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Documents

June 2007

Operational Techniques. Folder 76. The Chekist Anthology

In this folder Mitrokhin reports on some spy techniques used by the KGB in major western European cities (including Helsinki, Geneva, Bucharest) in 1975. According to Mitrokhin, the main tasks for KGB residents trained in the use of operational techniques were to check post offices for foreign correspondence, to secretly receive information about meetings of officials of a certain country, and to videotape any acts of anti-socialist movements. This note provides detailed statistics on the photographs taken of foreign mail, telephone recordings, and radio-intercepts. Mitrokhin specifically focuses on operations which took place in Vienna. As his note states, KGB agents photographed thousands of pages of secret materials using the “Zagadka,” a mini-camera built into a regular pen. The KGB residency had their own “TS” correspondence service with 98 N-line—undercover agents operated by legal residents—around Europe. Residents used microdot script and steganography —the art of writing hidden messages—for agents of N-line. As Mitrokhin states, X-line—residency subunit of scientific-technical investigation—agents’ tasks were to provide materials for secret operations. They built in a recording device in an ashtray, used the inside of an automobile seats to keep secret materials, and batteries for cameras. Mitrokhin also provides the exact number and names of all KGB residency agencies in Vienna in 1975, and describes security techniques used for their technology and agents.

December 17, 1947

Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov]

Terebin (Andrei Orlov) returns Kuznetsov's (Stalin) cable concerning a visit to Moscow by Mao. Terebin gives Mao's response to the invitation and tells of a discussion that took place between himself and Mao after Stalin's message was relayed.

April 20, 1948

Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin]

Stalin responds to two letters from Mao, via Terebin (Andrei Orlov). In the cable, Stalin gives advice to Mao on what to do with opposing parties once the Chinese revolution is complete and whether or not Mao should include the liberal bourgeosie in China's central government.

June 2007

Agent Reports. Procedural guidance on the form of agent reports in criminal cases. Folder 10. The Chekist Anthology.

This document outlines the limits and requirements of an agent’s engagement in the implementation of given objectives. The limits of an agent’s participation in a criminal investigation are set by an operative responsible for a particular case. Taking into account concrete circumstances of each assignment, the operative determines proper format of an agent report in order to fully detail all relevant information. The primary requirement of agent reports is to capture the circumstances, connections, and function of persons and events under investigation. Agent reports must be comprehensive, complete and objective. In criminal cases, every agent must conduct a deep examination of one’s lifestyle, behavior, habits, psychological condition, peer pressure, facial expressions and intonation. Agent reports are attached to an agent’s Working and Personal files. When an agent is relocated to a different KGB center, the reports included in the Working file remain in the original center for 10 years, while his or her Personal file is sent to a new location, where a new Working file is created.

November 19, 1951

Soviet Politburo Decision with Approved Message from Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev requiring more clear explanation about the earlier inquiry regarding Korean situation.

November 20, 1951

Gromyko to G.M. Malenkov, attaching draft telegram to Razuvaev

Telegram from from Gromkyo to Malenkov asking for a review of a draft telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK, Razuvaev. The draft chastises Razuvaev for permitting the North Koreans to make an appeal before the UN without first consulting the Soviet Union or China.

November 21, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 26044, Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev instructing him to explain to the Chinese and Koreans the reasoning behind Vyshinsky's demand that the demarcation line be established at the 38th parallel rather than at the present front line.

February 3, 1952

Ciphered Telegram No. 709, Filippov [Stalin] to Krasovsky, for Mao Zedong

Telegram to Mao from Stalin approving of Mao's progress at the armistice talks and reminding him to have Polish and Czech included in the commission of observers.

April 14, 1952

VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Stalin to Kim Il Sung

Telegram from Stalin to Kim Il Sung asking whether the latter wants wheat flour in response to a shortage of bread in North Korea.

July 16, 1952

Ciphered Telegram No. 502597, Razuvaev to Cdes. Vasilevsky and Vyshinsky, transmitting message from Kim Il Sung to I.V. Stalin

Telegram from Kim Il Sung to Stalin stating the current situation of the armistice talks and the pressure which is being exerted upon North Korea by uninhibited American air power. He makes a request for additional anti-aircraft support from the Soviet Union and China, which he believes will lead to a more advantageous bargaining position at the negotiating table.

Pagination