In this March 1978 conversation, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski discussed rising US concerns over Soviet and Cuban military involvement in the Horn of Africa, particularly its perceived threat to Western oil routes and the stability of Saudi Arabia. Dobrynin rejected Brzezinski’s fears as exaggerated, reiterating that the conflict stemmed from Somali aggression and emphasizing that the Soviet presence supported Ethiopia's defense. The meeting ended with both sides restating their entrenched positions, with the US seeking assurances of de-escalation and Soviet withdrawal, which Dobrynin declined to provide.

In this January 1975 conversation, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met with US Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to discuss the state of US-Soviet relations, focusing on discriminatory trade legislation, strategic arms negotiations, and the upcoming Brezhnev visit. Kissinger and Rockefeller expressed shared concerns over congressional interference in foreign policy and emphasized their commitment to preserving détente, while privately assuring Dobrynin that recent US threats of military intervention in the Middle East were strategic posturing to prevent another oil embargo. The meeting also highlighted US plans for long-term energy independence and efforts to sustain diplomatic momentum despite mounting domestic political challenges.

Memo by CSMD A. Rossi on the resumption of the work of the Committee of the 18 in Geneva and the issue of non-dissemination nuclear weapons: summary of technical-military observations from SMD to MD of March 1964 on US proposal for declaration on non-dissemination, analysis on nuclear power guidelines and Non-nuclear countries; draft British and Canadian agreements presented to the Atlantic Council and reactions to alliance countries, statement Foreign Minister A. Fanfani to Geneva; US project of nuclear non-dissemination treaty, MAE instructions to amb. Cavalletti

The telegram notifies the White House reaching an interim agreement with Japan that authorizes Tokai Mura to reprocess fifty more tons of spent fuel to keep the plant operating in exchange of Japan not making any attempts toward establishing a new reprocessing plant before 1 June 1981.

The briefing paper describes the Japanese government's reprocessing ability and desire to build the second reprocessing plant to fuel experimental breeder reactor. The State Department wants to resolve safeguards requirements for reprocessing in Japan but agrees that an interim agreement could be reached.

The telegram shows the State Department requesting the US Embassy in Tokyo to learn more about Japanese thinking on a second reprocessing plant and why Japanese MITI and JAERIA held different views on this issue.

The memorandum describing Ambassador Smith's thinking about an improved nonproliferation regime to Director General Yatabe.

The telegram describes the US Embassy in Tokyo reporting Japan's criticism of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 but its unwillingess to be strongly opposed in fear of a cut-off in enrichment services and nuclear reactor components.