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Documents

December 1979

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2013 Release]

This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2013 release (which is currently under appeal) includes some information from a “Secret Test by Others” (Pakistan, India) and the map on page 12 that had not been released before.

November 26, 1979

International Technology Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory, ITO-79-155, '22 September 1979 Event Report Draft'

This Los Alamos study is another in the series of report and studies of the Vela event performed by US intelligence agencies, the national labs, and contractors.

October 1979

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI-IIM 79-100213, 'Iraq’s Nuclear Interests, Programs, and Options'

This report found “no hard evidence” that Iraq was intent on a nuclear weapons capability. Nevertheless, considering the scope of Iraq’s “ambitious” nuclear program, intelligence analysts concluded that the Baath regime was covertly seeking a weapons capability to support its pursuit of regional hegemony and to match the perceived Israeli nuclear threat.

June 1978

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Special Projects Division, 'Proliferation Group Quarterly Report, January – March 1978'

This issue includes an extract from a recent study on Pakistan and two highly technical articles relating to on-going research to identify the signatures of high explosives used for the implosion method of nuclear detonation. It also includes a report that utilized open literature and classified intelligence, including two satellite photographs, the purpose of the article is to illuminate how the South African Government intended to use the site, down to the depth and thickness of the bore holes.

July 1978

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, 'South Africa’s Nuclear Options and Decisionmaking Structure'

Memo reports that during the period the Carter administration was putting pressure on South Africa to avoid the nuclear weapons route, but the analysts suggested that even if the South Africans signed the NPT and accepted IEAE safeguards they would continue to pursue a “covert program.”

September 1977

Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Special Projects Division, 'South Africa: Motivations and Capabilities for Nuclear Proliferation'

This report for the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) pointed to downsides of US and international pressures against pariah or otherwise beleaguered states such as South Africa and Israel and against would-be nuclear proliferants. They might cooperate to advance their goals.

October 18, 1964

Cable to the CCPCC International Liaison Department and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Reactions of Albanian Newspapers to Our Nuclear Bomb Test and Khrushchev’s Removal'

The Chinese Embassy in Tirana notes Albania's positive responses to China's successful nuclear test.

May 16, 1965

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Poland to International Liaison Department and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'A Few Polish and Czech Reactions to Our Second Nuclear Bomb Test Explosion'

The Chinese Embassy in Poland assesses the responses to the Chinese nuclear test among socialist countries in Eastern Europe.

October 21, 1964

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, 'Reactions among the North Korean Masses to China's Nuclear Test'

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea notes North Koreans' positive responses to China's first nuclear weapons test and a downfall of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union

September 25, 1963

Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 12328]

Cable from Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, to Warsaw, reporting his meeting with a US official "Henry" (not Cabot Lodge), where they discuss Maneli's meeting with Ngo Dinh Nhu. Notes that it was an attempt to establish contact between US and Polish officials in Vietnam.

Pagination