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February 22, 1967

US Department of State, Oral Note, 'Interpretations Regarding Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Formulations'

As an assurance to the Germans and other NATO allies, ACDA and the State Department drew up a memorandum on the interpretation of the NPT draft treaty. The key point was that the treaty “deals only with what is prohibited, not what is permitted.”

November 28, 1966

Adrian Fisher, Acting Director ACDA, and Leonard S. Meeker, Legal Adviser to the Secretary, 'Revised Draft Language for a Non-Proliferation Treaty,' enclosing Memorandum for the President, 'Suggested Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty'

Further review on the proposed NPT by ACDA and State Department lawyers in this report concluded that the language would “not disturb existing bilateral relationships,” that is, arrangements to provide U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiled in NATO countries for the use of West German forces and other allies in the event of war.

March 9, 1966

Department of State Airgram A-168 to US Embassy West Germany, 'NIE 23-66: West German Capabilities and Intentions to Produce and Deploy Nuclear Weapons'

At the request of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the agencies that belonged to the U.S. Intelligence Board began work on a National Intelligence Estimate to provide a “comprehensive analysis” of West German nuclear “capabilities and intentions.” In this Airgram, the State Department requested input from the Bonn embassy on the upcoming NIE.

August 23, 1980

US Embassy Japan Telegram 14873 to State Department, 'GAO Review: Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978'

The telegram describes the US Embassy in Tokyo reporting Japan's criticism of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 but its unwillingess to be strongly opposed in fear of a cut-off in enrichment services and nuclear reactor components.

April 28, 1959

CIA-State Department Differences on Radio Free Europe Polish Broadcasts

Cord Meyer records sharply different views of the utility of RFE Polish broadcasts aired by State and CIA officials in a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Foy Kohler on April 23, 1959

April 2, 1959

Review of Radio Free Europe Polish Broadcasts

Cord Meyer recounts conclusions of the June 2, 1958, session of the Committee on Radio Broadcasting Policy.

June 2, 1958

Voice of America and Radio Free Europe Polish Broadcasts Reviewed

Minutes of a Committee on Radio Broadcasting Policy meeting on April 17, 1958, focused on State Department criticisms of RFE broadcasts to Poland

August 23, 1974

Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 4-1-74, 'Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

A few months after the Indian test, the intelligence community prepared an overall estimate of the global nuclear proliferation situation. Such an estimate had not been prepared since the 1960s, no doubt because of the White House’s lack of interest. This estimate, SNIE 4-1-74, has been released before but this version includes more information, mainly a section on the Indian nuclear program, which had previously been withheld. While finding it “likely” that India would launch a covert program to produce a few weapons, the analysts were not sure that such a decision had been made and suggested that Moscow or Washington might be able to persuade the Indians from moving in that direction.

May 18, 1974

US Embassy India Cable 6598 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Explosion: Why Now?'

Having written off an early test, the day that it took place the Embassy scrambled to come up with an explanation. Deputy Chief of Mission David Schneider signed off on the telegram because Moynihan was in London. While the Embassy had no insight on the decision-making, it saw domestic politics and “psychological” explanations for the test: the need to offset domestic “gloom” and the need for India to “be taken seriously.” According to the telegram, “the decision will appeal to nationalist feeling and will be widely welcomed by the Indian populace.”

January 19, 1974

US Embassy India cable 0743 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Intentions'

The Embassy assessed India's potential for the development of nuclear weapons amd concluded that “deeper economic problems,” among other considerations militated against a nuclear test in the near future, even though the Indian government had the capabilities to produce and test a device. While there were no rumors about a test as there had been in 1972, “we know little about relevant internal government debate.” All in all, the embassy believed that economic conditions “tip the likelihood of an early test to a lower level than previous years.” Russell Jack Smith, previously the deputy director for intelligence at the CIA, and then serving as special assistant to the ambassador (station chief), was one of the officials who signed off on this cable.

Pagination