From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with A. Haig, First Assistant to the US President, 26 October 1973'

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION

with A. HAIG, First Assistant [SIC] to the US President

26 October 1973

Right after the end of President Nixon's press conference today, I received a call from the White House from General Haig, who is now the Senior Assistant to the President (the "Chief of Staff" of the White House) and, in fact, Nixon's right hand on all matters. Haig said the following.

He, Haig, was present at the President's press conference and was concerned that, in summary, Nixon's statements about the nature of his personal relationship with General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev could have made a completely different impression on the listeners than, as he is sure, the President himself, who highly values his personal contacts with the General Secretary, wanted.

In Haig’s opinion, this incorrect impression might be that during these days the President has taken a tough line with respect to the General Secretary on Middle Eastern matters, and the Soviet leadership, knowing the uncompromising nature of the President, gave in and was careful not to take matters too far, the General said.

I [translator’s note: presumably Haig] was concerned about the possibility that just such a wrong impression might remain with the audience of journalists and tomorrow find its way into the pages of the press, which in turn could be sharply perceived in Moscow. So I immediately went to the President and expressed my concerns.

The President, Haig continued, became deeply worried on a personal level and asked that it quickly be conveyed to the General Secretary that he did not think that his interpretation of their personal relationship could be construed in such a way. He, the President, only wanted to emphasize the unique nature of the personal relations with the General Secretary, which makes it possible to overcome even the most dangerous crisis situations between both countries. The President very much hopes that these personal relations will continue to be directed at further persistent work together to improve relations between our two countries and strengthening peace.

General Haig said that the President would like this to be known to L. I. Brezhnev.

He then asked whether I had seen the President’s speech which was broadcast on television and, having received an affirmative answer, asked if I had the same impression as he did.

I replied that, if we are to speak frankly, a number of the President’s statements at his press conference in the area of our relations left an unfavorable impression on me.

I was surprised, first of all, that the President continues to stubbornly pursue a line to show that there was some kind of major crisis in the relations between our countries which was allegedly caused by the Soviet Union and therefore justified bringing the American armed forces into combat readiness on a global scale, including the strategic nuclear forces.

I was simply amazed, I continued, that at today’s press conference the President even considered it possible to compare the current situation with the “Cuban [Missile] Crisis” of 1962, because such an unjustified comparison simply creates a false impression among the American and world public about the real state of affairs and the state of our relations, which, if you believe such statements by the President, should now be agitated, almost like before a nuclear missile war. But it is well known that all this is not so and that the indicated action of the White House is not at all the result of any actions by the Soviet side, which could be considered as a violation by us of any agreements with the President.

I further said that if we analyze the events of the night of October 24-25, during which we here at the Embassy were in constant contact with Kissinger and with General Scowcroft, his deputy in the White House, then this analysis directly shows that the crisis did not arise because of the security or national interests of the United States were suddenly affected, but was actually created artificially by the American side itself.

I do not know, I told Haig further, what exact reasons the President was guided by in making the unnecessary decision to bring American armed forces into combat readiness throughout the world, but I am convinced that no one can prove that this was actually justified by any irresponsible actions of the USSR or whether important US national security interests were suddenly involved. But the opposite - that there was no such involvement - is proven by the behavior of the White House itself.

Explaining, I said that starting at 10 pm on October 24, when a letter from the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was delivered to the President via our Embassy, Kissinger and his deputy Scowcroft called me on the phone almost every hour during the first half of the night and asked me to convey to Moscow, so that no action would be taken until the President’s letter of reply from the White House was sent to Moscow.

Such a letter arrived only at about 6 o'clock in the morning, but as it now turns out and, as the President himself stated today at his press conference, shortly after midnight he gave the order to bring American armed forces around the world into combat readiness.

At that time, not a word was said to us about such an order and about the US military preparations carried out all night.

And in the letter of reply itself from the President to L.I. Brezhnev received already in the early morning not a word was said about bringing American troops everywhere, including strategic nuclear missile forces, into combat readiness.

Meanwhile, American radio had already begun broadcasting sensational reports about US military mobilization preparations with references to American government sources.

