From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 27 October 1973'

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION

with US Secretary of State H. KISSINGER

27 October 1973

In a conversation today, Kissinger invited me to meet with him on Monday for lunch “for a calm, unemotional” discussion of recent events, which, as he said - “this cannot be denied, have caused considerable damage to Soviet-American relations.”

He noted that the President's statement yesterday at a press conference comparing recent events in our relations with the Cuban crisis was "highly unfortunate, as were some of his other statements on this subject, as the Soviet Ambassador noted yesterday in a conversation with General Haig."

The President “agrees with this.”

The explanation for all this, Kissinger concluded, can only be the very nervous atmosphere in which the entire press conference took place, especially on domestic issues, and the President was therefore not particularly precise in his answers on questions of Soviet-American relations and, perhaps, regarding his own personal relationship with the General Secretary. He, the President, regrets this.

It was arranged to meet with Kissinger on Monday.

Inasmuch as the White House line is now clearly aimed at “quietly” taking a conciliatory and even apologetic position with us, while at the same time leaving the impression on the American public that there was a serious crisis due to Soviet actions and that it was averted only through the firmness of the President, I considered it advisable during the conversation with Kissinger to give him our assessment of the Administration’s actions in a calm but firm form  (including on the question of a ceasefire, when the United States actually condoned Israel’s desire to seize more Egyptian land in the last moments).

In my assessment I intend to use the message of L. I. Brezhnev sent to the White House yesterday via the direct line from the Kremlin, the speech by L. I. Brezhnev at the Congress of Peaceloving Forces, the relevant passages from our appeals to the President in recent days, the TASS statement, as well as my argumentation in yesterday’s conversation with General Haig.

In my opinion, it is important now to clearly show both Nixon and Kissinger that we do not easily pass over their actions when, in the name of their tactical goals of foreign and domestic policy, they have quite easily jeopardized our relations and everything positive that has been achieved in these relations. And that we will draw conclusions from recent events.

Of course, I will structure the conversation in such a way that the doors to further constructive relations with the White House are not closed, bearing in mind the possibility of continuing joint efforts to resolve various problems, primarily the Middle East, which were interrupted by the unilateral actions of the White House in recent days.

SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN THE US

(A. DOBRYNIN)