Chancellor Kiesinger asked the Foreign Office after the ‘Czech crisis’ of late August 1968 to examine the “political consequences” of a “hypothetical case of a German non-signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” The request was forwarded by Director-General Hans Ruete to Wilhelm Grewe, Helmut Allardt, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Schnippenkötter who attended the UN Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in Geneva. 

In Grewe’s judgment, it would be a “benefit” for the NATO alliance, “likely even a condition of her future viability,” if the NPT were to fail. And “if it was the missing German signature which brought the NPT down,” that would lead to “a severe stress test.” But as a NATO member state Germany could “get through” it if the government was determined to “operate with effective arguments” and showed “strength”

Strauß asked the Foreign Minister to comment on a translated “note on problems” of the NPT which he claimed to have received from “French friends”. The note argued that the ambiguous wording of NPT articles I and II concerning indirect transfer of control of nuclear weapons would pose problems. The Soviet Union might politically exploit it over time to “put Germany on a path towards neutrality.” The document also alluded to a concern that the Soviet Union might later argue that non-nuclear weapon states’ (NNWS) participation in “nuclear NATO” (such as allowing nuclear weapons deployments in their territories) violated their NPT commitments.

After 1 July 1968, when the NPT had been opened for signature, Brandt brought up the accession question in a letter to the Chancellor, arguing that the “credibility of our détente policy” depended on Germany’s stance toward the NPT, which in his review it should sign by “early autumn." Brandt’s letter mirrored arguments made previously by Georg-F. Duckwitz, who was State Secretary in the Foreign Office.

In a stern letter to the Chancellor Kiesinger, the Minister of Finance Franz Josef Strauß explained that he would “fight against” the NPT. Strauß was chairman of the Bavarian CSU and had served as Minister of Defense between 1956 and 1962. His point was that a decision to accede to the treaty was unthinkable as long as he remained minister in Kiesinger’s cabinet and, hence, with the CSU participating in the ‘grand coalition’. Strauß’ letter also indicated his suspicion of Foreign Minister Willy Brandt and his disposition towards the NPT which Strauß apparently regarded as submissive.

Kohl and Li Peng discuss human rights in China and the Chinese interpretation of the Tiananmen   Square protests and massacre of 1989. Moreover, they review the relationship between the Vatican and China, German policy on Taiwan, China and  GATT, China and the USA as well as EC trade restrictions vis-à-vis China.

Schmidbauer and Rouhani review the state of bilateral relations. They discuss Iran's arms control policy and its interest in the aquisitation of nuclear technology for peaceful uses, as Rouhani argues. Rouhani reiterates Iran's readiness for whatever kind of international nuclear inspections. Iran's interest was still the finalization of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Kohl argues that the purpose of his journey to Asia was to show Germany’s continued interest in the world beyond German and European issues. Kohl and Kim discuss North Korea's nuclear program and the need for confidence building measures between South and North Korea as a precondition for the start of a meaningful dialogue.

The cabinet approved of the continuation of collaboration. The United States was discussed with to provide advice on how to move forward. Talks between the US and Iran about this are currently concluding. Deliveries of fuel assemblies are also discussed. 

Haunschild and Wieck meet with Dr. Etemad. First Haunschild discusses cooperation with Brazil on peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as other international partners. There is agreement on future plans for a IAEO Conference in Vienna in September. The continuation of all current projects, collaboration for education and research projects, and sending experts in research. 

Kohl and Yeltsin debate Russia's economic reforms and the situation in the Commonwealth of Independent States as well as Western financial aid and preparations for the 1992 World Economic Summit in Munich and especially Russia's participation. Moreover, they review the prospects of Honecker's release from the Chilean embassy in Moscow.