From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US President, R. Nixon, 26 December 1973'

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION

with US President R. Nixon

26 December 1973

First. I visited President Nixon and, citing the instructions of L. I. Brezhnev, conveyed the following to the president on his behalf.

"Mr. President,

I received a detailed message from Ambassador Dobrynin about the content of your conversation with him, which took place on December 13th.

First of all, I would like to express my appreciation to you for the spirit of frankness with which you expressed your thoughts on a number of questions of interest to both our countries.

Frankness and directness are absolutely necessary in communication between us, especially when it comes to exchanging opinions in confidence, and the usefulness of this form of communication between the leaderships of our two powers has been proven repeatedly.

They are necessary for two reasons. Firstly, we are talking about relations between two major powers that have enormous influence on the entire international situation as a whole; secondly, the expression of thoughts in the spirit of frankness and directness helps [us] to better understand each other, and, consequently, helps to find common ground, and even a coincidence of views on issues of mutual interest.

I understand why you began your conversation with statements about the situation in the Middle East. I’ll tell you frankly that much of what you said coincides with our opinion and our assessment of the situation.

You and I have exchanged opinions on Israeli policy more than once. The last time it was in San Clemente. You remember well what was said on our part when we directed attention to the danger awaiting both our powers and the world as a whole due to the tension in the Middle East caused by the ambitions of the people at the helm of Israeli policy and those who support and push it, and you yourself spoke well about these people.

But now I would like to emphasize not what we and you said in the past about Israel, about the Arab countries, and about the situation in the Middle East. Now, after a new bloody cataclysm that has occurred in this region, which has resulted in great casualties on both sides and, frankly speaking, caused considerable damage to Soviet-American relations, we need to focus the main attention on finding a solution to the problem and using the situation which has developed to prevent a new military conflict. There can hardly be any doubt that a new military clash in the Middle East would entail even more severe consequences, including for the relations between our countries, than has been the case so far.

I share your opinion that Israel wants war, not peace. However, a clarification arises here, with which you will apparently agree - it is not the people of Israel who need war, but the people who now determine its policy, and their policy is futile. Israel cannot exist all the time, being, as they say, “at odds” with the whole Arab world. After all, the Arabs are supported by virtually the entire world, which has long been convinced that the main reason for the tense situation in the Middle East and the military clashes that have taken place there is Israel’s desire to seize Arab territories by force.

The question of liberating Arab territories from Israeli troops is a key issue. And, of course, we should not be talking about liberating part of the occupied territories or even most of them, but all the lands seized from the Arabs. We believe there should be complete clarity on this question. How this question is resolved will, of course, depend on the outcome of the upcoming peace conference on the Middle East, which is about to take place, and we are doing everything we can in this direction.

Of course, the Soviet Union and the US should not put themselves in a position where one or the other of the two powers, or even both, could be used by the parties for some narrow interests that are contrary to both the task of establishing a lasting peace in the Middle East and the task of the further development of Soviet-American relations. We would like to express the hope that both our countries will proceed from this. I would like to note In this regard that I am impressed by your statement regarding the position of a certain minority in the US, for whom everything is good which disrupts and sets back Soviet-American relations, and everything is bad which helps [them] rise to an even higher level. In this question, of course, you know best how the plans of the aforementioned minority can be most successfully upset, for whom Israel with its policy today is just a stopover on the way to achieving the far-reaching goals of those people [whom] I mentioned, and you yourself have spoken out about them quite clearly.

I want to assure you that at the peace conference our representatives - initially, Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, and then others who will represent the Soviet Union, will proceed from this principled position and maintain the closest contact with the US representatives. Of course, on a number of fundamental and sensitive questions that require agreement via a confidential channel, we will do this in accordance with the established practice which has fully justified itself.

Still, in conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to emphasize one or two more thoughts.

We think that the conference may be in jeopardy if the first phase of the peace conference does not find a solution to the issue of Israeli compliance with Security Council Resolution 339 about the withdrawal of Israeli troops as a first step. We know the feelings of the Arabs on this matter and want to tell you about it directly.

Further, Israel, if it intends to prevent a positive outcome of the conference or to even disrupt it, it can of course do so. A continuation of its current line on the question of liberating Arab territories and presenting all sorts of absurd demands on Arab states could lead to this. But if Israel takes such a path and sticks to it with its characteristic tenacity, remaining deaf to any reasonable proposals aimed at resolving the situation, then you yourself understand that the whole world will hold not only Israel responsible for this. In this regard, I would like to say that we very much value your frank and accurate statements both about the very spirit of Israel’s current policy and about your firm intentions for the future. We can only wish you success here.

