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August 8, 1968

Note on a Conversation between the 1st Secretary in the USSR Embassy, Comrade Zvetkov, and Comrade Jarck on 7 August 1968 between 17:00 and 19:00 hours

The East German Ambassador in the DPRK summarizes South Korea's revised and strengthened military policy in the wake of North Korea's provocations in 1968.

March 4, 1968

GDR Embassy Letter to State Secretary Hegen

A wide-ranging report written by the East German Ambassador on the USS Pueblo Incident, inter-Korean relations, North Korean military and defense policies, the juche ideology, economic development in the DPRK, and North Korea's foreign relations.

December 8, 1967

Letter from Ambassador Brie of the GDR in the DPRK to Deputy MFA Hegen

East German Ambassador to North Korea Horst Brie reports on the growing number of incidents at the Demilitarized Zone between North Korean forces and South Korean and U.S. forces. Brie offers his own analysis of the military situation in Korea while highlighting the different views of officials from Czechoslovakia and Poland.

January 29, 1968

Memorandum of a Conversation with the Ambassadors of the CSSR, Comrade Holub, and of the People’s Republic of Poland, Comrade Naperei

Upon reviewing the Pueblo incident, both ambassadors conclude that the U.S. violated the Armistice Treaty. Instead of using force to retain their ship and men, the U.S. should issue an apology to the DPRK or else the Koreans will fight back.

June 18, 1975

Letter From GDR Ambassador Wenning to Bulgarian Member of the Politburo and Secretary of SED Central Committee Comrade Hermann Axen

This letter encloses a translated copy of an "Information for the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party about the Talks between Comrades Todor Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung during the Visit of the DPRK Party and Government Delegation to Bulgaria from 2 to 5 June 1975." In it is discussed both Kim Il Sung's remarks on Korean unification both officially and privately with Comrade Todor Zhivkov. Essentially in both cases Kim makes the argument that the path of military reunification is largely closed off due to the superior military presence of both South Korean and American forces, and instead discusses the details of achieving peaceful reunification by swelling up internal divisions within South Korea, forcing the withdrawal of American forces, and isolating the Park Chung Hee regime internationally.