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July 20, 1997

Memo from Ronald Asmus to Strobe Talbott, 'Hanseatic Strategy'

This July 1997 memo outlines a proposed "Hanseatic Strategy" to support future NATO membership for the Baltic states. Acknowledging political resistance within the US and NATO, concerns over defensibility, and Russian opposition, the memo proposes a three-part strategy.

October 29, 1996

Cable, Secretary of State to US Embassy Vilnius, 'Acting Secretary and Lithuanian Fonmin on NATO Enlargement'

On October 8, 1996, Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott met with Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys to discuss NATO enlargement. Gylys warned that excluding Lithuania from early rounds of accession would damage its security and risk public perception of Western disengagement, while expressing concern over Kaliningrad’s future role. Talbott reassured Gylys of the US commitment to Baltic inclusion, emphasized that NATO’s door remains open, and framed the Baltic Action Plan as a complementary—not compensatory—measure to support accession and regional stability.

February 21, 2023

Interview with Ray Acheson

Ray Acheson reflects on their career in nuclear disarmament, emphasizing the destabilizing role of nuclear weapons and their harmful physical, political, and environmental impacts. They critique the failure of governments, academics, and think tanks to fully embrace nuclear abolition, highlighting instead a focus on incremental reforms that sustain the nuclear establishment. Acheson outlines the unique contributions of Reaching Critical Will, including feminist advocacy, transparency in UN disarmament processes, and impactful treaty work, such as with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). They express cautious optimism about a nuclear-free future, advocating for dismantling militarized security systems while recognizing ongoing challenges like the war in Ukraine. The transcript was lightly edited to ease understanding without any changes in the meaning. Clarifications inserted post-interview have been marked with squared brackets [].

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

December 8, 2022

Interview with Harald Müller

Harald Müller recounts his lifelong interest in nuclear issues, stemming from the Cuban Missile Crisis, and his extensive career at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). He emphasizes the dual role of nuclear weapons as both a deterrent, especially against threats like Russia's current aggression, and a danger due to the possibility of catastrophic misuse. Müller suggests a multi-faceted approach to nuclear disarmament, advocating for academic input, practical policy steps, and international cooperation, while recognizing that genuine disarmament requires alignment among global powers, including autocratic states. Despite recent geopolitical setbacks, he remains cautiously hopeful for future nuclear arms control, though he stresses the importance of conventional deterrents in a potential nuclear-free world.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

November 27, 1998

Memorandum to General Ralston, VCJCS, from Strobe Talbott

Talbott writes to General Ralston on a policy of "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons being promoted by NATO allies, the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and India and Pakistan. He summarizes his recent communications with Jaswant Singh.

July 14, 1959

Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington)

First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. 

The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry. 

January 30, 1963

Airgram from the American Embassy Ankara to the Department of State, 'Milliyet Quotes Foreign Minister on Nuclear Missiles'

A report by the newspaper Milliyet cited Foreign Minister Erkin on the Jupiter missiles. According to the Embassy’s translation, Erkin said that the Jupiter missile bases would be “dismantled,” and that Turkey and the United States were discussing their replacement with Polaris missile launching submarines. When Erkin was asked whether Polaris submarines would be provided, he replied that, “These are details. Talks are continuing.” Negotiations were indeed continuing, but it would take six weeks to reach an agreement.

January 29, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1416 to the American Embassy Rome

Responding to Finletter’s request, the State Department provides a statement on the Jupiters for the NAC meeting on January 30, 1963. It explained that the U.S. cannot bring up the matter unilaterally until consultations with Italy and Turkey have progressed. Finletter should coordinate delivery of the statement with Italian and Turkish representatives while Reinhard and Hare work with the Italians and Turks in preparing a written statement that can be presented to the NAC at a later stage. While the Italians were willing to join the statement, it is not clear whether Turkey did or whether the statement was made to the NAC on January 30.

January 25, 1963

American Embassy Paris Telegram POLTO 879 to the Seceretary of State, Washington, DC

Kennedy’s press statements and announcements by Italy and Turkey of agreements with the U.S. on the Jupiters put the U.S. Mission to NATO in an awkward position because “most NAC members learned of withdrawal of Jupiters from press.” Moreover, an internal memo to NATO’s Secretary General complained about the U.S. failure to consult with the Alliance. Ambassador Finletter here asked the Department to provide a statement that he could make to the NAC at its January 30 meeting.

January 24, 1963

Department of State Telegram 634 to American Embassy Ankara

The early delivery of F-104G’s was a crucial element in the negotiations with Turkey over the Jupiters, and the U.S. planning on the deliveries was moving forward. The State Department, however, wanted Turkish authorities to understand that the timing of the deliveries “will depend on such progress in negotiations that it is clear GOT [Government of Turkey] will agree to dismantle JUPITERS.”

Pagination