Now I would like to express some opinions regarding your thoughts on the question of Soviet-American relations.

In fact, it remains for me to take into account your statements regarding the difficulties encountered in resolving the well-known question related to the trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and the US. It is regrettable that the artificial barrier created in Congress by opponents of the development of relations between our countries has not been overcome. But we approach the question this way: this is a mutual matter, we do not act as petitioners, although we are convinced that the implementation of the agreement reached would meet our common interests.

Perhaps it would be a repetition on my part if I now began to prove that we firmly stand for the course in Soviet-American relations that was clearly and convincingly defined and formulated during the two summit meetings in 1972 and 1973. You correctly note the firmness of my own convictions in the correctness and validity of this course.

I must say that I personally, all my colleagues in the leadership, and in general the entire leadership of the country stand for this principled course. Therefore, your idea that Soviet-American relations are key to the fate of the world and central to your foreign policy can only be met with a positive attitude on our part. You and I should stick to the course we have taken, especially since it was expressed in a number of very important specific agreements, which the world actually greeted favorably.

Of course, both you and we know voices of a different order, and this especially applies to the voices being heard in Peking. But this is not a surprise for us, nor is it for you. In fact, this is further proof that the agreements concluded between us, especially the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, hit the mark, that they meet the interests of the world, and not the interests of those who would like to see constant tension in relations between our countries, and still better, a clash between them.

You are right when you point out that there are some in Europe who do not like the success of the development of Soviet-American relations. We also hear similar statements, including in connection with Middle Eastern affairs and the preparations for the peace conference. We can only express regret about this. We are, of course, trying to explain and also, as you say, “a hundred times” we have also given such explanations to interested parties that our efforts in Middle Eastern affairs are aimed at establishing peace in this area and only peace, and we pursue no other goals.

I completely agree that views on some questions be exchanged regarding both the peace conference on the Middle East and the planned new Soviet-American summit meeting during the upcoming meeting between A. A. Gromyko and H. Kissinger.

I also drew attention to your statement about China and American-Chinese relations. Your statement that you will not do anything in the area of relations with China that could damage or cool Soviet-American relations, of course, can only meet with a positive attitude on our part.

You and I have spoken on this topic—about China—although perhaps not in detail. You know our position; We have also listened carefully to your statements on this topic. We proceed from the fact that both sides are well aware of the need to ensure that the question of relations with China is not a cause for slippage from the course taken by the United States of America and the Soviet Union in the development of their mutual relations.

A few words about your statements, Mr. President, regarding your intentions in connection with certain aspects of the domestic political situation in the United States. Thank you for communicating your firm intention to remain where you are.

These are the thoughts that were partly inspired by the content of your statements, and partly I wanted to speak independently of them.

If you have any thoughts in connection with this message of mine, I will be glad if you express them to me. I send you greetings and best wishes from my colleagues and myself personally.”

This time the conversation with the President took place in the presence of Kissinger, who had returned from his long foreign trip a few days ago.

The conversation began with the President, citing the fact that he had not yet had time to inform Kissinger about our previous private conversation with him, briefly summing up for Kissinger the essence of his statements during the conversation.

It needs to be said that Nixon quite accurately summed up his previous statements, including his criticism of the behavior of Jewish and pro-Israel circles in the United States.

Kissinger listened, nodded his head, as if expressing his agreement with the President, and at the end he briefly noted that he completely agreed with the analysis made by the President.

After this, the President asked me to begin presenting the thoughts and statements of L. I. Brezhnev. By agreement with the President, this was first done with respect to the Middle East.

Having listened carefully to everything that I said in accordance with instructions, the President stated that he would like to convey the following to the General Secretary in this regard.

He, the President, agrees with L. I. Brezhnev, that now it is better to focus not on the past, not on repeating what has already been said to one other on Middle Eastern affairs at Camp David and San Clemente, although the General Secretary, presumably, turned out to be more far-sighted then than he himself, the President.

He also agreed with the General Secretary's remark that the recent military conflict in the Middle East had also caused considerable damage to Soviet-American relations. He, the President, does not undertake to judge now why this happened (he made it clear that he was referring to the increased combat readiness of the US [armed forces] announced then by the White House, referring to my sharp criticism of this action in subsequent conversations with Kissinger). “Apparently, we (the US) proceeded from the wrong premises here. Unfortunately, this still happens sometimes. But the main thing was that the situation was quickly rectified through mutual efforts. And this became possible only thanks to the previously achieved high level of confidential, trusting relations between both governments and personally between the President and the General Secretary. I consider this a particularly important fact".

He, the President, is now pleased to note that our relations have once again returned to the general course of relations that were determined during the two summit meetings.

