the ongoing tensions surrounding Berlin. Khrushchev defends Soviet nuclear tests as a necessary response to perceived Western threats and the failure of disarmament talks, asserting that such actions are essential to safeguard the USSR and the socialist bloc. He reassures Nehru that access to West Berlin will remain unobstructed after the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany, though the legal basis would shift from occupation rights to agreements with the GDR. Both leaders emphasize their shared commitment to disarmament, but Nehru voices concerns that continued nuclear testing may derail global peace efforts and delay meaningful progress toward disarmament.

September 6, 1961

Record of the Conversation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. S. Khrushchev with the Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru

Khrushchev and Nehru discuss rising global tensions, particularly surrounding the German peace treaty and the status of Berlin. Nehru expresses concerns about the resumption of Soviet nuclear tests, warning of their impact on global opinion and the risk of escalating conflict. Khrushchev defends the tests as a necessary response to Western threats and military buildup. The two leaders are later joined by Ghanaian President Nkrumah to present a collective appeal from the Belgrade Conference, urging peaceful solutions and proposing a summit between Khrushchev and Kennedy to reduce the risk of war. Khrushchev emphasizes the need for global disarmament and greater involvement from neutral nations to pressure the US toward peace, while Nehru advocates for careful diplomacy to avoid further polarization.

July 8, 1961

Record of a Conversation Between N. S. Khrushchev and K. Popovic, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Concerning the Questions of Signing a Peace Treaty with Germany

Khrushchev and Popovic discuss the ongoing tensions surrounding the peace treaty with Germany and the future of West Berlin, with Khrushchev emphasizing the Soviet Union’s readiness to act if negotiations fail. They address the actions of Western powers, particularly the United States and its allies, and the risks of escalation, while acknowledging the importance of diplomacy to avoid conflict. Khrushchev also touches on the Soviet decision to suspend disarmament measures, the broader international situation, and internal developments in both the USSR and Yugoslavia.

July 4, 1961

Summary of N.S. Khrushchev's Speech to Graduates of the USSR Defensive Forces Military Academy on the Question of Signing the Peace Agreement with the GDR

Khrushchev addresses graduates of Soviet military academies, emphasizing the strength of the Soviet armed forces and the importance of peace through disarmament and diplomacy. He outlines the need to conclude a peace treaty with Germany to resolve lingering tensions from World War II, criticizing the resistance of West Germany under Chancellor Adenauer and warning against militarization and nuclear escalation. Khrushchev stresses that the Soviet Union seeks peaceful coexistence but will defend its sovereignty if necessary.

November 17, 1964

Echo of Recent International Events in Cuba

This document provides an in-depth analysis of Cuba's reactions to various international developments during late 1964. Cuban leaders were pleased with the radical anti-imperialist tone and diplomatic successes of the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. Fidel Castro welcomed French President de Gaulle's anti-American stance during his Latin America trip, linking it to tensions in pro-American governments. The British Labour Party's election victory was viewed positively, fostering hopes for policies aligned with Cuba's interests. Domestically, Nikita Khrushchev's ousting in the USSR created distrust and concerns about the continuity of Soviet support. Lastly, Cuba cautiously celebrated China's first nuclear test, seeing it as a potential shift in global power dynamics favoring socialism.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

July 6, 2023

Interview with Xanthe Hall

Xanthe Hall recounts her journey in nuclear disarmament, beginning in the 1980s with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the UK, driven by a strong opposition to nuclear weapons and an emphasis on nonviolent action. She emphasizes the importance of shifting global narratives, including the focus on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which played a pivotal role in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Hall discusses the challenges posed by current geopolitical dynamics, such as the war in Ukraine, and the difficulties in maintaining momentum for disarmament in a world still shaped by nuclear deterrence beliefs. Despite these obstacles, she remains committed to fostering collaboration across civil society and advancing a normative process for disarmament, believing that a nuclear-free world remains essential and achievable.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

July 1993

Saddam Meets with Tariq Aziz and Iraqi High-ranking Officials Regarding Ekeus, Inspections, and other Matters

This audio file contains a meeting between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi high-ranking officials in which they discuss different issues. Tarqi Aziz discusses the technical negotiations in New York, and the Security Council Resolution 687 of 1991. He asks whether the sanctions will be lifted after the end of the special commission. He recommends hurrying with the commission to shorten the period of inspection and to let them use the cameras they requested in order to claim Iraq had not imposed any obstacles during the inspection process. Saddam states the special target group is concerned with future observation rather than what they have already done so far. He adds that the attempts of overthrowing the regime have failed, thus they insist on using cameras to guarantee future observation. One of the speakers advises to let the team work in a technical and a professional mechanism away from means of media which always exaggerate things and make matters worse. Saddam shifts to another subject, saying that Iraq has unmasked western democracy. They discuss European political affairs, ruling parties, socialism, and what Arabs and Asians face from offering those hard jobs and low positions requiring only physical effort. Finally, they agree to send a message to the commission saying that when you believe in an appropriate way towards Iraq, you will have positive results. 

October 9, 1992

Ewan Buchanan to Warwick Morris (UK Embassy Seoul), 'U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting'

A telegram from Ewen Buchanan, an arms control specialist with the FCO, to Warrick Morris, the UK Ambassador to Seoul.

January 26, 1968

"Defence And Oversea Policy Committee: Non-Proliferation: Memorandum By The Minister Of State For Foreign Affairs "

Subsequent to De Gaulle's November 1967 veto of Wilson's EEC application, senior British ministers still saw the European question as having considerable importance. Shortly before his departure from the role of Foreign Secretary, George Brown reported to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that the ructions over Article 3 of the NPT would be "particularly awkward for us as potential members of EURATOM and the E.E.C." De Gaulle's second "Non!" only served to postpone Britain's membership of the EEC, as Edward Heath's Conservative government successfully campaigned for accession, which took place in 1973.

October 2, 1967

Letter from Derek Day (Foreign Office) to Michael Palliser (Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister)

Responding to a request from Michael Palliser (Wilson's Private Secretary for foreign affairs), the Foreign Office's seasoned Europe-watcher Derek Day argued that the government needed to balance three – sometimes conflicting – UK interests. First, there was the position as a European power, particularly with regard to the ongoing EEC application. Second, there was the UK's status as a nuclear power, in which the UK shared “special responsibilities” with the US, exemplified by the UK's acquisition of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles as its primary nuclear deterrent. Third, there was the desire to see a non-proliferation treaty concluded, which sometimes meant disagreement with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Day contended that the United Kingdom seemed to have been successful in positioning itself as understanding European anxieties, with Bonn having congratulated Wilson's administration on bring “good Europeans.” Day's assessment was seen and lauded by Wilson, who hoped that it was correct.

Pagination