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Documents

March 1, 1978

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with Z. Brzezinski, Assistant to the President of the US for National Security, 1 March 1978'

In this March 1978 conversation, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski discussed rising US concerns over Soviet and Cuban military involvement in the Horn of Africa, particularly its perceived threat to Western oil routes and the stability of Saudi Arabia. Dobrynin rejected Brzezinski’s fears as exaggerated, reiterating that the conflict stemmed from Somali aggression and emphasizing that the Soviet presence supported Ethiopia's defense. The meeting ended with both sides restating their entrenched positions, with the US seeking assurances of de-escalation and Soviet withdrawal, which Dobrynin declined to provide.

May 22, 1980

Record of Policy Review Committee Meeting, 'Korea'

Officials from the US Department of State, the White House, the CIA, NSC, OSD, and JCS determine US policy toward South Korea in light of the events in Gwangju.

March 4, 1977

Letter, President Carter to Secretary Brezhnev

December 7, 1979

Memorandum of conversation, Prime-Minister Van Agt – President Carter (and others)

Participants in the meeting included President Carter, Minister Vance, MP van Agt and also Min. Van der Klaauw, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, David Aaron, Tammenoms Bakker, and Merckelbach. Conversation revolves around TNF modernization and arms negotiation with the Soviet Union. Both parties discuss domestic difficulties shaping how these issues are presented and pursued.

February 14, 1977

Letter, President Carter to Secretary Brezhnev

December 7, 1979

Memorandum of Conversation between Dutch Prime Minister Van Agt, Secretary Vance, NSA Brzezinski, and Minister Van der Klaauw

Memorandum of conversation between Secretary Vance, National Security Advisor Brzezinski, Dutch Prime Minister Van Agt, and Minister Van der Klaauw. The conversation focuses on Dutch domestic sentiment toward TNF modernization and SALT II.