He would like to note “the extremely constructive and skillful role played by Soviet Minister Gromyko in overcoming a number of difficulties that arose during the opening of the peace conference. I want the General Secretary to know about this."

Kissinger made a remark in this regard that he generally appreciated the professional cooperation that existed between both ministers at the conference, expressing the hope that this would continue in the future, including between the permanent representatives of both countries at the conference in Geneva.

Endorsing Kissinger's remarks, the President said that he agreed with the General Secretary that on a number of the most fundamental and sensitive issues additional mutual agreement would be required through a confidential channel, in accordance with the practice that has entirely justified itself in this regard.

Nixon fully supported the statement of L. I. Brezhnev which I conveyed that the USSR and the US, of course, should not put themselves in a position where one or the other of the two powers, or even both, could be used by the parties in any narrow interests that are contrary to both the task of establishing lasting peace in the Middle East as well as the task of the further development of Soviet-American relations.

The President asked it be passed to the General Secretary that he will proceed from this and that he will not allow Jewish circles, as well as figures like Senator Jackson, to upset and throw back Soviet-American relations, and they are now attacking these relations from different sides, pursuing their specific, selfish goals. When they do this they pay special attention to the Middle East problem in the hope that this is where one of the most vulnerable links in relations between the USSR and the USA lie.

Nixon further noted that he would like to emphasize one more point in this regard.

He said, in the overall complex situation around the Middle East which has been created in which both foreign policy and domestic (at least for the US) factors are closely intertwined, it is extremely important that both Moscow and Washington avoid the temptation to trip each other up or try to negotiate during the conference so as to push one another out of this important region. This would be a very short-sighted policy that would cause great damage to Soviet-American relations, to the delight of all those who seek to slow them down.

I told the President that we proceed from the mutual recognition of the serious responsibility of both our countries to promote a lasting peaceful settlement in the Middle East, actively contributing to its transformation from a zone of constant and dangerous conflict into an area where relations between the currently warring neighboring countries would gradually normalize and then develop on a solid foundation which the peace conference must lay. I stressed that this is precisely what the Soviet Union is now guided by in its approach to Middle Eastern affairs, and that an important place in this approach is occupied by the desire to ensure that, as a result of a settlement, Soviet-American relations will be further strengthened, and not worsened.

All this is clearly evidenced by the principled position of the Soviet leadership, set out in the views conveyed to you today by L. I. Brezhnev, I said in conclusion to the President. Of course, the principle of reciprocity must be strictly observed here on the American side, which, in the past, it must be admitted, did not always act consistently in this sense, I added.

The President said that he agreed to act in the spirit of the views presented by the General Secretary.

In accordance with the instructions, I drew the President’s attention further to the fact that the issue of liberating all occupied Arab territories from Israeli troops is a key question. The outcome of the peace conference will, of course, depend on how this question is resolved.

I further cited the words of L. I. Brezhnev that the conference may be in jeopardy if a solution to the question of Israel's implementation of Security Council Resolution 339 on the withdrawal of Israeli troops as a first step is not found in the first phase of the peace conference. The Soviet leadership knows the mood of the Arabs on this matter and wants to tell you about it directly, I told the President.

The President agreed that the question of the withdrawal of Israeli troops is the key to the solution of the entire Middle East problem. However, in all his subsequent statements on this topic - in connection with our clear formulations on this subject - he clearly avoided talking about the need for a withdrawal “from all the territories,” although he proceeded from the need to return “most” or “almost all” territories. However, he did not elaborate on this question more specifically, citing the fact that the entire complex of Middle Eastern affairs still requires its deep analysis and consideration, which is what they are doing right now, given the urgency of the problem.

Nixon expressed his agreement with the opinion of L. I. Brezhnev about the importance of Israel's implementation of Security Council Resolution 339 on the withdrawal of Israeli troops in the first phase of the conference, saying that he had given corresponding instructions to Kissinger.

Kissinger made a remark in this regard that he had been privately putting pressure on the Israeli government in this direction for quite some time and, after the end of the Israeli elections (on December 31st), he hoped to achieve a successful accomplishment of this matter in January, although progress on this issue comes with great difficulty.

Kissinger cited as a positive sign today's statement by Israeli Defense Minister Dayan, who publicly expressed his opinion that the solution to the question of the withdrawal of Israeli troops (within the framework of Resolution 339) now has a better than a 50% chance of success. .

Nixon ironically noted that one should not really believe Dayan, much less his statements at the current election rallies, since he himself is probably aiming at becoming prime minister.

