Jelen, Bolesław

According to the Polish ambassador, Moscow’s goal to install missile launchers in Cuba was not completely clear. The explanation given by the Soviet Deputy Premier Sergei Mikoyan that Moscow wanted to use the missiles to obtain a guarantee for Cuba had obvious holes, Jeleń argued. To him, the Soviet move seemed more like a political ploy than military strategy. Warsaw’s emissary in Havana concluded his critical observations by stating that the Soviet Union did not make a mistake in withdrawing the missiles as the Cubans suggested but rather by installing them in the first place.

Jelen discusses a conversation he had with [Foreign Minister Raúl] Roa [García] on 9 September. They discussed diplomatic visits, UN delegation sessions, and growing tensions in the 'Cuban situation' and possible US military action against Cuba.

Jelen relays information presented by Blas Roca and Emilio Aragones Navarro on the ORI's decision to exclude Anibal Escalante from the leadership of the ORI.

Jelen discusses the Cuban Missile Crisis: military and missile bases in Cuba and Turkey, UN inspections of Cuba and U-2 planes.

This document discusses Cuba's decision to send observers to a Soviet-led conference, highlighting their shift from a previously neutral position due to pressure from Brezhnev and the Soviet Politburo. The decision, driven by the desire to maintain Soviet support during a difficult period, was met with caution due to fears of Chinese economic retaliation, signaling potential tensions in Sino-Cuban relations.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.