This undated audio file handles one of the Revolutionary Command Council meetings, attended by Saddam Hussein and some high-ranking commanders. The meeting addressed the UN and the Security Council resolutions against Iraq. Also discussed were the negotiations with Russia and France, British messages to the Russians to help release an unidentified British prisoner, frozen Iraqi assets, and biological/chemical weapons.

This Audio file contains the following: A meeting between Saddam Hussein and his military commanders. Saddam says that he did not expect the post-Gulf War uprising in the South, but that he did expect to be attacked by the United States. They discuss the power of the tribes and their ties to the government, internal security issues, and emergency plans in case of another uprising.

The following undated audio tape details a meeting between Saddam Hussein and High‐ranking officers. 00‐54 minutes contain the following subjects: Saddam spoke regarding Iraq's past difficult situations, the Iraq‐Iran war, and the Iraqi use of helicopters. The transfer of Lieutenant General Hamid, who was in the Air force and now in the General Command. An unknown officer reported to Saddam the army's status in the battlefield (Translator Comment: Probably Iran‐Iraq War). " Saddam asked a person called Ahmad about his opinion regarding Al‐Faw and Ahmad reported to Saddam what happened there. " Lieutenant General Nizar spoke about the Liberation War, Tawklna 'Ala Allah war, and the Iranian Army. " Concerns from the Iraqi Army and the Military Intelligence to conceal plans and intentions from the United States.   Discussions on Saddam's orders regarding retaking the Al‐Faw.

This file contains dialogues between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi ambassadors in foreign countries. This period contains an Iraqi ambassador comment on the Zionist influence in the United States. He stated that the American brains were conducting the Zionism in the United States. He added that the Jewish immigration whether to Israel or to the United states would create a threat on the Arab Countries. Saddam commented that the Soviet Jewish immigration to these states would decrease because the regime has changed in the Soviet Union. He said that Israel wished the Berlin wall would move to the States of the Middle East. Their target was to eliminate the wall separating them from the Arab States. He added that the democratic changes were continuously occurring. He gave an example about a protest in Czechoslovakia. It leads to the resignation of 11 Ministers of the Czechoslovakian government. Saddam answered that when a protest occurred in the Yarmuk City, Iraq, the Revolutionary Command Council considered carefully how to deal with the protest. . Israel was afraid from the Iraqi evolution to a technologically developed country. Saddam stated that every new power appearing in the world might threaten the two existent enormous poles. That was the reason Iraq fought. This period contains the Saddam declaration on the ambassadors' freedom to express their opinions. He also noticed that they were well prepared for the discussion. He added that the good preparation for the conferences was the key of their success.

This audio file contains a meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Revolutionary Command Council members to discuss the position of the US and Russia towards the Iraq war, specifically citing a Reagan speech which confirms US-Iran relations. It discusses Russia's position. Furthermore, he talks about the deal that America had offered to Iraq in which America would support Iraq with weapons and Iraq would give the US Russian tanks to be examined. Saddam comments on some of President Regan's speech like stopping the war and censuring violence. Saddam recommends sending a letter to the United States Government in which Iraq expresses its suspicions of the American positions. In addition, Saddam said that America is trying to create a misunderstanding between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and America's desire of not leaving the alliance with Iran for the benefit of Russia will force it to achieve the Iranian ambitions in the Arabian Gulf. Then Tariq 'Aziz talks about the friendly relationships with the great countries. He said that it's a hopeless case because the great countries are running after their own benefits even if it's against its own friends. Discussion regarding America wanting to end the war through supporting Iran, also to achieve its alliance with Iran. He adds that if America follows this policy, it will commit political suicide in the region.

This file contains handwritten transcripts from a recording of a meeting of the Armed Forces, General Command and Saddam's phone conversations with a group of military leaders, dated January 7, 1981. These meetings cover military considerations for the Iraqi Forces in the 1st Gulf War and suggestions from commanders. 

