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1974

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 07, Moscow, 1974, 195 pp.

The table of contents for volume 7 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to intelligence services of the "imperialist states" and adversaries, including the United States, West Germany, and Israel.

July 12, 1961

From the Journal of S.M. Kudryavtsev, 'Record of a Conversation with Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba Fidel Castro Ruz, 24 June 1961'

Kudryavtsev informs Fidel Castro of plans made by counterrevolutionaries with the assistance of the US intelligence community to assassinate prominent Cuban leaders. Castro argues that an assassination of Cuban leaders will not change the effects of the Cuban Revolution and could be disastrous for US relations in Latin America.

February 9, 1970

Memorandum Concerning the Intelligence Services of the US Armed Forces

Summary description of various US military intelligence services, including the Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency (NSA).

September 29, 1977

Attachement to the memorandum of conversation with Ethiopian Foreign Secretary Dawit Wolde Giorgis.

Memorandum on US Operation "Fakel" [Torch], which the United States was supposedly planning in order to destabilize the Ethiopian regime. It involved the arming of internal opposition groups with US weapons. This report was attached to the memorandum of conversation with Ethiopian Foreign Secretary Dawit Wolde Giorgis.

September 29, 1977

Memorandum of Conversation with Ethiopian Foreign Secretary Dawit Wolde Giorgis, 17 September 1977

The memorandum concerns an Operation named Torch, which the United States was supposedly planning in order to destabilize the Ethiopian regime. It involved the arming of internal opposition groups with US weapons.

June 2007

The Operational Situation as Reported in 1971, 1975, and 1981. Folder 35. The Chekist Anthology.

In folder 35 Mitrokhin discusses the KGB’s assertion of an increase in domestic dissent and unrest in the 1970s and early 1980s as well as the methods the KGB utilized to combat this threat. Soviet intelligence believed that this increase in domestic unrest was due primarily to an increased effort by the United States and its allies to promote internal instability within the USSR. In response, the KGB continued to screen foreigners, increased the harshness of penalties for distribution of anti-Soviet literature, and monitored the activities and temperament of nationalists, immigrants, church officials, and authors of unsigned literature within the Soviet Union. Mitrokhin’s note recounts the KGB’s assertion that foreign intelligence agencies were expanding their attempts to create domestic unrest within the USSR. These activities included the support and creation of dissidents within the Soviet Union, the facilitation of the theft Soviet property such as aircrafts, and the public espousal of a position against Soviet persecution of dissidents and Jews. Responding to public exposure of these activities, the KGB proclaimed its legality and trustworthiness while also beginning to assign some agents verbal assignments without written record.