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October 6, 1977

Hans-Hilger Haunschild, 'RE: Nuclear Power Cooperation with Iran; Result of my One-hour meeting with the President of the AEOI , Dr. Etemad, on 4 October 1977'

Hans-Hilger Haunschild provides an update on Iran's order of nuclear power plants from West Germany. He comments on the prospects for increased German-Iranian trade, problems of spent fuel reprocessing, the timeline for conclusion of agreements with Iran, Iran's negotiations with France, and a sea water desalination plant.

May 31, 1976

Letter to Federal Minister Genscher

This letter details the logistics of the conference in London. The US is likely to submit an application to stop the delivery of so-called sensitive technologies. Delivery and transportation of materials is discussed. 

May 28, 1976

Note re: German-Iranian Nuclear Agreement; Meeting with State Secretary Haunschild on 28 May 1976

This conversation involved discussing the removal of the fuel cycle from the agreement, the lands delivering nuclear material to Iran, the continuation of work outside of Iran, physical protection during delivery, and information about a conference in London. 

May 1976

Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, 'Cabinet Submission: RE: Draft of an Agreement between the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran on Cooperation Regarding the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy'

The cabinet approved of the continuation of collaboration. The United States was discussed with to provide advice on how to move forward. Talks between the US and Iran about this are currently concluding. Deliveries of fuel assemblies are also discussed. 

July 5, 1961

Record of a Conversation between N. S. Khrushchev and Chen Yi, Deputy Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China

Chen asks Khrushchev to go over the pressing international issues and he presents the USSR's stances on the situation in Laos, South Korea, and Cuba. Khrushchev also raises problems in GDR and difficulties in negotiations with Western powers with regards to the German question. Khrushchev also mentions Soviet plans to launch a spaceship and resume nuclear testing. The two leaders also discuss the challenges of agricultural development.

January 7, 1958

Unsigned Draft Code Message to Director Blusztain

This message summarizes responses to the Rapacki Plan from countries in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and North America.

November 26, 1969

US Embassy Bonn Telegram 15293, 'NPT – Text of FRG Note on NPT Signature'

This telegram detailed the conditions under which the West German's would ratify the NPT, which depended on the results of EURATOM-IAEA safeguards negotiations.

November 28, 1969

State Department Telegram 199360 to US Embassy Bonn, 'FRG and Swiss NPT Signatures'

On 28 November 1969, West German Ambassador to the United States Rolf Pauls signed the NPT at the State Department and delivered a statement and a detailed note. At the signing Secretary Rogers spoke about the treaty’s value, the “historic” importance of the West German signature, the U.S. understanding that the UN Charter “confers no right to intervene by force unilaterally in the Federal Republic of Germany,” and a reaffirmation of U.S. security guarantees to NATO and the Federal Republic.

November 5, 1969

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Ambassador Helmut Roth, 'US-FRG Consultations on NPT,' with memorandum attached

During these consultations on the NPT, the chief West German official, Helmut Roth, Chief of the Foreign Office’s Disarmament Section, reviewed the progress of the talks with Secretary of State Rogers. Roth emphasized the importance of the “reaffirmation” of US security commitments “at a time when [the Federal Republic] was signing a renunciation of nuclear weapons for its own defense.”

April 30, 1969

Thomas Hughes, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary of State, 'FRG - Further Delay on NPT Signature,' Intelligence Note-327

Noting that the same objections to the NPT remained, INR opined that some West German politicians were using them “to rationalize an opposition that is really based on nationalistic emotions and on the political advantages to be derived from playing upon these emotions.”

Pagination