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February 22, 1967

US Department of State, Oral Note, 'Interpretations Regarding Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Formulations'

As an assurance to the Germans and other NATO allies, ACDA and the State Department drew up a memorandum on the interpretation of the NPT draft treaty. The key point was that the treaty “deals only with what is prohibited, not what is permitted.”

November 28, 1966

Adrian Fisher, Acting Director ACDA, and Leonard S. Meeker, Legal Adviser to the Secretary, 'Revised Draft Language for a Non-Proliferation Treaty,' enclosing Memorandum for the President, 'Suggested Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty'

Further review on the proposed NPT by ACDA and State Department lawyers in this report concluded that the language would “not disturb existing bilateral relationships,” that is, arrangements to provide U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiled in NATO countries for the use of West German forces and other allies in the event of war.

March 9, 1966

Department of State Airgram A-168 to US Embassy West Germany, 'NIE 23-66: West German Capabilities and Intentions to Produce and Deploy Nuclear Weapons'

At the request of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the agencies that belonged to the U.S. Intelligence Board began work on a National Intelligence Estimate to provide a “comprehensive analysis” of West German nuclear “capabilities and intentions.” In this Airgram, the State Department requested input from the Bonn embassy on the upcoming NIE.

August 23, 1980

US Embassy Japan Telegram 14873 to State Department, 'GAO Review: Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978'

The telegram describes the US Embassy in Tokyo reporting Japan's criticism of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 but its unwillingess to be strongly opposed in fear of a cut-off in enrichment services and nuclear reactor components.

May 18, 1974

US Embassy India Cable 6598 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Explosion: Why Now?'

Having written off an early test, the day that it took place the Embassy scrambled to come up with an explanation. Deputy Chief of Mission David Schneider signed off on the telegram because Moynihan was in London. While the Embassy had no insight on the decision-making, it saw domestic politics and “psychological” explanations for the test: the need to offset domestic “gloom” and the need for India to “be taken seriously.” According to the telegram, “the decision will appeal to nationalist feeling and will be widely welcomed by the Indian populace.”

May 17, 1973

US Embassy India Cable 5797 to State Department forwarding Bombay consulate cable 983, 'India’s Nuclear Position'

A follow up to John J. Pinajian's 4 April 1973 report on "India's Nuclear Position." Pinajian got some access to the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, but noticed the absence of personnel responsible for experimental work. Moreover, he was getting cooperation from the Institute for Fundamental Research to conduct an experiment.

July 26, 1972

US Embassy India Cable 9293 to State Department, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

The Embassy acknowledged that India had the “technical know-how and possibly materials to develop [a] simple nuclear device within period of months after GOI decision to do so.” Nevertheless, it saw no evidence that a decision had been made to test a device. Moreover, capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons were limited, with no plans in sight to “develop [a] missile launch system.”

June 27, 1972

US Embassy Tokyo Cable 67912 to State Department, 'Japanese View Regarding Indian Nuclear Plans'

Cable on a discussion with Japanese Disarmament Division Chief Tanaka, who was uncertain whether India would conduct the nuclear test or not.

June 26, 1972

US Mission Geneva Cable 2755 to State Department, 'Japanese-Pakistani Conversations Regarding Indian Nuclear Plans'

Report on conversations between Japanese officials and a Pakistani source who indicated the location of the upcoming Indian nuclear test. The cable expressed doubts about the information, suggesting that the "stir" "may have been created largely on personal basis" by the Pakistani source.

March 14, 1972

US Embassy Canada Cable 430 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Intentions on South Asia Situation'

Elaborating on his earlier cable and responding to the general issues raised by the Department’s 9 March message, science attaché Hudson questioned Lauren Gray’s evaluation of Sethna, suggesting that by combining “guile” and “technical proficiency,” the latter could easily have “easily misled” the Canadian. Based on consultations with a variety of Canadian insiders with knowledge of and experience with the Indian nuclear program, the Embassy saw no technical or fiscal barriers to an Indian test. Moreover, any pressure on India not to test would increase the “likelihood” of that happening.

Pagination