• Pages 2‐6 include the index of this record. 
• Pages 7‐29 talk about the position of the Iraqi Forces during the Iraqi‐Iranian War, procedures, and military‐type discussions to reinforce their forces there and matters of providing ammunitions and tanks. 
• Pages 30‐56 include a conversation about the position and failures of their aircrafts, especially helicopters. They mentioned the military policy of Stalin. They also talk about the military formation of divisions and brigades of the land forces. 
• Pages 57‐80 proceed with the same conversation and mention Hitler and his military policy in addition to some historical events. 
• Pages 81‐92 include comments from the meeting's attendants on field events and positive sides utilized during this war and the spirit of fighters in the battlefield.
• Pages 93‐123 include an enthusiastic conversation with Saddam Hussein about the achievements made by the Iraqi fighters. In addition, there is communication between army units and some additional suggestions.
• Pages 124‐146 continue the same above discussion and conclude the results. They also discuss other relevant subjects such as the injuries and casualties of the enemy.

This file contains the record of a meeting between Saddam and his military commanders on efforts to defend Iraq from any coalition attacks following the Gulf War. They discuss the UN inspection regime, the diplomatic panorama, the prospects for Russian support, and other issues. They argue that Iraq was stronger after the Gulf War than before.

This audio file from a meeting dated 1 May 1991 between Saddam Hussein and the General Command of the Army regarding the enlargement of the Army, the political changes which affect the Army and its training. Saddam Hussein admired the forming of the Republican Guards groups, soldeirs who participated in Qadissyah Saddam (Iran-Iraq War). In addition, this file includes a discussion regarding the invasion of Kuwait and the low morale of Iraqi soldiers, the American request to cease-fire because of the Iraqi soldiers' brevity, the gradual erosion of Iraqi morale on the front, and the increase of Divisions' numbers within the Army. Major General Sultan discussed the use of high-technology weapons by the American forces in the First Gulf War.

Audio file details one of the Iraqi National Command's meetings. Saddam Hussein, who presided over the meeting, held sometime in 1993, stressed the importance of having the conference documents printed out and distributed to the members of the Ba'th Party. In the meeting, they talked about the following issues: The reports written out by the members of the Ba'th Party - Planning - The problems that face the National Command - The impact of the 1st Gulf War on the Arab world - Some issues of the Ba'th Party - The personality of the Ba'th Party members - How they can manage the universities to control the problems that face the youth - The chain of command of the Party Unions.

As other documents in this collection on Moroccan nationalists in 1947 and 1950 have exemplified, the United Nations was an important arena in decolonization struggles for Arabs, as it was for Asians and Africans as e.g. Alanna O’Malley’s The Diplomacy of Decolonisation: America, Britain, and the United Nations during the Congo crisis, 1960-1964 (2018) has shown. In this regard, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was founded in 1964 and taken over by the Fatah movement in 1969, was no exception.

To be sure, Palestinian organizations including Fatah and the PLO decried key UN actions. One was the UN Palestine partition plan of 1947; another was UN Security Council resolution 242 of November 1967. Calling upon Israel to withdraw “from territories occupied” during the Six-Day War in June and calling for the “acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace,” it did not mention Palestine or the Palestinians. Even so, the PLO sought to get access to the UN and UN recognition. A crucial landmark on this road was the address to the UN in New York in November 1974 by Yassir Arafat (1929-2004), a Fatah co-founder in 1959 and from 1969 PLO chairman.

Arafat did not speak at the Security Council, which was and is dominated by its five veto-carrying permanent members Britain, China, France, the United States, and the USSR/Russia. Rather, he addressed the UN General Assembly (UNGA), where from the 1960s Third World states were in the majority; his speech was the first time that the UNGA allowed a non-state representative to attend its plenary session. The UNGA invited the PLO after having decided, in September, to begin separate hearings on Palestine (rather than making Palestine part of general Middle Eastern hearings), and after the PLO was internationally recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, a landmark accomplishment for the organization. The UNGA president who introduced Arafat, Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1937-2021), was the Foreign Minister of Algeria, which since its independence in 1962 had supported the Palestinian cause organizationally, militarily, and politically. Arafat spoke in Arabic; the below text is the official UN English translation. Arafat did not write the text all by himself; several PLO officials and Palestinians close to the PLO, including Edward Said, assisted, as Timothy Brennan has noted in Places of Mind: A Life of Edward Said (2021). Later in November 1974, the UNGA inter alia decided to give the PLO observer status and affirmed Palestinians’ right to self-determination.