Record of Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and the President of Indonesia Sukarno

[handwritten: distributed]

Top Secret

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION
BETWEEN N. S. KHRUSHCHEV AND PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA SUKARNO

9 June 1961

After a greeting N. S. Khrushchev said that the time for the conversation was limited and therefore he would like to get down to business right away. According to the information at our disposal, he said, Indonesian intelligence has found the threads of a plot revealing the ties of United States intelligence with Indonesian rebels. An agreement has been reached between the Indonesia and American intelligence services that the information obtained should not be made public. The United States fears that in the event this matter becomes public knowledge it might cause harm to their prestige. N. S. Khrushchev said that evidently the President knows about this matter.

Sukarno replied that on the whole he knows about this, although without the individual details. He knows in particular that United States intelligence has constant communications with prominent army officer Sukendro and some other staff officers.

N. S. Khrushchev said that he had reported this information to the President in connection with the agreement which occurred in New York during the recent session of the UN General Assembly.

Sukarno replied that he remembered about this, and then said that according to information he had at the present time United States intelligence is more inclined to use another way to support Indonesian anti-republican forces, namely to give direct support to rebels in the jungles with material aid, and an increase of direct ties with prominent army staff officers. This is due to the fact that recently the position of the Indonesian rebels has considerably worsened compared to the past, both in West Sumatra as well as in Sulawesi. The day before yesterday, continued the President, General Nasution who had come to Moscow reported to me about the receipt of letters similar in content to letters addressed to acting President Juanda and Minister of National Security Nasution from a region where the rebels have the strongest positions at the present time. It said in the letters that the military leaders of the rebellion A. Husein and Simbolon opposed former government leaders Natsir and Sh. Prawirangara and expressed readiness “to return to the bosom of the Motherland”, that is, to surrender. One of the reasons for the disagreement in the ruling circles of the rebels is that at the present time the United States cannot give them direct material and financial support.

Consequently, American intelligence is now using new methods and strengthening its agent network in such cities as Jakarta and Bandung. One of the specific actions in this direction is their publication and distribution of a “Bulletin of the Revolution” by rotary means. This seditious bulletin contains open anti-government statements and pro-imperialist expressions.

N. S. Khrushchev said that the ties of United States intelligence and the rebels forces in a whole series of countries are characteristic. In particular, at the present time it is known that United States intelligence had a direct relation to the Algerian mutiny of the French generals. After the failure of the mutiny Kennedy, understanding the obscene role of the US in this matter, sent President De Gaulle a telegram with an expression of pleasure in connection with the fact that “De Gaulle managed to overcome the difficulties”.

President Sukarno said that United States intelligence had played just as  negative a role in anti-Cuban aggression. The President said, before my visit to Kennedy a representative of the US State Department came to me and asked that I not touch on the question of events in Cuba during the discussions with the President. In response to the question, why, I received the answer that this was a painful question for the prestige of the US. United States intelligence, headed by Allen Dulles, was guilty of the failure of the intervention in Cuba. The President received incorrect information from it that in the event of an intervention by the hireling rebels against the revolutionary Cuban government in Cuba it would produce an uprising and the Castro regime would be overthrown. However, this did not happen, the entire Cuban people supported Fidel Castro, and the intervention ended in failure. Kennedy was very ashamed of the failure of the anti-Cuban intervention, and it was even expected that Allen Dulles would be removed from his post. However, as before he remains the leader of American intelligence.

N. S. Khrushchev told the President that there is information about the efforts of American intelligence in the direction of isolating Sukarno from the other leaders of the government and the popular masses and his physical destruction when the opportunity was convenient. As before, when this is being done reliance is being made on General Nasution and some other army officers. An unenviable role in this matter is being played by Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio, who is pursuing a two-faced policy. On the one hand, he is supposedly devoted to the President, and on the other, he flirts with the Americans in order not to be left on the outside [ne ostat’sya na storone] in the event of the success of their policy. In conversations with the Americans Subandrio says that he does not support the anti-imperialist policy of the President.

Sukarno said that Subandrio is the most dangerous figure in this game; however, recently suspicions of direct ties with the Americans have increasingly fallen on General Yani. In the “Bulletin of the Revolution”, said Sukarno, I personally read of calls for the need to remove the President and replace him with another figure.

