This document provides an in-depth analysis of Cuba's reactions to various international developments during late 1964. Cuban leaders were pleased with the radical anti-imperialist tone and diplomatic successes of the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. Fidel Castro welcomed French President de Gaulle's anti-American stance during his Latin America trip, linking it to tensions in pro-American governments. The British Labour Party's election victory was viewed positively, fostering hopes for policies aligned with Cuba's interests. Domestically, Nikita Khrushchev's ousting in the USSR created distrust and concerns about the continuity of Soviet support. Lastly, Cuba cautiously celebrated China's first nuclear test, seeing it as a potential shift in global power dynamics favoring socialism.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

Czechoslovak diplomats in Havana inform Prague of the Soviet envoy’s admission that the threat of US-sponsored counter-revolution left Castro with no other choice but to turn to Marx and Lenin and to rely on the help of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries

In a 1961 top secret report, the Soviet embassy painted a very dire situation on the island with US-backed counter-revolutionary forces gaining momentum

The Cuban communists asked the Soviets for help exposing the government's “terror” and the interference of “American imperialism” in Cuba’s affairs. The CPSU’s Central Committee agreed to support the fight of the Cuban people in the press, radio, and public organizations in the closing months of 1958.

Soviet Ambassador Moskovsky talks with the Cuban Ambassador to Pyongyang about the foreign policies of North Korea and, in particular, North Korea's position in the Sino-Soviet split.

Rodriguez met with Koucky to clarify misunderstandings which could possibly arise because the reasons were not explained for Cuba’s positions on issues of the international communist movement, and for speeches and statements of some leading Cuban comrade.

Meeting between Raul Castro, Bohumir, Lomsky, and Langer. Castro informed Lomsky that internal danger has been eliminated, and contra-revolutionary and anti-government groups operating directly in Cuba have been broken up and practically destroyed. They evaluated the strategy of the cuba's defense, revised operational plans, and carried out number of changes. They originally approached the CSSR with a plea for a shipment of 200 pieces of 30 mm double cannons. The current situation, however (especially the situation in the DRV), is forcing them to ask for 30 mm cannons again.

Memorandum of Conversation between Czechoslovak Communist Party official Vladimir Koucky and Cuban Communist Party official Carlos Rafael Rodriguez that took place in Prague.

Anastas Mikoyan awaits the results of the New York City meetings and is actively preparing for the UN Security Council meeting in this cable. While Mikoyan is waiting with anticipation, there are still signs of reservation among the Cuban people and the revolutionary government regarding the approach of the Soviet Union. Confidence in the Soviet Union as a reliable ally has waned, accompanied by a loss of prestige and trust. The doubts are marked by a belief the U.S. will not hold up its end of the agreements, Cuba's stubborn refusal of inspections, and the belief that the resolution was bought at too high a price at the expense of the Cuban revolution.

Pavlicek, through Mikoyan, relays the results of the talks with the Cubans, despite Mikoyan being tightlipped about the nature of the talks in front of the Chinese. Mikoyan made the case that Soviet actions prevented a devastating nuclear war, while the USA provoked the situation and presented the danger of a nuclear war. The Cuban revolution will remain unchanged and instead grow stronger, with the blockade lifted and a guarantee of non-aggression on the part of the USA. In exchange, the missile sites will be dismantled and removed under supervision. Mikoyan concluded it was understandable that Cubans felt confused and rattled after the crisis, as in the Soviet Union the reactions were the same.