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November 7, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy Sweden cable 4456 to State Department

Swedish response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.

November 13, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistan Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy Spain Cable 13257 to State Department

British ambassador's meeting with Spanish Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs to discuss the UK demarche on inverter exports. Under Secretary agrees to cooperate and block all loopholes.

November 14, 1978

'Achieving USG Nonproliferation Objectives in Pakistan,' US Embassy Pakistan Cable 1119 to State Department

U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan advises against informing the Indian government about U.S. concerns over Pakistan's nuclear program. It would have an "adverse impact" for the U.S. government to be seen colluding with India by Pakistan.

November 8, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy West Germany cable 20685 to State Department

West German response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate and expressing surprise that Pakistan was attempting to complete the reprocessing plant.

November 7, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy Canada cable 5446 to State Department

Canadian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully and expressing surprise that Pakistan was attempting to complete the reprocessing plant.

November 17, 1978

'Achieving USG Nonproliferation Objectives in Pakistan,' US Embassy India Cable 17682

U.S. Ambassador to India reports that the Indian government is aware that the U.S. believes Pakistan seeks nuclear weapons capability. An Indian diplomat informed him that Pakistan was two to three years away from nuclear capability.

November 21, 1978

US Embassy Stockholm Cable 4662 to State Department, 'UK Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant'

Cable from U.S. Embassy in Stockholm debating Swedish responsiveness to U.S. and British demarches on inverters and reprocessing technology. It was an open question whether the Swedes were putting inverters on their trigger list and the U.S. would stay in touch with their British colleagues.

July 27, 1973

Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Galley, July 27, 1973

Transcript of a conversation between French Minister of Armed Forces Galley and U.S. officials, including Kissinger and Schlesinger. Galley says that the French are making progress and have benefited from their talks with Foster. Kissinger notes that the U.S. has a “cooperative spirit” with regards to French foreign policy. Galley notes the advances that have been made by the French and asks for aid with modernization of their forces to bring the French to the same level as the U.S., specifically in regards to missile hardening, underground testing, and submarines, among others. Kissinger notes that now that the French have missile technology, it is in the best interest of the U.S. that it be effective and not become irrelevant, but there is strong opposition not only from abroad but at home, as well. Kissinger wants to know how long the French can keep their advances a secret, and Galley notes that many things have already been kept secret and can continue to be kept as such. They end the discussion with talks about meeting again sometime in August.

August 9, 1973

Memorandum of Conversation, 'French Nuclear Discussion'

Transcript of conversation between Kissinger and Schlesinger. Kissinger wants to make Galley "drool" by keeping him interested without actually giving anything up. Kissinger worries about what the British want in terms of Polaris and notes that putting the French on the same footing as the U.S. would scare the British enough to get their point across.

August 17, 1973

Memorandum of Conversation, 'Visit of French Defense Minister Galley; Strategic Programs'

Kissinger wants to help the French without giving them too much. Foster thinks that the French have the worst missile program in the world, while the Chinese have the best. He thinks the best thing we can do is to look at their designs and offer suggestions, especially in regards to forming their objectives and planning how to meet them. Foster notes that any help we give to the French is perceived as a full commitment, so Kissinger warns that we must remain “cold-blooded.”

Pagination