That some officials in the State Department’s European Affairs bureau were convinced that Kennedy had approved a trade of the Jupiters in Turkey puzzled State Department official Seymour Weiss, who was convinced that the higher-ups has rejected a trade. In this memo, Weiss asked a colleague, Jeffrey Kitchen, to get an “accurate reading” on the matter.

During this conversation, Director Foster briefed Vice President Humphrey about the progress of the NPT. Foster said that he was willing to meet Germany’s concerns about such issues as protecting its civil nuclear industry and a future European federation. Moreover, noting that Washington had to discuss the NPT with other countries that could “otherwise go nuclear,” Foster worried that a long delay caused by consultations could “jeopardize the chance of the rest of the world getting signed up.”

Information about the recent U.S.-West German discussions had leaked to the press and in this conversation, Vorontsov “wanted to know what we had told the Germans with respect to participation in a European nuclear force.” Bunn told him that the “Germans were concerned that nothing in the treaty stand in the way of steps which might ultimately produce a United States of Europe.”

In this meeting between members of the Policy Planning Staff's board of consultants, the participants discussed their policy preferences towards European nuclear arrangements.
Recognizing “bitter” French and Soviet objections to a collective nuclear force, the consultants believed that over time it might be possible to “get both the force and the agreement.”

Statement by the Latvian Ambassador to the United States on the Soviet occupation of Latvia.

Director of the US Army’s Intelligence Division at the Pentagon, Lieutenant General Stephen J. Chamberlin, instructed American military attachés from eight European capitals to meet with one of his subordinates, Colonel Riley F. Ennis, for a conference in Frankfurt am Main in Germany on March 24 to discuss intelligence matters pertaining to Soviet activities in Germany.

Negotiation of a collective security or non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union would "arouse grave anxiety or cynical reserve" due to a number of problems.

Policy paper explaining the current status of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and the US policy of non-recognition of their incorporation into the Soviet Union.

State Department memorandum summarizing policy toward Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia following the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States.

Explanation of US policy of non-recognition of Soviet control of the Baltic states.