From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 12 October 1973'

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION

with US Secretary of State H. KISSINGER

12 October 1973

First. On the afternoon of October 12, another conversation took place with Kissinger on the Middle East (the conversation took place over lunch with him alone at the State Department).

The following should be briefly noted from the conversation.

1. Kissinger said that they had not yet received a final answer from London regarding Britain's possible introduction of a draft resolution in the Security Council on a ceasefire in the Middle East. As soon as such a response arrives, they will notify us immediately.

2. Kissinger said that in their assessment, despite the different approach to this issue by the warring sides, a ceasefire would still be achieved within the next week. After this, a no less difficult period of diplomatic steps will begin in the direction of a peace settlement after this military conflict and a general Middle East settlement as a whole.

3. Referring to the fact that “you, of course, know about the appeal of the Egyptians” to him, the Secretary of State, regarding the problem of a settlement (we here know nothing about this, but for understandable reasons, we did not start to find out exactly what this was about), Kissinger said that in principle he had no objection to convening an international conference on the Middle East composed of the parties to the conflict plus the great powers within two or three weeks after a ceasefire.

However, generally, Kissinger continued, they “have no enthusiasm” for the idea of such a conference, because without appropriate preparation, unlike, for example, the fully- prepared documents in advance of the Paris Conference on Vietnam, such a Middle East conference would be doomed to lengthy and fruitless public discussions and squabbles. In this last respect, the Chinese will apparently especially differ, “to show their revolutionary spirit,” but in fact this will interfere with a settlement.

In this sense, Kissinger further noted, it might be even better for the UN Secretary-General [Kurt Waldheim] to be engaged in looking for a solution to the current conflict, as some kind of mediator between the parties to the conflict with the tacit support of the great powers.

However, Kissinger immediately made the reservation that he was saying all of this by thinking out loud and that nothing of what was said were well thought-out views. He asked that in no case should this be considered as even preliminary proposals on his part. It’s just thinking out loud, he repeated.

4. Kissinger asserted that in contacts with him the Chinese are convincing them to “rely less on the Soviet Union” in a Middle East settlement because, as the Chinese say, the Russians still have their strategic goal of expelling the United States from the strategically important region of the Middle East.

The Chinese, added Kissinger, are not directly involved but essentially offered their services for contacts with the Arabs in the matter of a settlement.

However, the American side, he asserted, avoided being drawn into a discussion of these questions with the Chinese, based at least on such a simple reason that the Chinese really do not play any significant role in the Middle East right now, but are only trying to use the Middle East conflict and the Soviet-American differences in their political goals and earn themselves capital without risking anything. (It needs to be said that we at the Embassy have no information from other sources about the substance of the conversations on these topics between the Chinese and Americans, but it cannot be excluded that something like this may take place).

5. Just after the meeting, Kissinger called and said that the British, in principle, have agreed to take the initiative, but, according to their information, Egypt will reject the demand for a ceasefire. They, the British, would not want to find themselves in a ridiculous position with their initiative in this case and demanded assurances from the Americans that the Egyptians would not block their way in the Security Council.

Kissinger asked if I could give him such a guarantee about the behavior of the British.

I told him that the White House knows our position very well on the question of a Security Council draft resolution and that we would keep our word with respect to our position.

After thinking, Kissinger said that he personally was “ready to take a risk” and that if the Egyptians really embarked on the indicated path, then two great powers, the USSR and the USA, would “be taken in” at the same time, and they would then have to jointly look for a further way out of the situation.

He intends to talk in this spirit with the British, whose response he expects tomorrow morning.

6. In any event the situation at the front is such that, in Kissinger’s opinion, the latest a ceasefire will be achieved is by the middle of next week.

Second. In the course of the day’s meeting Kissinger said that according to their intelligence information three airborne divisions have been brought into combat readiness.

He said that they hope that this does not mean Soviet preparations for some use of its armed forces in the Middle East in one capacity or another.

Otherwise we would be forced to respond likewise, and this could create a situation close to an incipient confrontation between the two superpowers.

I replied that I did not have any information on this matter. At the same time, I directed Kissinger's attention to the fact that the United States is carrying out military measures that cannot be viewed other than preparation for military intervention in the Middle East or, in any case, as a military demonstration with the aim of directly influencing one of the warring parties.

I noted in this regard that the United States is conducting demonstrative movements of its 6th Fleet in close proximity to the area of military operations. In addition, it is pointedly announced that a helicopter carrier with several thousand Marines is being sent to the Mediterranean Sea. There are reports of the transfer or impending transfer of American weapons not only from the territory of the United States itself, but also from American units in Western Europe.

All this cannot fail to cause apprehension in the Soviet Union, especially as the operations are taking place in direct proximity to our borders, and the US is located several thousand miles from them.

My counter-demarche to Kissinger’s statement noticeably alerted him. During the conversation, he returned to this issue several more times, and already escorting me to the car, he again asked what our actions could mean (concerning the three divisions) and gave assurances that the United States, for its part, was not taking any serious military steps in connection with the conflict in the Middle East which could lead to the armed involvement of the United States in these events.

As the Secretary of State I can categorically assure this officially, that unless the Soviet Union turns out to be similarly involved in these same events, Kissinger declared at the end of the discussion.

Third. Referring to instructions, I told Kissinger to pass the following to President Nixon. The Soviet leadership considers it necessary with the utmost urgency to draw the President's attention to the provocative, frankly, criminal [banditskie] actions on the part of Israel, which, if not stopped at the very beginning, are capable of even further complicating the already dangerous situation in the Middle East and around it.

We are talking, firstly, about the barbaric bombing of populated areas in Syria and Egypt, including Damascus, by Israeli aircraft as a result of which there are numerous casualties among the civilian population. Among the dead and wounded are Soviet citizens. The buildings of Soviet institutions were also damaged.

