This document was made possible with support from Blavatnik Family Foundation
From Budapest
[Written by hand: “To Cde. K. V. Rusakov”]
Telephonogram transmitted via “VCh”
1 June, 1972
[Crossed out: “To Cde. K. F. Katushev”]
[Inserted by hand: “CPSU CC”]
On 31 May of this year, as instructed, [I] had a conversation with Cde. F. Castro on issues connected with his upcoming visit to the USSR. Cde. Rodriguez was present at the conversation.
Cde. Castro requested to make a number of substantial changes and clarifications in the itinerary which was previously agreed with him. The considerations that he expressed boil down to the following:
Cde. F. Castro refuses to tour the country. Having limited the duration of his visit to 9 days (from 26 June to 5 July, including 2 days of rest on Saturday and Sunday), he stressed several times that the most important thing for him is to have conversations with the Soviet leaders, in the course of which he is intending to exchange opinions with respect to the serious qualitative shift which in the past few weeks has started happening in the international situation, as well as to discuss the future of Soviet-Cuban cooperation. Cde. F. Castro said that conversations with the Soviet leaders are more important to him than a trip to Siberia and all the rest.
Cde. F. Castro announced that he intends to personally participate in the final stage of the negotiations on economic issues. At the same time, it is desirable for him not to make the economic part of the visit publicly known, so that the enemies of Cuba and the Soviet Union would not have a reason to accuse him, F. Castro, of “getting a payment” from the USSR for refraining from criticizing Nixon’s visit to Moscow.
The rest of the time, in Cde. F. Castro’s opinion, could be used for a serious and comprehensive discussion of the issues of planning of the national economy development at the State Planning [Agency] of the USSR (Russian: “GosPlan”), as well as visiting the Gagarin District Party Committee of the City of Moscow, the Ukhtomsky Plant, which produces sugar cane harvesters for Cuba, some sort of nuclear power station (possibly in Voronezh), and if time permits, [to visit] Moscow City Committee for Construction (Russian: “MosStroi”). Furthermore, Cde. F. Castro would like to pay a private visit to the widow of the cosmonaut Gagarin. When putting together the specific itinerary, he requested to take into account his wish not to schedule more than one event per day. He said that it is better to see less but more thoroughly.
Cde. F. Castro requested not to organize rallies. In this respect, he would like to limit himself to a meeting with the workers at the Ukhtomsky Plant. It is also advisable to minimize protocol formalities to the maximum extent. Cde. F. Castro proposes to have one reception on the Soviet side, and a reciprocal reception at the Cuban Embassy.
In addition to F. Castro, the following [people] are going to participate in the official negotiations: Rodriguez, Torralba, Machado, Naranjo, Ochoa, Riquet, Ambassador Garcia Pelaez, as well as Flavio Bravo and Osmany Cienfuegos, who were not originally included in the list of the persons accompanying F. Castro on his visit to the USSR. Depending on the wishes of the Soviet comrades, Cde. F. Castro will attend other meetings that he expects to have with Soviet leaders either by himself or in the company of Cde. Rodriguez, or the ambassador, etc.
Cde. F. Castro proposes upon the completion of the visit to publish a joint communique, and not a statement as it was discussed previously. It would be good, said Cde. F. Castro, to exchange drafts of the communique a week prior to the visit. Cde. F. Castro is asking to include in the itinerary time for meetings with the staff of Cuban organizations and Cuban students in Moscow.
It is advisable to have separate itineraries for the group of military leaders (excluding Ochoa) and for those civilians who are not included in the list for the official negotiations.
In general, said Cde. F. Castro, I would like for the visit to be businesslike. We have to clarify how and on what terms we will be working together.
Explaining his reasons for rejecting the previously agreed itinerary, Cde. F. Castro referred to the fact that a long time passed after the [itinerary] was agreed upon, and new factors came into existence: the number of countries, which he needs to visit during this trip, increased, as well as serious shifts in the international situation have occurred, which require thorough analysis.
