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November 9, 1978

CC CPSU Concerning the appeal to the Czechoslovak Communist Party about K. Babrak

This document discusses how the former to Ambassador the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in Prague, Karmal Babrak, seeks asylum in Czechoslovakia so that he can stay abroad and continue criticizing the PDPA. In response to such activity, the CC CPC proposes to talk to Babrak about the need to end his subversive criticisms.

June 29, 1979

Excerpt from Minutes Nº 156 of the CC CPSU Politburo meeting

This document discusses the situations in Kabul with the CC CPSU and the CC PDPA.

November 1, 1989

Soviet Record of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), Egon Krenz

Soviet record of conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), Egon Krenz concerning the possible reunification of Germany and issues faced by both the Soviet Union and the GDR

May 23, 1949

Cipher Telegrams Regarding Bulgarian Request to Sending Soviet investigators to Sofia

Stalin and Molotov approve a BCP CC request for the dispatch of Soviet investigators to assist in Kiril Slavkov’s trial

October 18, 1949

Cipher Message from Kolarov and Chervenkov to Stalin on Investigated Bulgarian Armed Forces Commanders

Vassil Kolarov and Vulko Chervenkov report on the measures taken against Bulgarian cadets at the Voroshilov Military Academy implicated in unlawful activities.

September 1, 1958

Letter from T. Zhivkov to Soviet Presidium on Training of Bulgarian Military Intelligence Officers at Intelligence Courses in the USSR

Todor Zhivkov requests from Moscow training of Bulgarian intelligence officers.

June 2007

The Operational Situation as Reported in 1971, 1975, and 1981. Folder 35. The Chekist Anthology.

In folder 35 Mitrokhin discusses the KGB’s assertion of an increase in domestic dissent and unrest in the 1970s and early 1980s as well as the methods the KGB utilized to combat this threat. Soviet intelligence believed that this increase in domestic unrest was due primarily to an increased effort by the United States and its allies to promote internal instability within the USSR. In response, the KGB continued to screen foreigners, increased the harshness of penalties for distribution of anti-Soviet literature, and monitored the activities and temperament of nationalists, immigrants, church officials, and authors of unsigned literature within the Soviet Union. Mitrokhin’s note recounts the KGB’s assertion that foreign intelligence agencies were expanding their attempts to create domestic unrest within the USSR. These activities included the support and creation of dissidents within the Soviet Union, the facilitation of the theft Soviet property such as aircrafts, and the public espousal of a position against Soviet persecution of dissidents and Jews. Responding to public exposure of these activities, the KGB proclaimed its legality and trustworthiness while also beginning to assign some agents verbal assignments without written record.

April 13, 1982

KGB Annual Report for 1981 (Excerpts)

In this report Andropov describes the successes of the KGB and Cheka in subverting the infiltration of counterintelligence of NATO countries and Solidarity in the Soviet Union.

June 2007

The Case of Zinovyeva and Others, 1972. Folder 23. The Chekist Anthology

Mitrokhin describes KGB reports on slanderous and politically harmful material disseminated in Kaluga Oblast.

June 2007

The Cherepanov Case, 1968-1980 Folder 24. The Chekist Anthology

In this folder Vasili Mitrokhin reports that in 1968, a part-time student of the Vilnius Polytechnic University, Cherepanov, was sentenced to two years in a correctional facility for disseminating inflammatory leaflets in downtown Vilnius calling for the overthrow of the Soviet government. In 1970, he returned to Vilnius upon release and was unable to find employment. The KGB recruited Cherepanov, but in 1974 he was fired from the agency network for attempting to exploit his connection with the KGB for personal use, for behaving provocatively and making derogatory statements about the leadership of the KGB, and for intending to leave the Soviet Union.

In 1978, Cherepanov met Yolanda Vachatis, citizen of Canada. They tried to get married, but the KGB intervened. In January 1980, Cherepanov attempted to leave for Israel. He applied for permission from the Office of Visas and Registration at the Ministry of the Interior, but was denied.

In March 1980, Cherepanov met with Heikki A. Surye, citizen of Finland. Heikki agreed to assist Cherpanov and handed him a map marked with locations safe for escape. Cherepanov persuaded Surovets to come along. The two began collecting information critical of the Soviet regime in order to publish it in the Western press.

On June 30, Cherepanov and Surovets left Vilnius for Riga. Once in Riga, Cherepanov mailed a letter to Vachatis, who resided in France at that time, saying that he was planning to meet her there sometime in July. On July 7, Cherepanov and Surovets reached the border zone. The warning system was set off, but, due to a rainy weather, footsteps could not be traced, enabling Cherepanov and Surovets to cross the border. Heads of the 11th and 2nd customs checkpoints and others were reprimanded for negligence and mismanagement of the situation. Cherepanov and Surovets were taken back to the USSR on July 24.

Pagination