Kissinger responded that Dayan did indeed have plans to become prime minister. However, the latest armed conflict with Egypt and Syria has thoroughly undermined his reputation and only Golda Meir, whose place he had previously wanted to take, saved him from his a shameful resignation from the post of Minister of Defense.

Therefore, Dayan, Kissinger said, is not now speaking out with his own views, as he has often done in the past, but is saying only what Golda Meir is now telling him to do. Accordingly, according to Kissinger, Dayan’s statement mentioned above is quite meaningful, as a reflection of the opinion of G. Meir herself, who “does not like to waste her breath in vain.”

Nixon, half-jokingly, again noted that one still cannot really believe what is said during an election campaign, “especially in Israel.”

Then, switching to a serious tone, the President said that he asked that the following to be conveyed to the General Secretary.

I don't want to do anything now while the election campaign is going on in Israel, so as not to be accused of interfering in Israel's internal affairs. However, one thing is clear: without serious pressure on Israel on my part, its leaders will not budge, using all sorts of pretexts and their influential lobby in the US itself. I understand very well that I must “deliver” Israel to the final destination of a just peace settlement,  in spite of all the difficulties and obstacles, for there will be many of them. How will I do this? I am not yet ready to say this in all detail because much will depend on the further development of the external and internal situation. But I have come to the firm conviction that we must not miss the opportunities now available for a peaceful settlement, but must achieve it by all means. I very much hope for the positive cooperation of the Soviet Union in this matter, because in the long term and in a broader sense this would have a beneficial effect on Soviet-American relations, removing them from the constant threat of aggravation due to certain selfish interests and actions of Israel or Egypt. I hope for the assistance of the Soviet leadership with respect to the Arabs, although I myself will exert direct influence on them in the interests of a settlement. As concerns Israel, I repeat, this burden practically falls on my shoulders and I am determined to achieve the above goal.

I only ask the General Secretary and the other Soviet leaders to consider statements about my intentions regarding Israel as strictly confidential, for if they become known to the Israel lobby in the United States, the whole matter could become very difficult, the President concluded.

Kissinger said, turning to Nixon, that [he] should have asked L. I. Brezhnev not say anything about this to President Sadat, for it could easily get to the French and British from him and his entourage, as well as to the Israelis, with the same extremely unfavorable consequences.

Moreover, Kissinger added, Sadat will make a scene at us when he learns about some confidential statements of the American side from Soviet representatives, and not directly from the White House. This was recently the case, for example, when Sadat learned about his, Kissinger’s, statements in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador that the White House would try to get Israel to withdraw troops (according to Resolution 339) somewhere in mid-January. At the last meeting Sadat complained to him, Kissinger, that the US still trusted the Soviet Union more than him, although the matter directly concerned him personally. Sadat emphasized that in this kind of matter he prefers to act directly with the White House, without Soviet mediation.

Noting that he had little faith in Sadat or Dayan, Nixon supported Kissinger's request not to tell Sadat and other Arab representatives about everything he had said to the General Secretary.

Second. Soviet-American relations were discussed in the course of the second part of the conversation with President Nixon.

Referring to the instructions of L. I. Brezhnev, I outlined to the President his relevant thoughts and statements on this question.

Nixon listened carefully to everything that was said to him in this regard. It was noticeable that he was especially impressed by the words that we firmly stand for the course in Soviet-American relations which was clearly defined and formulated during two summit meetings in 1972 and 1973. It was felt that this entire appeal by L. I. Brezhnev was perceived by Nixon as an indicator of our understanding that he would eventually overcome his domestic political difficulties. The President was clearly pleased with this.

The President's subsequent statements (which were of an unusual nature for him, with a repetition and emphasis on the main ideas) can be summarized as follows.

“I ask you to convey to the General Secretary,” Nixon began his remarks, “that I, as President of the US, will do everything in the remaining three years of my time in power to ensure that the course in Soviet-American relations worked out at two summit meetings remains irreversible.

It’s true,” he continued, “there are now many critics and opponents of this course in the US. There are Jewish and pro-Israel organizations, many media outlets, the so-called liberals, opposition in the US , and other circles. They all have different goals of their own, but they are now acting as a coalition organizing attacks on this course.

The paradox of the situation is that many of them at one time opposed the “Cold War” and were for an improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. The same applies to our Western European allies, who previously tried in every way to persuade us, the US, to conduct business with Moscow in such a way as to reduce the risk of Soviet-American confrontation, especially a nuclear [one]. However, now that all of this has been achieved to a considerable degree, they have done a 180* [Translator’s note: SIC. No note explains the asterisk, but I assume that Dobrynin explained the colloquialism separately] and are beginning to criticize the White House for "collusion with the Russians." The French and [Foreign] Minister [Michel] Jobert are trying especially [hard] in this regard. In general, after de Gaulle, the French noticeably “shrunk”. He had a high “class” and big concepts. Pompidou strives to equal him [tyanetsya za nim], but clearly he is not a man of that caliber, although he is clearly now trying to put something together in Western Europe under its aegis.

