During his meeting with Turkish defense minister Sancar, McNamara raised the risks posed by, and to, the Jupiter missiles and the need to withdraw those “obsolete” missiles and replace them with Polaris SLBMs. Turkish officials would play a role in targeting the missiles at NATO military headquarters. Worried about the implications of withdrawing the Jupiters, Sancar expressed concern about the impact that removal of the missiles would have on Turkish “confidence” in the U.S., the need to avoid “moral depression” (meaning morale) among “the people or the army” and stressed that the U.S. (“the best of allies”) was leaving Turkey “to a condition of ‘aloneness.’” McNamara did not believe that substituting Polaris for Jupiters would have that impact. Both agreed on the importance of proceeding in secrecy.

When Sancar observed that the late delivery of F-104G’s would adversely affect morale, McNamara said that an earlier date would be possible and suggested the possibility of announcing earlier delivery with the removal of the Jupiters. McNamara added that “time was of the essence.”

The State Department later sent a telegram to the ambassadors in Italy and Turkey reporting on McNamara’s meetings with Andreotti and Sancar.

In a meeting with Italian Defense Minister Guilio Andreotti, McNamara had several matters to raise, but soon brought up the Jupiters and the need to “substitute something more responsive and less vulnerable to sabotage or direct attack.” When Andreotti raised the possibility of a naval deployment, McNamara agreed, suggesting assigning Polaris submarines to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), “with an Italian role in the targeting.” Suggesting that the U.S take the initiative on the matter, Andreotti preferred that it be settled before the spring 1963 elections.

Kennedy, McNamara and Rusk moved ahead with the Jupiters matter by making plans to bring it up with Italian and Turkish defense ministers at the NATO meeting in Paris in December 1962. The goal would be to persuade them of the obsolescence of the Jupiters, the dangers that they posed during the Cuban crisis and in future crises, and the need for “better arrangements,” such as “a rearrangement of Polaris deployments.”

President Kennedy continued to monitor the Jupiter missiles problem. During a meeting with Rusk a few weeks later, McNamara explained that President Kennedy, who he had seen in Palm Beach on December 27, had asked him what steps were being taken “to remove the Jupiters.” Consistent with that, McNamara favored the “earliest possible date” and asked whether a “deadline” could be set for April 1 to begin the removals.

Discussion between Andreotti and McNamara concerning the political aspects of the MLF

In this memorandum, McNamara, Rusk, and Adrian Fisher discuss amendments and language of the NPT treaty that was in stalemate that summer. Fisher saw the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, with its prohibition of the “transfer of atomic weapons to any other country,” as providing model language for an NPT because it was compatible with the bilateral agreements.

At the request of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the agencies that belonged to the U.S. Intelligence Board began work on a National Intelligence Estimate to provide a “comprehensive analysis” of West German nuclear “capabilities and intentions.” In this Airgram, the State Department requested input from the Bonn embassy on the upcoming NIE.

During this conversation Wilson, McNamara, Rusk, and Ball continued the discussion of the British proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force, including possible command arrangements. Other topics included the impact of the Chinese nuclear test and a nonproliferation agreement.

In this conversation, President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson discuss the MLF and the proposed ANF--the "Atlantic Nuclear Force," a British proposal as an alternative to the MLF. The two leaders weighed the pros and cons of both proposals, with President Johnson ultimately deciding to give a positive response to the ANF, leaving it up to the British to see if Bonn could be enlisted.

In this conversation, Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary McNamara discussed the West Germans signing the U.S. proposed Limited Test Ban Treaty, which Adenauer felt would be a "success" for the Soviets. Adenauer worried that signing the same documents as the Soviets would recognize the Soviet Occupied Zone.

This memorandum details an extensive conversation between representatives from the U.S. and Great Britain about President Kennedy's decision to cancel work on "Skybolt," or a surface-to-air missile that the British were invested in. The meeting was an attempt to placate a "looming crisis" in Anglo-American relations.