From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with with the Secretary of State of the United States, H. Kissinger, 3 April 1975'

In. No. 01352
5 June 1975

MEMORANDUM OF THE CONVERSATION 

with the Secretary of State of the United States, H. Kissinger

3 April 1975

First. Kissinger, referring to our request regarding the sunken submarine, stated the following during today’s meeting on 3 April. 

He can assure us that the U.S. government will not conduct any operations now or in the future in cases involving Soviet submarines. 

As for the other information requested by the Soviet side, Kissinger stated that an additional response would be provided separately.

Second. Kissinger provided the following response to our inquiry regarding American assistance to Japan in its development of large rockets: 

“Under the U.S.-Japan Agreement on Space Cooperation dated 31 July, 1969, the United States provided certain technology and equipment for the construction of a launcher intended for launching space objects for scientific purposes. The 1969 Agreement clearly states that this technology and equipment will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Agreement covers non-secret technology and equipment, except for technology related to the re-entry of launched objects and the issues associated with it. 

The United States aims to continue such peaceful scientific cooperation with friendly governments. 

We believe that [should there be] a similar cooperation agreement that the Soviet government may enter into, there will be a clear provision regarding the use of equipment or technology solely for peaceful purposes.”

In response to my comment that his statement still does not provide a clear answer to the important question posed in the Soviet government’s inquiry, Kissinger said that he had conveyed the “official text” of the response prepared by the State Department.

However, he also wants to clarify that he personally verified the factual aspect of the issue and in this regard can confidentially state the following on behalf of the U.S. government:

First. The United States provided the Japanese with information only about old “Thor” type rockets from 1955-57. No other information regarding more modern and powerful rockets, especially those of a strategic nature, was provided to the Japanese. Kissinger can firmly assure that the U.S. did not provide and does not intend to provide the Japanese with anything related to critical parts of rockets, such as missile guidance systems, re-entry vehicle technology into the dense layers of the atmosphere, etc., in other words, anything associated with the strategic use of rockets.

Second. The U.S. government officially states that, like the Soviet government, it is not interested in Japan becoming a first-rate state in terms of strategic weaponry and that Washington will continue to be guided by this fundamental principle in the future.

Third. During the meeting, Kissinger requested expedited responses regarding the timing of L.I. Brezhnev’s visit to the USA, as well as his, Kissinger’s, meeting with A.A. Gromyko. Kissinger mentioned that these matters are of personal interest to the President.

Fourth. In connection with the fact that some time ago Vice President Rockefeller expressed a desire to our Charge D’affaires Yu. Vorontsov at one of the receptions to visit the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet government, I casually inquired about Kissinger’s opinion on this matter, referring to the fact that he, as far as I know, is a close friend of Rockefeller and can gauge President Ford’s attitude towards this trip, as they might have already discussed this issue.

Kissinger pointed out that this question, given the complex relationships within the Administration, is indeed not simple. 

He further mentioned that, as far as he understands, there has been no discussion with Ford about the Vice President’s trip to the USSR, as he would have known about it from both Ford and Rockefeller if that were the case.

Kissinger personally is fully in favor of Rockefeller’s trip to the Soviet Union, where he has never been before, and his stay there can undoubtedly have a positive impact on the Vice President’s foreign policy perspective, which at times is still under the influence of “certain outdated clichéd concepts.”

However, Kissinger further emphasized in confidence that under no circumstances should Rockefeller be invited prior to L.I. Brezhnev’s visit to the United States, i.e. before his next meeting with President Ford.

President Ford, Kissinger explained, is very protective of his personal relationship with the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and he might react unfavorably to Rockefeller’s trip to Moscow before a new Soviet-American summit. Even though Ford, Kissinger continued, being a straightforward person, invited Rockefeller to the Vice Presidential position himself, the ongoing speculations in the press and within the White House about Rockefeller’s alleged ambitions for the presidency could have some influence on Ford. Nevertheless, Ford still maintains a good relationship with his Vice President. Therefore, it is better not to stir unnecessary feelings of animosity that may arise in Ford if Rockefeller travels to Moscow before the President’s meeting with the General Secretary, said Kissinger in conclusion, this is my honest advice.

