From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Supplement to the Record of a Conversation with Kissinger's Deputy, Scowcroft, 25 October 1973'

SUPPLEMENT TO THE RECORD OF A CONVERSATION

with Kissinger’s Deputy, SCOWCROFT

25 October 1973

First. It needs to be said that even before Scowcroft’s call, reports began to be broadcast on the radio with reference to Pentagon sources that many American bases and military centers in Europe and in the United States itself, including strategic aviation and strategic nuclear forces, were being brought into the first (initial, a lower) stage of readiness. The 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg is being brought into readiness.

Radio commentators added that no explanation is being given for the reasons for such an order, but it can be assumed that this order is connected with events in the Middle East.

At first, no references were made to us. Then, in subsequent radio reports, phrases began to be added that all this was the result of the Soviet nighttime representation to the White House that the USSR would send its troops to the conflict area to impose a truce, even if the United States did not join in such a Soviet step. It is asserted at the same time that there has been a large movement of Soviet transport aircraft and ships in the direction of Egypt.

It is emphasized in this regard that the White House refused to yield to such Soviet pressure. The theme of the “firmness” of the White House’s position is increasingly heard, although this is interspersed with assurances that the United States itself is not going to send its troops to the region of the conflict.

These reports are now cited with links to government sources, although there are no official statements yet.

All this is clearly being done with the goal of diverting attention from the treacherous behavior of Israel (and, in fact, the direct indulgence of this on the part of the United States), as well as from the noticeably worsening personal position of President Nixon in recent days in connection with the aggravation of the domestic political situation in the United States around Watergate by escalating such dramatic tension.

At the same time, an attempt is being made to present the matter in such a way that the United States is taking measures to deter the armed intervention of the Soviet Union into the affairs of the Middle East. This is being done in the deliberate expectation of later making political capital of allegations that the decisive actions of the White House stopped the Soviet Union.

Second. In connection with these reports and the President's message of reply, we will introduce the following provisions for consideration that could be included in our reply to the President.

1. Criticize the White House for fanning a military (nuclear) psychosis. Request information from the President about the reasons for the above US military actions (in accordance with Article IV on the Prevention of Nuclear War).

This step of ours ought to be publicly announced in order to neutralize the above propaganda line of the White House. In particular, our representative on the Security Council could be instructed to say something like the following:

“In connection with reports from the United States that the armed forces there are being brought into combat readiness, including the strategic nuclear forces, the Soviet government, in accordance with Article IV of the Agreement and the Prevention of Nuclear War, has requested information from the US government about the reasons for such actions "

2. Accept the proposal about joint observers:

3. Say that the issue of sending Soviet troops was not and is not any threat to the United States (much less is it a reason for the mobilization measures of the White House), but that, as before, we are ready to do this within the framework of a possible Security Council decision, that is, to take part in the UN armed forces that may be created by a decision of the Security Council.

It seems important to us not to leave the impression - neither in the US, nor in the Arab countries, nor throughout the world - that we yielded under US pressure.

Another question is about the actual dispatch of our troops. In the current conditions, both the United States and Israel (and, apparently, Sadat himself) will to one degree or another then try to reduce the matter to the fact that the UN troops (if the United States does not veto this idea altogether) will include only troops of neutral countries or ‘third world’ countries. Even in this event, if the UN agrees to our participation in these questions, this could not be depicted by Washington as a threat to the United States, inasmuch as the Soviet contingents would be only one of the constituent parts of the multinational UN troops approved by the Security Council.

We will keep to a principled policy, which is important for future relations with the US.

SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN THE US

(A. DOBRYNIN)