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Documents

April 29, 1975

On the Visit of a DPRK Party and Government Delegation Headed by Kim Il Sung to the PR China from 18 to 26 April 1975

Report of the visit by DPRK officials to the PRC. This summary addresses the PRC’s and the DPRK’s relations with each other and their individual policies towards South Korea, it examines the issue of reunification and touches on the Sino-Soviet competition.

March 11, 1976

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.051

The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang conveys the remarjs of Pak Jung-guk, North Korean Ambassador to Bucharest, on the situation in South Korea.

May 19, 1975

Telegram from Moscow to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 050.572

The document summarizes North Korea's prospective approach towards unification. Pyongyang envisages three different paths: peaceful, military and revolutionary. In order to support these three routes to unification, the DPRK forwards three policies: the rapid development of socialism, promotion of democracy in South Korea and reinforcement of military solidarity with the revolutionary forces of the world.

December 6, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.537

The document describes how the North Koreans enthusiastically celebrated the consensus of Committee No. 1 over the Korean issue in the UN; however, Lazar believes that the Korean leadership has not actually grasped the full implications of the decision. In addition, the telegram describes how Pyongyang's attempt to reassert control over South Korean islands close to the North Korean shores in the Yellow Sea has created friction between the two countries. The author also mentions that North Korean support for the student movements in South Korea legitimized Seoul's harsher crackdown on the dissident movements.

November 3, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 061.497

Following the end of the inter-Korean dialogue, Zhivkov observes increased antagonism in the rhetoric of the North Koreans regarding unification paralleling the increasing tension between the two Koreas.

August 29, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.360, Urgent, SECRET

The document mentions a forthcoming North Korean condemnation of Kim Dae-jung's abduction in Tokyo by KCIA agents. The author states that the declaration will ask Lee Hu-rak to be removed from co-presidency of the North-South Coordination Committee. Pyongyang seeks Romanian support in publicizing the North Korean position.

August 1973

Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note, No. 01/010124/73, Secret

The document outlines Romania's position regarding the issue of unification of the Korean Peninsula. After a summary of inter-Korean negotiations thus far, the report concludes that the two Koreas are moving very slowly because both sides are attempting to gain advantage over the other. Nonetheless, Romania declares its firm support of the DPRK.

June 29, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.253, Urgent, SECRET

North Korean officials blame pressure from Japan and the US as reasons why South Korean representatives are not receptive to the North's proposals in the North-South Coordination Committee meetings. The official believes that Seoul is attempting to slow down negotiations with Pyongyang because South Korea is unstable. Pyongyang worries that Seoul's plan for joint accession to the US will enshrine the division on the peninsula.

June 16, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.238, Urgent, SECRET

Romanian officials report on the third session of the North-South Coordination Committee (NSCC) in Seoul. Due to differences in each side's ideas on cross-border cooperation and the organization of NSCC, the meeting ended without notable accomplishments. Both sides blame each other for espousing two separate Koreas.

June 7, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 061.224

Popa notes the rift between the two Koreas since the North-South joint declaration in 1972 as Seoul considers North Korea's attempts to join organizations where South Korea is already a member as a means to undermine its authority.

Pagination