July 27, 1963
Memorandum of Conversation of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev with Indira Gandhi
This document was made possible with support from Blavatnik Family Foundation
To Com. G.T. Shuyskyy
Subject to return to CPSU CC (General Department, 1st Sector) No. P 126[?]
Sent to members of the CPSU CC Presidium, to candidate-members of the CPSU CC Presidium and to secretaries of the CPSU CC
Secret
Memorandum of Conversation of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev with Indira Gandhi*
27 July 1963
* N.S. Khrushchev did not review the memorandum of conversation.
Present at the conversation were Comrade Ye.A. Furtseva and
Republic of India Ambassador in Moscow T.N. Kaul
T.A. Sokolova interpreted the conversation.
At the beginning of the conversation Indira Gandhi advised that she has a task from Indian Prime Minister Nehru to relay the following to N.S. Khrushchev:
“Please relay to Mr. Khrushchev my greetings and best wishes. We highly value the speech which he gave at the opening of the Indian exhibition.
Relay to him my congratulations on the successes achieved in conducting the policies of peace and disarmament. I sincerely hope that the Agreement to ban tests will soon be completed and will lead to further steps in the cause of disarmament, which means strengthening peace.
Tell him that, as always, we wholly stand for disarmament and peace and will continue this work as much as we can so as to bring resolution of the issue to the end. We will gladly cooperate with the Soviet Union in its endeavors and to further strengthen the cause of peace.
Also relay to him that we fully adhere to our policy of non-alignment. There was some misunderstanding in this area which I hope has been eliminated. We do not intend to have foreign bases nor to enter into foreign pacts which would hinder us in conducting our policy.
We are thankful for the assistance the Soviet Union has rendered us and we await further growth of our cooperation with the Soviet Union in the cause of peace and development.”
N.S. Khrushchev expressed thanks for the information and asked that greetings and wishes for good health and success in his work be conveyed to Mr. Nehru.
Indian Ambassador Kaul thanks N.S. Khrushchev for visiting the Indian national exhibition and the breakfast at the Indian embassy.
Ambassador Kaul asks permission to explain the real meaning of reports appearing in the press recently related to the conduct of military maneuvers in India. He says that the actions which the Indian government are taking were not correctly understood by global society. The Indian government was buying not weapons, but military equipment needed to outfit India’s armed forces. Military exercises will be conducted only with the goal of familiarizing armed forces personnel with this new equipment. Ambassador T.N. Kaul emphasized that no military units from foreign powers will be brought in, and there has not been nor is there any talk about organizing military bases in India. All exercises, which are to be conducted only in Delhi and Calcutta and not in border regions of the country, will be accomplished under the leadership of Indian commanders. The Indian government was forced to take these actions in connection with the reports that had appeared about the imminent attack of Pakistan on Kashmir and of China on the eastern borders of India. Therefore, these measures are undertaken by the Indian government solely for defense purposes.
At the direction of his government, Ambassador T.N. Kaul turned to N.S.. Khrushchev with a request to consider the possibility of the Soviet Union rendering economic and military assistance to India. He says that an Indian delegation is currently in Moscow, having come to negotiate on concluding an agreement on providing India with a long-term credit for 20 years as the Soviet government does for other non-aligned countries.
N.S. Khrushchev answers that in the current situation it is very hard for the Soviet government to resolve similar issues. As you know, we have brotherly relations with China and friendly relations with India. And any participation of ours on one or the other side will complicate the situation.
There are difficulties caused by the conflict existing between India and China, N.S. Khrushchev says. The Soviet Union, as I think are other countries, says N.S. Khrushchev, is very interested in a peaceful resolution and in the elimination of conflict between India and China. Indeed, this conflict complicates the resolution of many international problems. The best outcome from this situation are negotiations at a round table. I cannot say precisely since Chinese leaders have not consulted with us, but I submit that they now want to resolve this conflict. A basis for this could be the removal of Chinese troops from the Indian territory they occupy. This is a serious matter. We understand why the Indian government does not go to negotiations and it complicates the matter that the obligatory condition for the Chinese side is advancing the requirement to make decisions at the conference in Colombo. We understand the trouble for the Chinese side which cannot accept your conditions which affects China’s prestige.
Indira Gandhi notes that the Indian government sincerely wants to have these negotiations and understands their necessity. However, the prevailing political situation in the country, and the exacerbation of the response which was exploited as India’s defeat in the border conflict with China does not allow Nehru’s government in these conditions to make a decision on the commencement of negotiations. The intent of Nehru’s government is to begin negotiations even should China accept the Colombo decisions has met with strong opposition in the country.
Further she says that right-wing forces in the country want to achieve the resignation of the Nehru government and for reactionary forces to come to power which will conduct policy aimed at the involvement of India in the military blocs of western countries.
N.S. Khrushchev explains that the Soviet Union understands all the difficulties that have arisen for the Indian government, but we believe that Mr. Nehru, as an experienced politician, will find the opportunity for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
N.S. Khrushchev again turned attention to the need to begin negotiations to resolve the Indian-Chinese conflict. We understand that perhaps in this situation the Indian government has to waive a bit of its prestige in the name of preserving peace and preventing further development of military conflict.