Fifth. During the meeting, Kissinger inquired about our reaction to the appeal made by the Egyptian Foreign Minister [Ismail] Fahmi to the Soviet Union and the USA regarding the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.

I informed him that I had not yet received detailed information on this matter, so I was unable to comment on the appeal. I then asked for his assessment of the Egyptian appeal.

Kissinger responded that they would definitely oppose the involvement of non-aligned countries. Regarding France and England, the U.S. also does not show much enthusiasm for the idea of their participation in the conference. However, considering their allied relations, Washington will likely take a neutral position on this issue. As far as the U.S. concerned, this matter will be resolved mainly based on the level of insistence of France and England themselves.

Kissinger mentioned that he plans to continue the discussion with us at a later time regarding the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. 

In discussing this topic, Kissinger briefly noted that Israelis may, for the first time in many years, feel “out of their depth,” as unexpectedly public opinion in the United States did not support Israel’s position in the matter of the collapsed talks with the Arabs. Even the most ardent leaders of the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. fell silent, awaiting further developments.

Kissinger added that the main challenge with the Israelis is that they still want to retain a significant portion of the captured Arab territory, without realizing that time is now working against them not only in the Arab world but even within the United States itself. Therefore, the Ford administration is currently, for the first time and quite openly, taking an “educational” approach towards Israel, aiming to encourage Israeli leaders to be more flexible and cooperative in the future. Secretary Kissinger hopes that this approach will prove beneficial.

His statement regarding maintaining communication with Rabin and Sadat (with very positive epithets for the latter from Kissinger) is noteworthy, as well as his hint that “who knows, maybe we will still be able to accomplish what was not accomplished ten days ago before [the] Geneva meeting after all.” However, State Secretary avoided providing any further explanations on this matter.

Sixth. During the meeting with Kissinger, the situation in Southeast Asia was briefly discussed.

The conversation on this topic took place immediately after President Ford’s press conference, where, as already reported, the focus was mainly on Vietnam.

In a somewhat philosophical and detached mood today, Kissinger mentioned that “North Vietnamese have been quite lucky” in that the Congress passed a law prohibiting U.S. military intervention in events in Indochina. He noted that there are currently significant disagreements and disarray within the U.S. on many issues, not just Vietnam, which hampers the United States from demonstrating its decisive character that typically arises from internal unity in the country. Kissinger stated that “if it were not for Watergate and the subsequent sharp decline in government power and authority, North Vietnam would not have been able to disassociate itself [translator’s note: from what is not specified] as easily, given that their actions violate the existing agreement with the U.S.”

In his further remarks on this topic, it was clear that Kissinger was nostalgic about the Nixon era, particularly the early years of his presidency. During that time, U.S. foreign policy was predominantly shaped and implemented by the White House with little consideration for the Congress and public opinion of the country.

            Seventh. During the meeting with Kissinger, I brought up the issue of the voluntary principle regarding notifications about major military exercises (within the framework of disarmament measures currently under discussion in Geneva at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe).

I expressed hope to Kissinger that the American delegation would support this principle, as it essentially aligns with what he himself, as the Secretary of State, had mentioned when initially discussing general disarmament measures.

Initially, Kissinger expressed uncertainty about whether that was their position in the past, noting that their Western European allies were against the voluntary principle on this matter, which he found “quite logical”.

After reiterating my arguments, Kissinger got in touch with his deputy, [Arthur] Hartman, who is in charge of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe matters at the State Department.

Following the phone call with Hartman, Kissinger stated that indeed, the Americans had previously talked about incorporating elements of voluntariness related to the mentioned measures, and that they were now willing to stick to this position.

I urged the Secretary that they should provide clear instructions to their delegation in Geneva to actively work in support of our essentially shared position.

Kissinger agreed with this and suggested that their delegation, as with some other issues, would be better off quietly concentrating their efforts among NATO countries without openly showing them that there was a corresponding Soviet-American understanding. This tactic has proven to yield better results.

The Secretary added that, of course, their delegation would be willing to quietly maintain contact with the Soviet delegation on the mentioned issue, as has long been done on a number of other matters.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE USA

(A. DOBRYNIN)

Printed 2 copies eg
1 – USA Desk of the MFA of the USSR
2 – to file

No. 640
23 May 1975