In an exhaustive review of Romanian foreign policy, the Chinese Embassy concludes that the "USSR has a decisive influence over Romania’s foreign policy."

Letter from South African Foreign Minister R. F. "Pik" Botha to U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz contesting American arguments against supporting UNITA.

The General Secretary of the Communist Party of Bolivia, Mario Monje, informs Chestnoy about a recent meeting with Che Guevara, in which they discuss the differences in Chinese Communist leadership policies. Guevara states that if forced to choose between the two sides, Cuban leadership would be on the side of the Soviet Union.

Darusenkov notes a meeting in which Guevara discusses Khrushchev's resignation and its potential policy implications for the Soviet Union, focusing particularly on foreign policy towards Cuba.

Cuban foreign and domestic policy is analyzed. Cuba's long-term economic improvement and international agreements regarding Cuban sugar exports are discussed, indicating a "new stage" of the Cuban revolution.

In a top secret report, Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck describes a recent meeting with Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos. Beck divides the conversation among five categories—agriculture, industry, central planning, counter-revolutionary activities, and the party. Dorticos reports improvements and obstacles (e.g. agricultural production is developing, though slowly, and the growth of the party remains in its initial stages of formation).

Chargé d’ affaires ad interim Miklós Vass reports on secret US State Department documents that Cuban Minister of Industry Ernesto “Che” Guevara acquired. The documents reveal US principles on Venezuelan economic policy and US positions on Latin American states and Latin American public opinion on Cuba. Vass advises that the secret documents be translated officially into Hungarian and sent to Hungarian embassies throughout Latin America. The document included three enclosures; Vass references two secret documents repeatedly.

During his visit in Poland, Castro relates Cuba's position on a conversation taken place in Moscow and why it may be of interest to the Cubans. Gomulka raises the issue of the missiles. In Gomulka's opinion two factors were decisive: contradictions which arose within the socialist camp and the policy which was conducted by Khrushchev. Gomulka is assured that US is capable of conducting a war with Cuba by way of conventional weapons, it does not have to use nuclear weapons. It is clear that the socialist camp and the USSR cannot defend Cuba in any other way but by using nuclear weapons. If a conflict is meant to be, then it will be a nuclear conflict, there is no other way. Gomulka further raises a question whether to go into a nuclear war or not. Castro disagrees with a manner nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Cuba by Soviets. Khruchshev explained that he did not have time. Per Gomulka, Khrushchev conducted a policy which was not thought-out and which was all-out. Gomulka further discusses his talks with Chinese and Vietnamese comrades re: nuclear weapons issue.

In a memorandum, Konstantin Tellalov, Head of the Foreign Policy and International Relations Department of the Central Committee of BCP, and Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev evaluate Cuban-Bulgarian relations. Tellalov and Bashev contextualize Cuba's development both nationally and internationally. Cuba's primary concerns are related to its economy (re: housing, rationing, embargo). Cuba's leadership continues to display a limited understanding of Marxism-Leninism, scientific planning (central planning), and the importance of COMECON. Taking into consideration the Bulgarian delegation’s recent visit to Cuba, they stress the importance of Cuba's success and the need for a radical, all-embracing commitment to relations.

The Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo report includes three main documents: a protocol and resolution with notes, a top secret information note, and a top secret protocol from 30 July 1970. The first section includes the Politburo's approval of the delegation's negotiations with Cuba, proposals to restructure economic partnership, and the Bulgarian delegation's statements on miscommunication between Cuba and Bulgaria. The second section, top secret information note, summarizes important exchanges during the Bulgarian visit to Cuba (e.g. Zhivkov's discussion on the importance of economic cooperation (COMECON) to the development of socialism). The third section, the top secret protocol, includes portions of a conversation between Bulgarian delegation and Cuban Politburo members. Castro summarizes ideas exchanged during the state visit.