First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. 

The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry. 

A letter from Olzhas Suleimenov welcoming participants to the upcoming International Citizens Congress for a Nuclear Test Ban. Suleimenov describes the recent successes of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement and explains that forming a united voice with the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War will lead to future victories.

A page of logos used during the International Citizens Congress for a Nuclear Test Ban.

A timeline describing the conception and subsequent activities of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Nuclear Movement. Special attention is given to Kazakh-U.S. cooperation, acts of protest, and nuclear tests carried out by the USSR. The timeline ends with the International Citizens Congress for a Nuclear Test Ban in May 1990.

This shortened program for the International Citizens Congress for a Nuclear Test Ban broadly describes the daily activities of congress participants. According to the program, the congress will include a variety of receptions, working committees, dinners, press-conferences, and speakers.

A letter explaining recent actions taken by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War to campaign for a nuclear test ban. The letter celebrates the media coverage of the International Citizens Congress for a Nuclear Test Ban generated by congress participants and applauds the Soviet Union for continuing its undeclared moratorium on nuclear testing.

A letter expressing gratitude for the participants of the International Citizens Congress for a Nuclear Test Ban. The letter expresses hope that participants will continue to build international coalitions in the future and mentions an upcoming January 1991 meeting of the Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference.

A participant program for the International Citizens Congress for a Nuclear Test Ban. In addition to a letter welcoming participants to the congress, a detailed schedule of events, list of speakers, draft appeal to the leaders of nuclear weapons testing states, and map of the area around the participants' hotel in Alma-Ata are included.

This letter describes the recent efforts of the United States Comprehensive Test Ban Coalition to pressure negotiations about nuclear test bans occurring in January 1991. The letter ends with a request for donations.

A letter from the Director of Public Affairs of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War providing travel information to participants of the International Citizens Congress for a Nuclear Test Ban. Processing of visas, customs procedures, and an onward flight from Moscow to Alma-Ata are discussed.