If indeed we were talking about a real threat to the security of the United States, I further emphasized to General Haig, or at least the President thought so as a result of some of our actions, then one must assume, the first thing that should logically be expected from the President would be posing such a question in his letter of reply to Moscow, emphasizing that the United States would be forced to begin military preparations if the USSR did not remove the threat to US security.

In other words, it could have been expected that the White House would make an urgent attempt to come to agreement peacefully to relieve tensions and warn of the danger of retaliatory actions by the US, doing this through a confidential channel, without propaganda hype. But nothing of the kind was done either in the letter, or in telephone contacts between the Embassy and the White House, or through the direct communication channel between the White House and the Kremlin, which precisely exists for such critical situations. Instead of all this, the American propaganda machine was launched, scaring listeners with American military preparations and the threat of a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union over the Middle East, although there was no such threat, but there was the unceasing Israeli aggression with the obvious connivance of the US.

Judging from everything, I said further to Haig, all this was done not out of a real fear of a military clash with the Soviet Union, but apparently in the hope that once the need had passed the artificially created crisis in Soviet-American relations would also be as easy to close as it was to start, knowing the restraint of the Soviet leadership, in the meantime gaining some kind of internal political capital, and essentially covering up the continuing Israeli aggression. But regardless of all that, what is surprising is that both the President and Kissinger could not help but know that they were dealing a big blow to the new relations between Moscow and Washington, based on increased trust, that had emerged after two summit meetings.

That is why I still do not understand why the President persistently continues to publicly repeat the version of a serious crisis in Soviet-American relations allegedly caused by the Soviet Union and prevented by the President by mobilizing the US armed forces. If all this is done with the aim of putting pressure on us during the Middle East conflict, pressure in favor of some specific interests of the White House and Israel, then such a path is fraught with serious consequences, for the Soviet Union cannot be intimidated. And if Moscow has shown restraint up to now in connection with all this, then it is not from weakness, but from the consciousness of responsibility for the fate of the world and for our relations, which we are ready to develop further, but only on a mutual, honest basis.

In conclusion I said to General Haig that I am expressing my personal point of view, which he can report to the President. At the same time, I emphasized that I am saying all this openly and honestly, for I am feeling a certain alarm for the further development of Soviet-American relations in the light of recent events and the actions of the White House, and for the state of personal relations between the General Secretary and the President of the United States, which has so far been the most important positive for both our countries.

Haig said that he well understands the motives for such frank statements and is confident that the President will understand all this correctly. Haig emphasized that he himself experienced similar alarm, which led him to talk with me today.

The entire conversation with Haig had a businesslike nature, without unnecessary emotions, since we had gotten to know him well in recent years and could talk quite frankly.

An interesting detail: in the course of my statements, Haig made a remark that not everyone in the President’s entourage agreed with (he made it clear that he was among them) to make sure to make a dramatic public announcement about bringing the US military machine into combat readiness. As is known, similar actions were carried out in the past, but without advertising. Whoever needed to know it in the Soviet Union knew about them and drew their own conclusions, weighing the foreign policy steps. The Soviet Union itself did the same thing behind the scenes, and they understood this in Washington. But all this did not cross over into the realm of propaganda, where such actions begin to acquire a very dangerous character.

At the end of our conversation General Haig said that he would report what I said to the President and, for his part, asked that L .I. Brezhnev be told what he had said at the instructions of the President.

I replied that, of course, this would be done.

It is not clear, whether by chance or not, that this time it was not Kissinger who called at the instructions of the President but Haig, who is increasingly becoming the closest and most trusted person in Nixon’s entourage.

It is not excluded that Haig himself really could have drawn the President’s attention to his ambiguous-sounding statements at the press conference, and the President ordered his assurances to be conveyed to us. Or it may be that Nixon himself considered it necessary to give such explanations and assurances to us, taking into account the specifics of the situation, when the United States is now playing a completely pro-Israeli game, not through Kissinger, but through Haig.

By the way, Haig, who is well known to us, is a career military man, not a Jew, but an Anglo-Saxon, gives the impression of a thoughtful, balanced person; neither in contacts with us or publicly has he ever made any attacks on the Soviet Union or its policies.

SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN THE US

(A. DOBRYNIN)