The US Ambassador to India met with Jasawant Singh to discuss US-India relations following the Pokhran-II nuclear tests.

Burgess Laird summarizes Jasawant Singh's comments at a recent CFR dinner. Notes from an internal Department of State meeting about the US approach to India and Pakistan are also included with Laird's memo.

Strobe Talbott outlines international efforts against India and Pakistan following nuclear tests by both countries.

Strobe Talbott and Gohar Ayub Khan debate Pakistan's response to India's nuclear tests.

Strobe Talbott and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif discuss Pakistan's possible testing of a nuclear weapon following India's Pokhran-II tests.

This is an interagency Policy Review Committee paper prepared for Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. The piece explores possible short and long-term strategies for dealing with Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.

This document is a three-page brief from U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Jimmy Carter regarding Pakistan's nuclear program.

A memorandum from Hugh Montgomery, The Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department to Ambassador Ronald Spiers discussing Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Director details tensions between Pakistan and India, potential actions by India to stop a Pakistani nuclear program, and the influence of outside actors such as the USSR, China, and the United States.

A U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research report offers an overview of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, and speculates how the development of a weapon in one country could strain relations with Washington and lead to a regional nuclear arms race. India is less likely to take preventive action against Pakistan because of the risk of “antagonizing China,” the report suggests.

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.