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Documents

January 17, 1963

Minute of Understanding [between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Fanfani]

The two leaders signed off on a “minute of understanding” expressing their understanding on the MLF, replacement of Jupiters with Polaris by April 1, the substitution of Sergeant for Corporal missiles, and the possibility of using the Jupiters for “space experiments.” In accordance with Fanfani’s request, the minute was retyped to leave out the reference to bases in the Mediterranean.

December 13, 1962

McGeorge Bundy, 'Last Conversation with the President before NATO Meeting of December 1962'

Kennedy, McNamara and Rusk moved ahead with the Jupiters matter by making plans to bring it up with Italian and Turkish defense ministers at the NATO meeting in Paris in December 1962. The goal would be to persuade them of the obsolescence of the Jupiters, the dangers that they posed during the Cuban crisis and in future crises, and the need for “better arrangements,” such as “a rearrangement of Polaris deployments.”

President Kennedy continued to monitor the Jupiter missiles problem. During a meeting with Rusk a few weeks later, McNamara explained that President Kennedy, who he had seen in Palm Beach on December 27, had asked him what steps were being taken “to remove the Jupiters.” Consistent with that, McNamara favored the “earliest possible date” and asked whether a “deadline” could be set for April 1 to begin the removals.

October 10, 1963

Memorandum of Conversation between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Gromyko, 'Non-Dissemination and the MLF'

In this conversation, President Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko discussed the Soviet attitude toward the MLF. Gromyko argued that it would be a barrier to a nonproliferation agreement. Kennedy made the standard argument that “one of the reasons for an MLF was to make it less possible for the Germans to press for nuclear weapons of their own.”

May 30, 1963

Memorandum from President Kennedy to Holders of NSAM 241

In this memorandum, President Kennedy questioned whether Washington should make “representations” to the Germans or Italians because that could have an adverse impact on U.S. relations with those countries in regards to attitudes towards Pierrelatte. He also expresses opposition to European nuclear cooperation overall.

December 19, 1962

Memorandum of Conversation, 'Skybolt'

This memorandum details an extensive conversation between representatives from the U.S. and Great Britain about President Kennedy's decision to cancel work on "Skybolt," or a surface-to-air missile that the British were invested in. The meeting was an attempt to placate a "looming crisis" in Anglo-American relations.

April 5, 1963

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Talbot and the President's Deputy Special Counsel Feldman

President Kennedy and Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres discussed the possibility of UAR intervention in Jordan. Peres stated that "the UAR is the only Arab country that Israel really fears."