Cable No. 1825 from Ambassador Yamada Chusei (Egypt) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait (Prime Minister Sedky’s Unofficial Comments)'

Secret

Telegraphic Copy                    [blacked out]                                       04-040

Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait (Prime Minister Sedky’s Unofficial Comments)

No. 1825         Secret  Urgent　(Priority Processing)             [blacked out]

At the dinner party on October 2, hosted by the President, Prime Minister Atef Sedky spoke to Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Owada Hisashi regarding Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Although fragmentary, his comments were as follows:

1. Regarding future responses to Iraq, further strengthening sanctions against Iraq is most important. I think that the use of military force would not be good. I do understand the wish to resort to military force for a fundamental solution to the situation, but what will continue to be important is maintaining the solidarity of the entire international community and the Arab world and putting pressure on Iraq. We should not do anything that would have a negative influence on that.

2. (When Owada said that he thought it would take a considerable amount of time for the sanctions to have an effect and asked Sedky for his prediction) I think that it will take around three months at least, but they will have an effect. Depending on the circumstances, it may be six months, but I think that they will gradually have an effect.

3. (When Owada asked him what scenario he imagined as the result of the sanctions, perhaps Saddam agreeing to a settlement or a coup d’etat taking place) I do not imagine Saddam giving up and agreeing to a settlement. I have met Saddam a number of times. He is cunning and sharp, a man with great confidence in himself. Because he is autocratic and relies on biased information, however, he will not make the first move to settle if he sees that things are going badly. A coup d’etat, too, is inconceivable in Saddam’s organization. I think that the most conceivable scenario is one in which the public’s dissatisfaction increases as the economic sanctions take effect and Saddam becomes unable to resist popular pressure.

4. My (Sedky) view is that the idea of settling the issue by military force, as I said before, could lead to a situation in line with the scenario that Saddam is aiming for. Even if Saddam were to fall, chaos would remain afterwards. I have told this to Secretary of State Baker as well.

Passed to diplomatic missions in the United States, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Syria, Jeddah Consulate General, Britain, France, the United Nations, and the Soviet Union.  (End)