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Documents

April 21, 1955

Letter to Z. P. Zaveniagin, 'Regarding the Choice of Devices for Strategic Use'

Report describing the relative merits of the RDS-27 and the SD nuclear weapon designs for use on the R-7 "Semyorka" ICBM.

March 1, 1955

Pravda Newspaper Article on the Decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Concerning the USSR CM [Council of Ministers]

Pravda announces the decisions made by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

May 11, 1989

Soviet Record of Conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and US Secretary of State J. Baker

Gorbachev and Baker discuss cuts in tactical nuclear weapons.

October 27, 1962

Telegram from TROSTNIK (Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (General Isa Pliev)

Malinovsky prohibits the use of nuclear weapons without instructions from Moscow.

June 21, 1946

Soviet Council of Ministers Resolution, No. 1286-525, On Development of Soviet Atomic Weapons

Resolution outlining the work of the newly established Design Bureau No.11 (KB-11). Atomic bombs are referred to in the resolution as “jet engines S,” in two versions, S-1 and S-2 (abbreviated as RDS-1 and RDS-2). RDS-1 meant the analog of the first U.S. plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested on 16 July 1945 in New Mexico RDS-2 signified the analog of the uranium-235 gun type bomb exploded over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945.

April 9, 1946

Soviet Council of Ministers Resolution, Establishing Design Bureau No. 11

Resolution establishing Design Bureau No.11 (KB-11), which was the Soviet analog of the secret wartime American nuclear weapons laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

August 20, 1945

Soviet State Defense Committee Edict No. GKO-9887ss/op

Instructions for the creation of a Special Committee which would supervise nuclear research and development of an atomic bomb.

January 24, 1963

Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Soviet-Cuban Conflicts

Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on post-Cuban-Missile-Crisis conflict between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Beck highlights Cuba’s tendency to act independent of socialist country opinion. He also mentions the negative influence of nationalism on the Cuban government, which has a direct influence on Soviet-Cuban relations. The Soviets believe Cubans do not understand that Soviet negotiations with the US secured Cuba from a future US invasion. The Cuban Missile Crisis also is evidence that neither the US or Soviet Union want to start a nuclear war.

December 5, 1962

Hungarian Legation in Washington (Radványi), Report on Mikoyan’s Visit to Washington

Hungarian Chargé d’Affaires János Radványi reports on Anastas Mikoyan’s visit to Washington, DC. After a brief description of Mikoyan’s Washington itinerary, the report is divided into three sections: Mikoyan’s impressions of his meetings with American officials, meetings in Cuba with Cuban officials, and meetings about different socialist countries (e.g. China, Hungary). Primary subjects discussed include the presence of missiles in Cuba, nuclear proliferation and Latin America as a nuclear free region, missile bases, and the Berlin issue.

November 12, 1962

Hungarian Socialist Workers Party First Secretary János Kádár’s Account of His Visit to Moscow to the HSWP Central Committee

János Kádár presents on his diplomatic trip to Moscow to the Hungarian Central Committee. Kádár first places the Cuban Missile Crisis in context. This includes describing the success of the Cuban revolution, US aggression towards Cuba, and the Cuban-Soviet military and defense agreement, which ultimately spawned the US’s unilateral military mobilization. Kádár then describes the Soviet Union’s strategy to achieve two goals: protect the Cuban revolution and preserve peace. He notes that Cuba and the Soviet Union disagree about how the crisis was resolved, but asks the congress of workers to show complete support of Soviet actions and successes.

Pagination