I ask you to forgive me – notes N.S. Khrushchev jokingly – that I am meddling in the sovereignty of the Indian government.
I want to continue our conversation, N.S. Khrushchev says, and cite one example. You know that at one time the Soviet Union brought missiles to Cuba. This issue related to relations between Cuba and the USSR, however the USA demanded, as you know, the removal of these missiles from Cuban territory. The intensification of the situation reached such a threshold that we decided to remove the missiles from Cuba, even though, as is known, our territory is surrounded by foreign military bases. Meanwhile, U.S. President Kennedy publicly gave a guarantee of non-aggression against Cuba. Our main goal was preserving the Cuban revolution and, as you see, we achieved this goal. However, China’s leaders declared to us that we handled this incorrectly, removing our missiles from Cuba and accused us practically of cowardice and that we believed imperialists who did not keep their promises. However, as all know, the conflict was eliminated and peace was preserved. Of course, we took the risk, understanding that the Americans might not fulfill their promises and assurances. In the name of preserving peace on earth, it is worthwhile to take the risk, N.S. Khrushchev stresses. Surely it is not necessary to tolerate waging a war.
Ambassador T.N. Kaul asks whether it was possible to guarantee that the Chinese government would not again violate its obligations after signing an agreement.
In answer to this, N.S. Khrushchev told the ambassador that he will answer with a question, a method which is well known.
N.S. Khrushchev further says that we consider that this conflict between India and China can be eliminated only in the case that both sides manifest a great desire for this. And here Mr. Nehru must show all his courage, find in himself the strength to go to negotiations with the Chinese side. I do not see any other way out, N.S. Khrushchev notes.
Ambassador T.N. Kaul again turns to N.S. Khrushchev with the following words:
If there are no conference decisions in Colombo, then some third party could participate in the resolution of the conflict between India and China. What assistance in this regard could the Soviet Union render?
N.S. Khrushchev answers that it is hard for him to say which country or countries could participate in resolving this conflict, but as regards the Soviet Union, we had declared to the whole world at the emergence of the conflict our regret regarding this conflict. We already rendered specific aid in resolving the conflict, and in particular to your country, and we firmly and consistently hold to these positions.
Ambassador T.N. Kaul says that they know of the agreement between China and Pakistan on the concentration of Chinese and Pakistani troops on the borders of India. Right-wing forces in the country are using this to sow distrust among the populace in the rightness of the Nehru government’s actions and to call for the resistance of measures which the government is undertaking for peaceful regulation of the conflict. Therefore, it is very difficult for the government to take steps toward peaceful regulation of the conflict.
As to reports of the concentration of troops on your borders, N.S. Khrushchev says that it is possible that it does not really exist. One should not always believe rumors. Sometimes, some governments resort to such well-known tactics in history as spreading various rumors, they “lose” and throw out orders on military actions which they never intended to begin.
As regards your people’s attitude towards war, it is also hard to believe that they desire to fight.
Indeed, it is not likely that there are such people in general who would like to fight, emphasizes N.S. Khrushchev. It is known that the U.S. is the leading imperialist country and is the most aggressive country. But it is well known to all of us that the American people do not want war. This is actually explained by the fact that Mr. Kennedy gave a speech in Washington in which he declared for the first time on the need for the existence of two systems.
N.S. Khrushchev underscores that this was the first speech by the head of the American government in which he assured the American people about the peaceful aspirations of his government with regard to the Soviet Union. Indeed, we know that at the time of the previous pre-election campaigns, the platform of both parties in that country was military aggression, calls for an arms race and for preparing for a new war.
And, despite the fact that this was the first such speech, N.S. Khrushchev continues, the American people believed their government. And as you see, Mr. Kennedy did not fear speaking with this new platform. Therefore, it seems to me there is little undue concern that the Indian people will not believe their government, which constantly conducts a policy of peace. Surely Indians have not really become more aggressive than Americans, N.S. Khrushchev says jokingly.
Ambassador Kaul asks N.S. Khrushchev when the atomic test ban treaty will be signed, which the Indian government would like to sign as the first of the non-aligned countries.
N.S. Khrushchev explains that, in accord with the preliminary agreement, the treaty signing is slated for 5 August. We think that nothing will impede it.
At the end of the conversation Indira Gandhi delivered an invitation in the name of the government for cosmonaut V. Tereshkova to visit India.
Indira Gandhi and Ambassador T.N. Kaul thank N.S. Khrushchev for a very important and useful conversation.
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4 August 1963
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Nikita Khrushchev, Indira Gandhi, and T.N. Kaul discuss the Sino-Indian border conflict, emphasizing the challenges of pursuing negotiations amid domestic pressures. They also address Indo-Soviet relations, India’s non-alignment policy, the upcoming nuclear test ban treaty, and Khrushchev’s reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis as a lesson in preserving peace.
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