N. S. Khrushchev expressed the opinion that at the present time domestic reactionaries are not touching Sukarno in connection with his enormous popularity among the broad popular masses and because of a fear of losing his prestige.

Warning that he would like to express his purely personal opinion and apologizing in advance for the complete frankness, N. S. Khrushchev told President Sukarno that he would like to share some thoughts with him about the domestic development of Indonesia.

From the repeated statements of Sukarno and, in particular, from his speeches in the Soviet Union it is known that the building of a socialist society, where there is no exploitation of man by man, is the desire of Indonesia. This postulate is a Marxist postulate, if you take it by itself, and therefore we support it. A socialist society has already been built in the USSR and right now a concrete program of the development of Communism has been developed which will be discussed at a CPSU CC Plenum on 19 June of this year, and it will be published in the press at about the end of the month. The history of the Soviet Union teaches that it is impossible to build socialism without the Party. One person or group of people cannot decide matters. Only the Party can unswervingly lead to the great goal. All people are mortal and sometime the question will arise of who will continue the line of President Sukarno to build socialism. Evidently his continuers will be such people as Juanda, Nasution, or Subandrio. However, if they do not pursue the President’s policy then the idea of building a socialist society cannot be accomplished. At the same time the Communist Party of Indonesia is in essence the most consistent defender of these ideas. Therefore it is hard to understand the intentions which exist in Indonesia to ban the Communist Party. In so doing some make reference to the situation in the Soviet Union where only one Party exists. However, the situation in the USSR is characterized by an absence of classes in society. In Indonesia there are classes, and the Communist Party represents the most revolutionary and advanced class, the class of the workers. Therefore the attitude toward the Communist Party in Indonesia does not fit the ideas proclaimed in the country of building socialism.

Sukarno expressed agreement with everything that N. S. Khrushchev said; however, he pointed out that the present situation in Indonesia is very complex and due to a whole series of reasons. Sukarno said, after I proclaimed the country’s independence in 1945, I issued a decree prohibiting the establishment of parties. When I did this I could not put the Communist Party in a privileged position inasmuch as Muslim, right-wing, nationalists, and left-wing circles exist in Indonesia. Putting a Marxist party in a special place at that time would be unquestionably unjustified. During my absence in the capital Vice President Hatta actually betrayed me and issued the so-called 3 November political manifesto  which contained a call to create political parties. As a result, for a short time 40 political parties appeared in the country. After a certain period of time I came to the conclusion that their existence was not to the country’s benefit; however, I could not kill 39 parties and leave one, the Communist, inasmuch as the Nationalist Party and the Muslim parties Nahdlatul Ulama and Masyumi had real strength. When I tried to make a suggestion to disband all political parties I received a strong rebuff from all the parties, including the Communist and religious parties. I was forced to retreat from the step, and then issued the so-called Presidential Decree Nº 7, which put a number of conditions for obtaining permission for a particular party to exist. After this, only seven parties of the 40 remained. The rest did not satisfy the conditions of Decree Nº 7, which spoke in particular of the need for agreement with the new policy, unconditional recognition of the 1945 Constitution, etc. I want to stress that during the period of the selection of the parties a military group headed by Sukendro and Yani applied no little effort to prohibit the Communist Party as a political organization. Then I called General Nasution, a member of the commission to inspect the parties, and told him that in all conditions the Communist Party had to exist and could not be weeded out. My attitude toward this Party was expressed in particular in the fact that I do not decide any serious government question without consultation with D. N. Aidit and other of its leaders beforehand. It is understood that I should conduct such consultations often and privately. In addition, I boldly proposed and defended the idea of Nasakom against all attacks, that is, the union of the three most important groups in Indonesia – national, religious, and Communist.

