The document reaffirms the highest objective at the time: improving requirements technical work in the Vietnamese Ministry of the Interior. The document also recounts successful cooperation in areas of electrical engineering and electronics, precision mechanics, and camouflage.

Inventory documenting the shipment of dictation machines, tape recorders, and other devices from East Germany to Haiphong in North Vietnam.

Notes from a 1966 meeting between Erich Mielke, Nguyen Minh Tien, and several other East German officials. Tien summarizes the results of recent East German/North Vietnam collaboration, including laying the groundwork for the establishment of a Technical Operations Department in North Vietnam and makes several requests, including assistance with training of cadres. Mielke expresses East Germany’s intent to help North Vietnam, indicates that East Germany will buy advanced technology for North Vietnam, and proposes sending OTS (Operational-Technical Sector) and other specialists to Vietnam to learn more about the conflict.

The East German Minister of State Security, Erich Mielke, meets with the head of North Vietnam’s Technical Operations Sector, Nguyen Minh Tien. Tien requests the transfer of expertise from East Germany in a number of different areas, including covert photography, remote surveillance (e.g. “bugging”) and counterfeiting.

Intelligence reports from the Fifth Navy Radio Network from 7 and 9 February reporting that there have been increased amounts of radio transmissions between naval commanders of the US forces in the Far East, and that evidence suggests that the US command is preparing a landing operation on the west coast of Korea.

Assessment by the Stasi of the espionage of the main Western secret services in East Germany based on its investigation of cases of spying in 1961.

Assessment by the Stasi of changes to operations made by the main Western secret services in response to Khrushchev's November 1958 diplomatic note to the United States, Britain, and France demanding an end to the occupation of West Berlin.

Letter from South African President P. W. Botha to Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda asserting that SWAPO is the aggressor in excalation tensions between SWAPO and South African forces, and that South Africa is responding in measured and restrained ways. Asks for Zambia's assistance in convincing SWAPO to cease hostilities.

Analysis of the military campaign waged in Southern Angola in 1987-88 as well as the lessons learned from this exchange. Document indicates that FAPLA failed to learn from its mistakes, while UNITA adapted much more effectively to the combat environment it faced in Angola. Although FAPLA managed to hold on to Cuito Cuanavale, its large losses led to a Cuban build-up in Southern Angola, which challenged the existing military balance in the region. This provided new impetus to peace negotiations and resulted in the December 1988 Accords among South Africa, Angola and Cuba.

CIA station chief in Luanda, Hultslander gives his perspective on the US involvement in Angola. In his interview he explains what the US knew about liberation movements prior to the outbreak of Civil War, his opinion on the CIA covert action program IAFEATURE, the Cuban presence in Angola and his assessment of the leading factions in Angola; MPLA, UNITA and FNLA.