We have information – and want the President to also know this – that the other side has the ability to retaliate against Israeli cities, from which it has so far refrained, unless Israeli bombing of Arab cities is stopped immediately.

Further. On the night of October 11-12, in the Syrian port of Tartus, the Soviet merchant ship Il’ya Mechnikov, which had delivered cargo there for peaceful purposes, was attacked by torpedo boats. A fire broke out on the ship and it sank.

There is hardly any need to explain what such provocative actions against Soviet ships heading to the ports of Arab countries could lead to. In this case, too, it should be absolutely clear to Tel Aviv that it cannot expect to get away with anything. The Soviet Union will, of course, take such measures as it deems necessary to protect its ships and other means of transport.

Having heard the statement Kissinger said that they understand the concern of the Soviet government.

He said further that just this morning that the Egyptian government turned to them about this same question and they contacted Israel.

Now an answer has come from Tel Aviv, which you, Kissinger said, addressing me, are unlikely to consider satisfactory.

Kissinger then showed me a telegram from the American Ambassador to Israel that the Israeli government had said the following in response: they had conducted a special investigation, which showed that Israeli aircraft had acted exclusively against military targets, although they did not exclude the possibility of causing unintended damage to civilian objects.

I told Kissinger that in fact this Israeli response was completely unsatisfactory, and again fully confirmed everything that was said in our statement, emphasizing its especial seriousness and the significance which we attach to it. I further recalled that our statement also refers to the barbaric bombing of cities and ports in Syria, where Soviet people have died and where our ships were subjected to piratical attacks by the Israelis.

Kissinger then said that they would again turn to the Israeli government in connection with our representation of today.

For my part, I again drew his attention to the great danger of the situation which is developing due to the reckless actions of the Israeli militarists and asked him to urgently report to the President about this urgent appeal of the Soviet leadership.

I left Kissinger the full text of our statement in writing.

Fourth. In the evening of the same day, I met again with Kissinger and, citing instructions, talked with him on the next question.

In recent days we have received many reports about the American side assisting Israel in various areas, including through direct supplies of weapons.

We received such information even before the Secretary of State’s conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on the 10th of October, during which he reproached us, citing reports of Soviet military supplies to Egypt and Syria. Newly received information leaves no doubt, as we understand, that more and more shipments of weapons and ammunition, including aerial bombs and air-to-air missiles, have indeed been and are being sent from the United States to Israel, and now reports have appeared about this and in the American press. There are also reports that American aircraft and tanks are being sent from Western Europe to Israel.

Meanwhile, in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, Kissinger had said that the White House was refusing Israel’s requests for urgent additional supplies of weapons.

There are also reports that 150 American military pilots are already on their way to Israel, heading there under the guise of “tourists.” If these reports are also true, then the US government must be aware that it is embarking on a very risky path leading to the US being drawn into hostilities.

I told Kissinger that there was thus a clear discrepancy between the Secretary of State’s statement made in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador and the actual situation. Kissinger apparently understands the reaction this will cause in Moscow. Moreover, we are talking about the supply of weapons to a side that has committed aggression and is trying not only to keep previously seized foreign lands, but also to occupy new territories.

Kissinger said in response that the information we are citing about US actions is largely untrue and they cannot imagine from what sources we could have obtained it.

Considering, however, the serious turn which relations between the White House and the Soviet leaders are apparently now taking, he, as Secretary of State, considers it necessary - in order to avoid misunderstandings that might lead to tragic consequences - to declare the following absolutely officially and in the name of the President concerning questions raised by the Soviet side.

(…Kissinger told about the dimensions of America aid to Israel).

6. [SIC] Concerning the US being drawn into hostilities. Kissinger said that he could also state categorically on behalf of the President that not a single US soldier, pilot, or sailor, not a single American aircraft or ship, would enter into the hostilities currently taking place in the Middle East. The United States does not have any plans to land its troops in Syria, Egypt, or Israel under the guise of protecting or evacuating American citizens.

To put it bluntly, Kissinger continued, we have one plan for armed intervention, developed in detail: this, taking into account the specifics of US-Israeli relations, is a plan for direct military aid to Israel with American troops only if the very existence of Israel is jeopardized, that is, if the Arab armies seriously penetrated into the territory of Israel itself, and the latter might disappear as an independent state.

Inasmuch, however, Kissinger noted further, the current situation is far from such a hypothetical possibility, this only American plan for the actual involvement of the United States in military operations in the Middle East now remains only on paper.

Kissinger repeated in conclusion that on behalf of the President he asked that Moscow be told that the United States itself would not intervene and would not send its troops to the Middle East unless the Soviet Union did so.

In the event the USSR takes such steps then they will definitely respond with countermeasures, taking into account the specific Soviet steps. However, they would like to hope that events will not take this turn.

7. Kissinger said in conclusion, in the White House they proceed from the fact that after a ceasefire (“and, judging from everything, it should occur no later than the middle of next week”), certain opportunities will still open up to begin the process of a Middle East settlement, the success of which will require the cooperation of the USSR and the US. And for this it is very important to get past the current military conflict in the Middle East with the least losses for Soviet-American relations themselves.

Such were the main points of Kissinger’s statements in response.

In conclusion he declared that, of course, he will report to the President today about our conversation with him, but that on the factual side of the question, he considered it possible to immediately explain to us the specific state of affairs on the American side, for he is “fully aware of the question as Secretary of State and as an Assistant to the President.”

This ended the conversation, because both of us had to go to the White House for the ceremony associated with Nixon’s announcement of a new Vice-President to replace Agnew, who had resigned.

[…]

SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN THE US                                          

(A. DOBRYNIN)