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January 16, 1963

Memorandum of Conversation between Aminitore Fanfani, Prime Minister of the Italian Republic, and the President [John F. Kenndy], 'Modernization of Nuclear Missiles in Italy and the Miditerranean'

Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani’s visit to the U.S. was an opportunity for he and President Kennedy to reach “a meeting of the minds” on the Jupiter-Polaris problem. The two had several conversations during the next two days on East-West relations, NATO nuclear issues, and the developing world, among other topics.  During this conversation, with only the U.S. translator present, Kennedy explained to Fanfani that Polaris/Sergeant missiles as a replacement for Jupiter/Corporals, along with Italian participation in an eventual MLF, should be announced as “whole package” rather than to have “the different points of decision simply leak out, without coherence and possibly at the wrong moment.” He believed that the main elements of the agreement would find “general approval” among most political groupings in Italy. When Fanfani brought up the possibility of announcing the U.S. request on Jupiters and Polaris and then taking it to his government, Kennedy emphasized the need for quick action, adding that it would “not be desirable to allow for prolonged discussion” of the package.

At Fanfani’s request, Kennedy explained the arrangements for Polaris missions in the Mediterranean, which operated out of a base in the Iberian Peninsula (Rota, Spain), and the various options for an MLF, either surface or submarine ships. Such an approach, Kennedy believed, was a way to improve the “position of the West.” Accepting Kennedy’s assertions about the dangers of the Jupiter missiles, Fanfani nevertheless saw a “psychological” problem involving the “prestige and strength” of Italy’s armed forces. Kennedy “indicated lively interest” in Fanfani’s question as to whether the Jupiter bases could be used for “cooperative peaceful space efforts.”

At the meeting’s conclusion, Kennedy “stressed that by the following morning they should be able to combine four or five points into a proposal that would strengthen the Italian and American position within the framework of the Alliance, thus making this meeting a gain in its cohesiveness and hence political strength.”

November 9, 1962

Memorandum from William R. Tyler to the Secretary [Dean Rusk] through U. Alexis Johnson, 'Turkish and Italian IRBM's'

Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

December 14, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 14 December 1962

The cable from van Roijen concerns a conversation between him and Director of UN Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State Joseph Sisco. Sisco informs van Roijen that the Kennedy Administration has decided to let the Cuban issue quietly die, boiling down to the United States and the Soviet Union "agreeing to disagree." The State Department does not think there should be further debate on the issue in the UN Security Council because the U.S. is not willing to make further concessions while there have been no UN inspections. Sisco also reports that the Soviets have made a commitment to withdraw all combat troops from Cuba.

October 26, 1962

Cable from Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, The Hague, to Dutch Embassy, London, 26 October 1962

This cable from Foreign Minister Luns refers to a personal letter received from British Foreign Minister Lord Home, regarding the stance of the United Kingdom in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The letter is one encouraging support to the United States at the UN Security Council, and that such a crisis would have repurcussions not only for the Caribbean but for Europe as well. Luns later sent a reply of thanks, indicating continuing solidarity with the Western World and promises to keep in closer touch with the British.

October 28, 1962

Cable no. 332 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek writes of a breakthrough with the UN Secretary General and Cuba with regards to ending the crisis; Castro is willing to enter into settlements to resolve the crisis peacefully, on the condition that Cuba's sovereignty and security not be infringed by the United States. Preparations are being made for Cuban foreign minister Raul Roa to fly to the UN Security Council meeting.

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry

Report on a breakfast held by Zorin - chairman of the Security Council - with its members. The topics of discussion include: American agreement to the Soviet proposal for checks on vessels carried out by representatives of the International Red Cross, the Irish proposal to convene the Council right after U Thant's return from Cuba to decide on an inspection mechanism for the dismantlings, and the Ghanaian delegate's remarks on the situation in Congo.

November 2, 1962

Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU re 1 November 1962 meeting with Stevenson

Mikoyan discusses the results of a meeting with Stevenson. The two discussed the quarantine in Cuba, the dismantling of weapons, the possibility of the Soviets and Americans coming to agreements over the issues to be discussed by the UN Security Council and the possibility of normalization of relations with Cuba in the future.

October 25, 1962

Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry on UN Security Council Meeting of 24 October 1962

Zorin transmits the events of the 24 October meeting relaying the speeches of British, French, Romanian, Chilean, Ghanaian, etc delegates. Zorin argues that delegates from Venezuela and Chile supported the American draft resolution under the US pressure. The United Arab Republic and Ghana stressed the US actions against Cuba violated the principle of maritime freedom and posed a threat to security. UN Acting Secretary-General U Thant proposed the interested parties meet and discuss the situation within several weeks. Zorin also relays that a number of neutral Afro-Asian countries are working on a new draft resolution.

November 1, 1962

Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko to the Soviet Mission in New York

Instructions to the Soviet Mission in New York on negotiations with the UN, especially on the issues of the dismantling of weapons, American bases in Turkey, lifting the blockade and the composition of the group of Security Council agents.

October 25, 1962

Telegram from the Soviet representative to the United Nations, Valerian Zorin, to the USSR MFA

Zorin reports on a meeting of the UN Security Council.

Pagination