As concerns the question of the further development of Indonesia I well understand that the hour of my death will come at some time, and if by that moment there will not be any other ideas then the helm of the country will fall into the hands of Juanda, Nasution, Subandrio, and those like them. I am trying to foster a change and am seeking such a figure who could guide the country after my death and, what is very important, to be acceptable to all circles of Indonesian society, both the nationalists, the religious circles, and the strata following true Marxist, Leninist principles. However, I have not yet found such a figure. In my heart I very much do not want the leadership of the country to ever fall into the hands of, let’s say, Nasution. Therefore my intentions include giving all possible support to the Communist Party so that it can become the strongest party in the country. I have gone so far here that I have recently had serious differences on these grounds with the National Party of Indonesia.

N. S. Khrushchev spoke of the importance of the Party to develop the country, and said that after Stalin’s death Molotov undertook attempts to put government bodies above the Party. Such a situation cannot be permitted.

Agreeing, Sukarno recalled Lenin’s words that the Party is like the brain of the country.

N. S. Khrushchev told of the situation which developed in the CPSU CC in connection with Molotov’s statement and how the entire Central Committee supported the correct positions of the four members of the CC Presidium, although the seven other members opposed them.

Then, switching again to the question of Indonesia, he asked the President’s opinion about the advisability of pursuing such a policy with respect to Nasution the same as during his first arrival in the USSR, when he was give a very warm and friendly reception.

The President replied that right now Nasution needed to be given more attention within reasonable limits. In this connection he cited the example of the attitude toward Nasution’s deputy, Gatot Subroto, who was among the people accompanying Nasution and found himself in a position below other military men; however, nevertheless, he was pleased with the great attention shown him in the USSR.

N. S. Khrushchev asked Sukarno’s opinion about whether one ought to hint to General Nasution on a suitable occasion that his fear of reprisal from the Communists for the role which he played during the 1948 events in Indonesia is unfounded.

Sukarno expressed the opinion that [he] ought not talk about this with the General. Then he pointed out that after he visited the Soviet Union there were certain shifts in Nasution’s views for the better, and with the skillful use of his current stay in Moscow this shift might be developed further. Then the President said that in this connection it would be useful on condition that Chairman of the Communist Party D. N. Aidit was advised that some statements of Communist leaders not at headquarters but at the grass-roots level are not facilitating Nasution’s retreat from reactionary positions, but only putting him on his guard with respect to the Communist Party.

He then explained that during an assessment of the figure of Nasution it is necessary to take into consideration his long-held close ties with some officers exerting a reactionary influence to him. He himself would be better if he could be freed from this influence.

Sukarno asked that he be told of the conversations which took place between Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna.

N. S. Khrushchev said that on the whole the conversations had a sharp nature. Kennedy made the problem of Laos the main question, although it does not deserve it. An agreement has not been reached on this question. Prince Sihanouk, just like India, retreated from his previous positions, fearing a strengthening of the leftist forces in Laos. The Soviet Union is of the opinion that a concession to the Americans in Laos would mean a blow to the leftist forces in Laos. It is possible that the complex situation in this country will lead to its partition into two parts.

President Sukarno noted that India’s position on this question is completely hopeless.

N. S. Khrushchev spoke further about how the discussion of the question of disarmament and its monitoring went, what were the positions of the Soviet government on this question, and the prospects for its resolution. Then he told about attempts by President Kennedy to put pressure on the USSR on the question of West Berlin and that the Soviet government, as before, considers the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany the key to the resolution of the German question. N. S. Khrushchev said that the USSR intended to conclude a peace treaty with Germany in December regardless of which position the United States held to on this question. When he did so he expressed confidence that, in spite of the concealed threats by Kennedy about the possibility of an outbreak of war in connection with the problem of West Berlin, there would not be a war, and that the conclusion of a peace treaty after a delay of 16 years is absolutely necessary.

Then N. S. Khrushchev informed the President that in Vienna Kennedy was presented with two memoranda on the question of disarmament and the Berlin question. At the present time the question is being discussed of the publication of these documents in the Soviet press. He said that it was discussed in the course of a number of other questions and, in particular, the question of the situation in Cuba and about China.

Sukarno said that the last question is very important at the present time, and he would like to discuss it separately; however, it is not possible to do this right now in connection with the shortage of time.N. S. Khrushchev expressed readiness of discuss this later at a convenient time for the President.

Sukarno thanked N. S. Khrushchev for the conversation

The conversation lasted one hour and 15 minutes.

                                                                        Recorded by V. Sigayev