Cde. F. Castro stressed several times that after receiving K.F. Katushev’s message through the Cuban Ambassador in Moscow, which was relayed to him prior to Nixon’s visit, he did not have any other information about this visit and about the situation in Vietnam aside from the information provided by the news agencies.
Based on Cde. F. Castro’s statements on these issues, I had a sense that he did not orient well in the new situation and did not know how to act. He was visibly nervous, and afraid to take any actions until fully figuring out what the new situation held in store for Cuba. Apparently, he is apprehensive about the unfavorable reaction of the “third world” to the latest events, and is concerned in this respect about the “revolutionary credibility” of Cuba in the eyes of this world. This probably explains, in the first place, his proposal to change the itinerary for his visit to the USSR. The same is reflected in his desire not to publicize the economic aspect of the visit.
Below is a verbatim reproduction of the part of Cde. F. Castro’s statements that relates to the visit of Nixon to the USSR.
“There is a new situation currently. This situation needs to be analyzed. I want to know how Soviet comrades evaluate it, what their thoughts are about the future development of the events. We are interested in how Soviet comrades interpret agreements concluded with the US. There was almost nothing reported about this. I believe that specifically these issues should become the subject of discussions in Moscow, and specifically in the light of these issues we have to approach how our visit in Moscow will look like. Let’s take for example the issue of the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Agreement. We have to look at what political value it has in this new situation, what it can offer us. All of this needs to be thought through, and thoroughly evaluated.
We are concerned about Nixon’s policies. He is a crooked and slippery political animal. Bombings of Vietnam quite obviously have a psychological objective. Nixon is a calculating enemy. His statements in the Soviet Union were ill-intentioned and cynical. I think that the Soviet people did not allow themselves to be fooled and did not fall for Nixon’s empty rhetoric. He was so melodramatic when he spoke about the girl from Leningrad! But he of all people has the least right to talk about her, the cynic that he is. His language is the language of a great power, his philosophy is the philosophy of a great power. He says: we have to bring order! We have to limit our friends in their actions! We have to exaggerate our actions!”
Nixon is a real son of a bitch. We have a very high personal resentment towards him, which has its roots way in the past. Nixon was a friend of dictator Batista. He took part in organizing the invasion of Playa Girón by the mercenaries, and participated in imposing an embargo on Cuba. We are disgusted by his arrogance. We do not trust him in anything. We see how he operates: his trip to Romania, his trip to China… He is not only a repulsive political animal, he is also a failure of a political animal.
There was a time when we were thinking that through the so-called Vietnamization he was looking for a way out of Vietnam, that he was trying to achieve by political maneuvering what Johnson wasn’t able to achieve by bombings. And what is the situation like now? What is his state of mind? What is he trying to achieve? I would very much like to hear what Cde. Brezhnev thinks about this.
Nixon has been maneuvering around the socialist camp for a long time. He is manipulative, he is trying to bring discord into our camp. I know Nixon very well, and will never engage in discussions with him. Nixon is conducting Machiavellian policy, which has partially replaced the policy of force. But he still carries the stamp of former power. He does not use force currently to directly threaten the Soviet Union. He is maneuvering and is trying roundabout ways of achieving the old objective.
It would be nice to know what propaganda activities Soviet comrades have in mind in order to thwart attempts of the US and other interested forces to exploit the results of Nixon’s visit to the USSR in their interests – which they, without any doubt, will be doing and, as a matter of fact, are already doing.
And finally, if is very important for us how Nixon will be behaving in Latin America now. Whether he will feel that his hands are untied.”
At the conclusion of the conversation, Cde. F. Castro requested to inform him about the position of Soviet comrades with respect to the opinions he expressed.
O. Darusenkov
5 copies. al/DOT
01.06.1972
[signature]
O. Darusenkov explains that Fidel Castro has changed his itinerary for his visit to the USSR, deciding to emphasize conversations with Soviet leaders over a tour of the country. Furthermore, Darusenkov relates that though Castro will engage in economic discussions, he wishes that the economic dimension of his visit be kept secret. Castro's disdain for Nixon following the President's visit to the USSR is also made clear.
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