The document records a conversation with Leon Fuerth, Vice President Gore's National Security Adviser, discussing key issues in US foreign policy around March 2000. Topics included concerns about Northern Ireland, Russia's power under Putin, and tensions in Montenegro, China. Fuerth also expressed worries about campaign issues, particularly related to Gore's foreign policy priorities and his own potential future role as National Security Adviser.

Clinton and Blair discuss Israel/Syria, Iraq, the Helsinki Summit, translatic relations, Russia, the IMF, and Northern Ireland.

Hugh Richardson reports from Lhasa on the latest developments in Tibet from June 15-July 15, 1950. The first section, dealing with India's relations with Tibet, was evidently removed from the report before it was shared with the British Government.

The Indian Mission in Lhasa reports on the Tibetan Government's attempts to engage the governments of India, the UK, and the US while it begins negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party.

An update on Tibet's relations with India, China, Nepal, the UK, and the US in early 1950. There are also comments on political and economic developments within Tibet.

The monthly report of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, Tibet, for the period December 15, 1949, through January 15, 1950.

A letter, in French, from Pak Dong Tehoun, the DPRK representative in Paris, to H. Davies, the head of the Far Eastern section of the FCO.

While geopolitical reconfigurations in the region and issues like arms control and defense posture were of key concern to British observers, American domestic events also fed into British analysis. This report describes South Korean responses to the attacks on Korean-Americans during the riots in Los Angeles in the summer of 1992

When the USSR and the USA submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty in the early autumn of 1967, British representatives were enthusiastically arguing that as a prospective member of EURATOM, any British position must axiomatically take account of European interests.  As the negotiations moved forward, though, Wilson's government found itself caught in a three-sided trap of its own devising: fearful of being labelled “bad Europeans,” anxious about being seen by Washington as “unreliable allies,” and concerned about Moscow viewing them as part of the “treacherous West.”  Balancing out these competing concerns was becoming foremost in the minds of senior ministers.

Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.