Kissinger made a remark at this point that he was surprised by the lack of sober realism among the French: they did not understand that in any Western European union, especially with a military aspect, the Germans, and not the French, would inevitably dominate, although the latter flatter themselves with various illusions.

Kissinger further noted that the French are now trying to “confuse” the British, emphasizing their commonality in the form of the known nuclear potential and pushing them to take the path of creating a joint Anglo-French nuclear missile force in the hope that this will give them a leading role in the Western European community.

In response to my remark about the danger of such “concepts”, which, as we know, were in circulation in the past, Kissinger said that the White House understands this and will take measures to prevent the implementation of such plans, affecting primarily Britain, which uses American nuclear missile weaponry to a considerable degree.

At the same time, Nixon’s remark is curious that now in Western Europe there is not “a single major statesman, including Pompidou and Heath.”

Returning then to his thought, Nixon emphasized the importance for both our governments of them remaining firmly on the course that was determined by the summits, regardless of attacks on that course from any quarter.

It would be a great tragedy, he emphasized, if we allowed politicians like Senator Jackson, Jewish circles, the French, the Chinese, or the British to knock us off this course. Now in the US it has become a kind of fashion, especially among the so-called liberal intelligentsia and its representatives in the media, to show marked skepticism regarding the progress achieved in Soviet-American relations in recent years.

The opposition criticizes me that, for the sake of rapprochement and achieving [closer] relations with Moscow, I have allegedly dangerously weakened the US nuclear missile strategic forces, sacrificed ties of alliance with Western Europe, forgotten about Japan, and do not think about “human rights” (in connection with the issue of the question of so-called emigration from the USSR) and I have committed “other similar sins.” They demagogically ask me what exactly have I achieved for America with my course towards improving relations with the USSR; they ask me not because they don’t know, but in order to deliberately mislead American public opinion.

Judging from everything, the President continued, there are now people in the Soviet Union who are apparently asking the General Secretary whether we are doing the right thing by reaching agreements with Nixon, who is the object of loud criticism in his own country and who is still has not yet been able to secure most favored nation status for the Soviet Union. I do not criticize such people because, for example, if we judge matters according to the American press, then the impression may be the most bleak.

I can say one thing about this: I know the true sentiments of the American people who, despite the fuss from certain circles, want peaceful and friendly relations with the Soviet people. This gives me the strength and the determination to follow my chosen course in the sphere of Soviet-American relations.

By the way, I still intend to seek most favored nation treatment for the USSR. Regardless of whether I personally agree with your emigration policy or not (“and its propaganda support abroad, frankly speaking, is very bad”), I give firm assurances that I will not accept any linkage of this question from the US Congress with the most favored nation regime. Such a link is direct interference in the internal affairs of the USSR, and this is unacceptable.

I want to emphasize once again, Nixon then said, my deep conviction that the fate of the world is now determined by the Soviet Union and the US. In ten years, China and possibly Japan will apparently be added to us in this sense. Therefore, it is extraordinarily important that right now the USSR and the US, jointly strive without delay to contribute to the creation or formation of a peace on earth by that time that would meet the security interests of both our two countries and the majority of other countries.

It is extremely necessary in this regard, despite our remaining differences on a number of questions, to combine our efforts in the pursuit of this highest goal. After all, our countries were able to successfully overcome much that divides them in order to achieve the main goal, the defeat of Nazi Germany. The parallel may not be entirely apt, but it gets my point across, Nixon said.

(To characterize Nixon’s own state of mind, the characterization he gave during the conversation of the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition, in particular in connection with Yalta, is quite indicative: he said that Roosevelt showed himself to be an impractical, idealistic person and that in this sense Stalin and Churchill are the heroes for him, Nixon, but not Roosevelt).

After the war,” he continued, “both our countries passed through a difficult period. Let's not argue who was right or wrong. Much stemmed from mutual suspicion and fear of each other, including from a purely military point of view. Now we are actually “playing a game” of equals. Inferiority complexes or concerns about possible damage to the vital interests of one country as a result of the actions of another country have ceased to play the role which they previously played. Both sides have become “adults” in this sense, and the level of relations between the leadership of both countries has become such that it has made it possible to conclude the most important agreement of our time on the prevention of nuclear war, which was unthinkable even five years ago.

[...]

SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN THE US

(A. DOBRYNIN)