The Soviet Politburo approves the Narkomtsvetmet's 1941 work plan for the Sin'tszyanolovo concession and outlines the tasks related to the concession for which the NKVD, NKO, Civil Air Fleet, Narkomtsvetmet, and the Council of Ministers are respectively responsible.

The Soviet Air Forces report on the number of aircrafts which were shot down during the Korean War and the reasons for the decline in the effectiveness of the fighters.

This document details the scope and implementation of military coordination between Polish and Soviet forces.

This document sets out plans to coordinate the air defense forces of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Coordination primarily includes, for example, the mutual exchange of information regarding detection, tracking, and actions of enemy targets.

This document details the composition of Warsaw Pact air forces.

The Soviet Ambassador Vasily Moskovsky and Kim Il Sung discuss DPRK’s border security in the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis. By pointing out North Korea’s poor air defense and coast guard capabilities, Kim Il Sung requests an increase in the Soviet military assistance. He clearly states that DPRK is in favor of a peaceful resolution of the Cuban Crisis, because according to him, the socialist camp does not need a military conflict at that time. The two also discuss the economic development of the country.

Telegram from Stalin to Kim Il Sung, congratulating him for his victories thus far and offering advise on the air force strategies.

Telegram from Mao to Stalin agreeing to Stalin's proposal to reinforce Soviet air forces and air defense in China and Manchuria.

Matveyev describes the state of the Korean People’s Army, particularly the severe status of troops in Seoul and Busan after having encountered American air and ground forces. Matveyev also reports on a meeting between several Soviet and Korean foreign ministers in which Kim Il Sung assumed the tasks of both Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister and ordered the deployment of troops northward. Matveyev also outlines the steps he plans to take as a Soviet envoy in aiding the desperate Korean army.

This document outlines the politico-military situation in advance of a 17-25 March 1975 operational command staff exercise. The exercise scenario begins with a conventional offensive initiated by the 'Westerners' at 0600 on 17 March which escalated to a theater nuclear war by 19 March. This briefing document for exercise participants describes the military situation as of the morning of 19 March, including the tactical information on the geographic disposition, activities, and status of Warsaw Pact and 'Western' forces, air defense, communications, electronic warfare, and the situation in the rear. Appendices (included as a .pdf) contain detailed information on: The order of battle of the troops of the 4th Army, The availability of nuclear warheads and surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] in the 4th Army, Information about the nuclear strikes of the "Westerners," Information about the nuclear strikes by the "Easterners" on troops and objectives in the "Westerners" rear, Information about the engineer troops of the 4th Army, Information about the chemical troops of the 4th Army, Information about the signal troops of the 4th Army, Information about the rear of the 4th Army, The order of battle and the identified numbering of the formations and units of the "Westerners."