Comments of N.S. Khrushchev

COMMENTS OF N. S. KHRUSHCHEV

dictated 10 August 1959

Therefore what is Taiwan to you, why do you hold onto a dead body, this is only for aggravation, to poison the atmosphere. Therefore is it not better, as the old custom did, to courteously bid farewell and bury deeper [?]. The earlier you do this the earlier the atmosphere will be cleansed and relations between countries will be improved, but this is needed for the peoples of all countries, to ensure peace. You hardly need to prove whether China is in China or China is in Formosa.

They have a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, but we have a treaty with the PRC. If we rely on these treaties we need to find a decision to exclude the use of these treaties. China cannot be evicted from China, but Chiang Kai-shek can completely be.

The Near and Middle East

If they raise this some irony needs to be allowed then, Mr. President, you have some information that we do not believe in the stability of the situation in Iran. We also think that the position of the Shah is not completely strong, possibly, you have other information. You have your people there and know better because the treaty of indirect aggression which you signed, and it is clear to every competent person that it is directed against the forces acting against the Shah. What is such indirect aggression? It is domestic dissatisfaction. You want to come to [his] aid. You came to the aid of the Russian bourgeoisie 42 years ago, you know how this ended. Therefore we think that it is better not to go this route, it is better to rely on the will of your own people and to reckon with the will of your own people. You are afraid that the Shah will lose power. But with such a policy, if there is indirect aggression you worsen the Shah’s position. The more Americans there will be in Iran right now the sooner the Shahinshah’s dynasty will come to an end, but we don’t want anything.

It is the same in the Arab and African countries. We say and have said that the age of the colonizers has come to an end, that these peoples should receive their independence, and the troops should be withdrawn. We can say: there are airdrop aircraft in all countries and therefore if we pursue a policy of sending our forces this won’t lead to [anything] good, this won’t lead to peace, but will lead to war.

About American bases

The question of disarmament is the question of bases. Disarmament might be only gradual, but if you keep the bases then, of course, the tension will remain. Your bases are like a magnet which draws tension to them because we have to prepare against your bases.

I will cite such an argument. Your bases, we even agree to assume [them], are directed at defense against us, of course, you are defending yourselves. But a base intended for defense can also serve both for defense and as an origin of attack. Therefore, it is natural that we have our own bases against your bases.

We thought, why do you need these bases[?] We came to the conclusion that you needed them in order to exhaust us economically, that you surround us with bases, you force us to maintain a big army and spend a lot of money on weapons, and this weakens our economy. I think, Mr. President, that if this were made a basis then it would end up unconvincing because we have the necessary army because we have weapons and new weapons and, accordingly, there will be no further economic weakening, but a solution to the dispute through the use of accumulated weapons. I will tell you that we have such and such missiles, and at such and such a cost. If it wasn’t that way before that we made an aircraft, but when it became old we replaced it, then now if we made a missile and if it was to fly 2000 [km], then in a year or two it will fly its 2000. An atomic warhead also does not get old, it will also lie and wait.

Some have raised [their] voices to prohibit the production of nuclear weapons. I once spoke and said that most probably we will cease this production ourselves, unilaterally, because this is not like growing a cucumber which you grow and then eat, but this [you] make it and [have to] store it. These are arguments of the absurdity of such a position.

Concerning a Troop Withdrawal

We are ready to do this as I declared to Nixon. Here we can go for limitless options. We are not eliminating troops right away, but we will gradually reduce, withdraw, etc., but after the elimination of military bases and the elimination of armed forces [we] are ready for all sorts of monitoring: both to fly and crawl.

Concerning summit conferences

I will tell them that this is for a game. When we cannot find a decision when, like a lightning rod for the public, then the ministers discuss [this]. Another time this is also useful, the appearance is created that a question is being decided, but in essence the question is not being decided, but the decision is being delayed. We agree to this matter, but not as far as infinity.

Concerning Lend-Lease

First of all I repeat what I told the governors and Harriman. Our peoples shed so much blood, what is this blood worth, it has no price, but you want to get [it] from us. You forgave your Allies [their debts], but you all together had fewer losses than we. The problem is not the money, but in the policy. But I said that we agree to reasonable discussions to give nominal satisfaction. 

Concerning the Baltic republics say that this is not a big callous, you are doing this not to allow good relations between our countries, just for this.

The question about the cancellation of restrictions on the movement of foreigners is a domestic question. The faster you eliminate your military bases the faster we will come to agreement on contentious questions and the sooner we will remove the restrictions.

The question about information. Nixon spoke, but this is stupid. I say more in a speech on international questions than President Eisenhower, since if they sign so that all the speeches are published, then we will gain. I think it possible and once I raised this question that from time to time statements on a mutual basis with equal articles and statements without changes could be arranged. But, it is natural that these articles or statements should not incite the peoples of a given country against the government, but any other contentious questions could be raised. Nixon spoke, but we didn’t abridge anything. Ask our people what he said and they will say that he babbled nonsense. I told him that you have created a Soviet person in your imagination, but you don’t understand there is no such person.

Concerning disarmament.

General and complete disarmament, a militia system to protect domestic order. I have talked about this in my statements several times, and their former ambassador gave a lecture in London.

We ought to prepare my statement in the United Nations. It could be done this way: prepare my statement in the Assembly and a written declaration which [could] be distributed to the delegates of the Assembly after the statement. This will be a document.

Concerning a message to Macmillan.

No later than the 15^th, I agree. I think that special courtesies ought to be withdrawn from my message to Macmillan where I say to him that he said such and such, he thought such and such. It possibly ought to be excluded.

Work it out, print it not to send it as a cable but as an original of a letter.

Concerning a conversation with De Gaulle

This was my suggestion, that it’s necessary to make a conversation in the spirit of the letter to Macmillan. But I was thinking and consider that this would be incorrect because Macmillan might inform De Gaulle and then it would be clear that it is repeated word for word. This would anger the proud De Gaulle. Therefore I think that it would be necessary to abandon this idea, rework this letter so it’s not word for word, and to raise some specific questions of interest to France. And those questions need to be raised, they cannot be discarded, they are for both Macmillan and De Gaulle, but somewhat worth working on.

Possibly when Vinogradov holds the conversation he will tactfully say: Mr. President, if you wish, I will leave you an aide-memoire. The President invites [him] for a conversation and [he] needs to accept. The President expressed a desire to hold a conversation with him. He should raise these questions in this conversation, that here are some questions which the government has considered necessary to raise with you, and present [its views]. Since everything is difficult to present with a translation then tell him: if you agree, I will leave you this aide-memoire.

Concerning the message of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru

Such content can be published, but cannot be published unilaterally.

Thank [him] for this message, for the attention, and that I am sure, the same as you, that our efforts are directed at this…

I express gratitude to you for the correct understanding of our policy and, what do you think, Mr. Nehru, ought this correspondence be published or left between us [?]

1k ng

[date off the reproduced page] August 1959